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“One either allows racial inequities to persevere, as a racist, or confronts racial inequities, as an
antiracist. There is no in-between safe space of “not racist.” The claim of “not racist” neutrality
is a mask for racism.”
― Ibram X. Kendi, How to Be an Antiracist
“Caste is insidious and therefore powerful because it is not hatred, it is not necessarily personal.
It is the worn grooves of comforting routines and unthinking expectations, patterns of a social
order that have been in place for so long that it looks like the natural order of things.”
― Isabel Wilkerson, Caste: The Origins of Our Discontents

"Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly. I can never be what I ought to be until you
are what you ought to be. This is the interrelated structure of reality."
― Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
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Abstract
This is a study about what David Theo Goldberg (2002) describes as “the racial state”: a
modern nation-state where rule and constructions of race are deeply intertwined (2002: 7). Racial
difference, he posits, is one of the easiest and most potent ways a governing body in modern
times can establish power, social order, and dominance (130). Racial projects are a robust form
of establishing state formation and legitimacy as they create two intertwined identities: a
national, racial state identity and personal identities who depend on the very racial narratives
governing bodies create. Yet, such narratives do not gain support without arduous application.
This study is also about coercion, symbolic and literal, and how governing bodies deploy
violence as to enforce racial narratives and further establish legitimate governance. As Goldberg
(2002) states, “Power is to the state and the state to power as blood is to the human body” (9).
Guided by Goldberg’s (2002) theory, I set out to explore how the racial nation-state
materializes across three distinct countries: China, Chile, and Myanmar. While highly distinct in
many aspects, governing bodies in all are persecuting an indigenous, religious, or ethnic minority
group and then are implementing racial narratives and government coercion to justify such
suppression. Executing a secondary source, comparative analysis, I have focused on four themes
I’ve made chapters—racial narratives, symbolic and real peripheries, rhetoric of terrorism, and
methods of oppression—to argue that governing bodies in each of these three countries are
coercively enforcing racial narratives as to achieve government legitimacy. I argue that type of
government affects how racial narratives and government coercion manifest as well as threat of
minority group separatism, but that ultimately, racial narratives are how governing bodies retain
authority across all three countries. I conclude by predicting that a globally racist society is
emerging in which methods of oppression and racial narratives are converging globally.
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…
Theoretical Context
i. The Formation of the Nation-State: Legitimacy Through Violence
Throughout history, the fundamental challenge of nation-states and governing bodies has
been the creation of legitimacy. How does the nation-state gain civilian support and obedience,
and justify its dominance to continue its rule? How does the state present itself as an objective
and distant force, concerned for the best interests of the people, while inevitably imposing rules,
norms, and regulations onto its polity? And how does the nation-state create unity when its
formation relies on physical and metaphorical barriers of exclusion? Balibar (1991), summarizes:
“The fundamental problem [of the nation-state] is to produce the people” (93).
In his essay, “Politics as a Vocation”, sociologist Max Weber (2004) claims that the
nation-state and their governing bodies are the only ones in society who have the authority to
execute violence legitimately. “The state is the form of human community that (successfully)
lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory,” Weber
writes (2004: 33). He explains that because only the state has legitimate authority to employ
violence, “all other organizations or individuals can assert the right to use physical violence only
insofar as the state permits them to do so” (Weber, 2004: 33). Hence, acceptable violence is both
authorized and organized by the state.
Michel Foucault (2003) then argues that the sovereign state not only can legitimately
execute violence, but that it is this violence itself which helps legitimize the nation-state and the
governing body. Disciplinary measures, he argues, help solidify the state’s sovereignty and its
creation of “discourses of truth” (23-40). Further, he continues to argue, “juridical code” and
disciplinary tactics make it possible for states to assert domination while “conceal[ing] its
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mechanisms” (37). That is, the rise of disciplinary practices in sovereign states allow for the
naturalization of the current social order, social norms, and social domination created by the
state’s governing body (38-39).
Explaining how ancient states first gained legitimacy through war, Foucault (2007) then
describes how violent conflict has shifted under the biostate as states modernized and war
became less common: a process Foucault calls “governmentalization” (109). As societies became
more modern, he argues, the disciplinary techniques and military tactics of war were shifted to
the general population, and “the horizontal relationship with other nations” were replaced with
“the vertical relationship between the nation and state, or, more generally, between the state and
whatever it is that defines the society whose security the sovereign state is concerned with”
(Spieker, 2011: 190). The focus of the state and the application of discipline, that is, in modern
societies changes from an external enemy to an enemy within.
To discipline societies and achieve order within, Foucault particularly emphasizes the
importance of security. Security is a “dispositif”, he writes: a mechanism or structure that
enhances and maintains the power of the state (2007: 6). Combined with the power of law,
Foucault argues that security is the mechanism which connects the biostate’s triangle of
“sovereignty, discipline, and government” without arousing suspicion as to the state’s legitimacy
(Foucault, 2007: 107). In other words, security is the hidden force validating the state’s use of
disciplinary power, which, again, is key to legitimizing the state’s sovereignty and rule. “Why is
power so readily accepted?” Tadros (1998) asks. Foucault asserts that it is security’s hidden and
powerful forces which both conceals and enforces the biostate’s triangle of domination (Tadros,
1998: 102).
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Yet, while security is important for state domination, so is fearmongering; the creation of
“moral panic” and “folk devils'' which both necessitates and legitimizes state intervention (Adler
and Adler, 2016: 153-154). English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, argues that it is fear that
makes citizens obedient to the state and is the most important force for ensuring the nationstate’s unchallenged rule over civil society (Spieker, 2011: 195). Even in liberal societies, Evans
(2010) explains, creating fear is key to legitimizing state rule (421). “In proclaiming peace,”
Evans writes, “Liberals are still committing themselves to making war” (421). Once again, in
creating feelings of insecurity, precarity, and fear, the state can posit itself as the legitimate
protector of the citizen body. That is, in creating widespread panic and moral anxiety of an
internal problem or enemy--in socially constructing problems that then, must be suppressed
through discipline or violence--, the state further enforces its legitimacy (Adler and Adler, 2016).
A cycle of fearmongering, problem creating, and security and discipline enforcing hence
becomes the core of state sovereignty.
ii. Race as the Enemy Within
But how does the nation-state create fear of an internal problem or enemy? How do
whole groups of people become labeled the “problem” or the “deviants” in society? Under what
characteristics does the state separate “good” civilians, from the “evil,” manipulative, and
dangerous “other”?
While the idea of caste has routinely evoked reflections on India’s historical racial and
social hierarchy, author Isabel Wilkerson (2020) argues that a racial caste system is present in
many other countries, such as the United States. Caste, she argues, “Is an artificial construction, a
fixed and embedded ranking of human value that sets the presumed supremacy of one group
against the presumed inferiority of other groups on the basis of ancestry and often immutable
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traits” (17). She concludes, caste relies on “rigid, often arbitrary boundaries to keep the ranked
groupings apart”; a dependence on the stigmatization and dehumanization of an artificially
constructed “other,” which is often formulated on the basis of race (17).
In his book, How to Be an Anti-Racist, Kendi (2019) articulates how “race is a mirage”
(37). Race is a false construction, he explains, which is “standardized, normalized, and
legalized,” through state institutions (38). Although artificially created and utterly illogical-grouping diverse groups into monolithic categories to elide differences--Kendi (2019) argues that
race and racism still have concrete consequences for both racial minority and majority groups.
Race has become so personalized, Kendi (2019) exposes, that people across societies have
incorporated its falsities into their identities, becoming blind to the state policy lurking behind its
creation and maintenance. “Racism is not a normal or inherent human condition,” he writes
(123). Yet, nonetheless, race and racism have become inherent conditions of personal and
national identity across the globe, all the while, hiding the state’s manipulative fabrications of
such narratives.
Returning to Weberian tradition, social order and social cohesion are once more built
upon social exclusion and boundary making (Stone and Rizova, 2014). Contributing to
sociological conflict theory, Weber argues that “boundary and group markers” and “social
closure” are constructed by the more powerful to maintain control over the less powerful (Stone
and Rizova, 2014: 17). Race provides a powerful mechanism in forming boundary markers--or in
further stigmatizing boundary markers already there such as differences in religion or ethnicities-and in creating status groups for societal and personal identity. Subsequently, the citizen body of
higher racial status groups normally buys into these racial boundary markers as real or
legitimate. The state’s creation of these boundaries remains hidden, and its governing body then
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gains legitimacy when they publicly protect these boundaries. “The ultimate type of control,”
novelist George Orwell explains, “Is to persuade people that their interests and those of their
rulers are one in the same” (Stone and Rizova, 2014: 13). Race allows the state to garner the
steady support of its racial majority polity while again, obscuring its own conniving strategies of
state building and sovereignty.
President Lyndon B. Johnson once stated, “If you can convince the lowest white boy that
he is better than the best colored man, he won’t notice you’re picking his pockets” (Bottoms,
2019: 16). Tied back to power and state domination, if you convince the lowest white boy that he
is better than the best colored man, he won’t notice that the nation-state is imposing social
control and regulations that often work against the polity’s best interests.
Yet, to return to Wilkerson (2020), racial caste systems have been accepted into personal
and national identities worldwide and are key to nation-state formation and internal enemy
building. Defining the term “scapegoats” --people who are blamed for the misfortunes and
setbacks of the nation and the citizen body--Wilkerson explains that racial minorities have
consistently been accepted as necessary targets of state repression by the unsuspecting and
uncritical polity (142). Racial minorities and the lower caste, that is, have been blamed and
ostracized for national shortcomings in order to divert “society’s attention from its structural ills
and…collective misfortunes” (191). Scapegoating hence leads to the dehumanization and
distancing of whole groups of individuals whom the racial majority view as inferior, dangerous,
or unworthy in society and meanwhile, the state, the governing body, and its policies remain
hidden in obscurity (199).
Racial scapegoating and the creation of a racialized “enemy” is thus a powerful force in
shaping state legitimacy: through the creation of a racialized internal enemy, nation-states can
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assert their power and drive wedges between proletariat groups who would otherwise have
similar interests; they can control who lays within and outside of symbolic racial boundary
markers—garnering the support of the racial majority by positioning them in a higher status
group than another racialized subsection of the population--and can naturalize social order which
ultimately, continues to position their governing bodies on top.
iii. Government Coercion as Means for Modern State Legitimacy
In the twentieth century, sociologist Pierre Bourdieu coined the term, “symbolic
violence,” to describe the hidden and non-physical types of control implemented by the state to
maintain its dominance (Murphy and Choi, 1997: 103-110). “Portrayed to be the rational
management of behavior rather than the imposition of norms,” Bourdieu explains how symbolic
violence is masked by the state as the official, the universal, and the standard (Murphy and Choi,
1997: 103). Symbolic violence, that is, is how the state remains seemingly neutral, while
simultaneously concealing its physically and metaphorically violent means of control. Murphy
and Choi (1997) conclude, “power is thus omnipresent...everything is not successfully
controlled, but control comes from everywhere” (109).
Drawing back to Weberian and Foucauldian ideas, ever since the modernization or what
Weber calls the rationalization of the state, modern governing bodies have had to revert to more
symbolic and covert forms of violence to maintain domination. This has led to greater
dehumanization of individuals, and a more ubiquitous and powerful presence of state control
throughout societies. Weber (2004), writes, “Rationalization tends to promote situations where
business is discharged according to calculable rules and without regard for ‘persons’” (Weber,
2004: Introduction lv). He continues to explain that herrschaft, what Weber calls the domination
of a rationalized and bureaucratic state, is presented as if it were autonomous or sui generis to
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society which “effaces or disguises the fact that there is ruling going on at all” (Weber, 2004:
Introduction lii). Hence, as the modern state develops, the more dehumanized individuals
become, while at the same time, the more concealed herrschaft operates.
Similarly, Foucault (2007) argues that as nation-states developed, new technologies and
apparatuses for the enforcement of state violence (symbolic and real) and discipline emerged.
Echoing Weberian ideas of rationalization, new security apparatuses of state control became
contingent on their passing as the natural order of things (11-23). Particularly, Foucault (2007)
argues that police in countries have transformed to become “urban projects” and “the permanent
coup d’état” to control the activity of the citizen body and to enforce discipline throughout
society (322-357). “The right of police and the right of justice have nothing in common,”
Foucault (2007) argues, rather, police are potent for the monitoring of peoples and their
enforcement of laws and regulations throughout society--their enforcement of social norms and
social domination (339). Once more, as nation-states became more modern, its symbolic and
concrete forms of violence became cloaked, yet, omnipresent throughout society in new security
and disciplinary mechanisms such as the police.
Yet, while police may be a new form of security and a new mechanism for what Foucault
calls the “great diplomatic-military apparatus (dispositif) that has hardly changed since the
eighteenth century,” the question still arises as to how modern states and police enforce violence
and coercion in liberal and “post racial” societies (2007: 354)? In their book, Postmodernism,
Unraveling Racism, and Democratic Institutions, for example, authors Murphy and Choi (1997),
contemplate the inherent contradiction as to how democratic nation-states, founded upon ideals
of equality and liberty, could nonetheless execute violent measures against internal, racialized
groups to gain legitimacy. How do nation-states deal with discrepancies of control and racial
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repression while still maintaining an aura of legality? Extraordinary means, they conclude, are
necessary to confront such extraordinary cognitive dissonance (53). Specifically, they write, the
creation of a “sound rationale” for racial oppression becomes necessary (53).
This is where government coercion and racial narratives overlap: taken collectively, if the
nation-state is once again legitimized through violence or discipline, and if the modern state is
now more rationalized and bureaucratized that it needs an enemy within, rather than an enemy
outside its borders to authorize government dominance and state sovereignty, government
coercion that is both justified by racial narratives and further reinforces these racial narratives
work to achieve modern government legitimacy. Government coercion such as police or
detention camps as will be discussed later in this study, help to enforce racial narratives in
nations which subsequently, ensure citizen support and government authority; because racial
majority citizens have again absorbed racial narratives so intimately into their entities as to
uphold their own status or supremacy in society, government coercion that acts on and reinforces
racial narratives throughout societies brings legitimacy to governing bodies. Meanwhile, a
governing body’s control and imposition of norms and ideologies remain hidden, and they
maintain dominance over everybody. In this sense, government coercion is the carriers of racism
working violently—either symbolically or overtly--to uphold a governing body’s authority and
its racial nation-state positioning it at the top of society.
…
The Study
i.

The Problem
Guided by Weberian and Foucauldian ideas regarding state violence and legitimacy and

inspired by ideas of racial castes and racist scapegoating, I set out to investigate how governing
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bodies use government coercion to create and sustain racial narratives which then uphold their
own dominance. Particularly motivated by recent violent governmental action against racial
minorities globally, such as the recent police murder of George Floyd in the United States, I set
out to investigate how governing forces create, control, and violently repress racialized others
through coercive forces as to establish governing body authority. My goal was to explore how
governments remain hidden actors behind racial hierarchies, and how the intersection between
government coercion and racial narratives ultimately creates divisions in the citizen body which
leads to the racial majority’s support of government rule across society. Particularly guided by
ideas of peripheries (physical and metaphorical), rhetoric of terrorism, and methods of
oppression, I sought to explore such ponderings applied to three unique countries: Chile, China,
and Myanmar. Because governing forces in these three countries all deploy coercive government
action such as specialized police operations found in Chile and subversive “re-education” camps
found in China, I sought to compare these countries to analyze the ways in which various
governments similarly and uniquely use government coercion and racial narratives to legitimize
their rule; I set out to explore how racial narratives and government coercion intersected
uniquely in these three countries as to help governing bodies in each establish their authority.
Specifically, I sought to discover how government coercion and methods of racial
framing change under the various circumstances of each country’s government structure and
rule. I sought to answer, how does Myanmar’s authoritative government, China’s communist
authority, and Chile’s democracy shape how government coercion materialize and how various
governments execute violence for legitimacy? I hypothesized that an authoritarian government
would lead to harsher methods of oppression of racialized others than in a communist and
democratic country. But I also speculated that while racial narratives would be unique to each
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country, that similarities in how whole segments of a country’s population were ostracized and
made a racialized other would parallel each other across these three societies in a global
apparatus of racism I predict is emerging.
Ruth Benedict once stated that “we must know as much about the eye that sees as about
the object seen” (Jacobson, 2003: 10). As I set out to conduct this study, I was more interested in
studying the ways in which governing bodies in Chile, China, and Myanmar see possibility for
power and legitimacy through racial narratives and government coercion. That is, I approached
this study less interested in the false notions of racial differences of the polity (the object seen),
and more focused on the state’s active and continuous constructing of racial and social hierarchy
through the use of government coercion (the eye that sees). Then, I was interested in how these
governments and their racial narratives and government coercion that enforce such narratives
affect the way the eye sees racial caste throughout the rest of society.
ii. Choosing the Three Countries and Race as the Status Marker, Not Indigenous Status,
Ethnicity, or Religion
China, Chile and Myanmar were strategically chosen on the basis of their common use of
government coercion to suppress a racialized subsection of their population. Although different
in their historical means for nation-building, means of oppression, global flows of people, and
other factors, governing forces in each of these three nation-states create racial narratives to
achieve their own domination in society. They then use various forms of coercion to sustain and
enforce these racial narratives to once again, achieve state legitimacy. All three of these countries
ultimately engage in what Goldberg (2002) calls the modern building of the racial state which
needs to be reaffirmed daily. Drawing on anti-black or anti-dark racism and creating what
Emirbayer and Desmond call “racial fields” for racial identity, solidarity, and unequal
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distributions of capital, each of these three countries have racially ostracized a subsection of their
populations to create national and group identities.
Yet, on the surface, none of these countries look like they are discriminating and
repressing the racialized or minority groups at focus in this thesis (the Mapuche in Chile, the
Uyghurs in China, and the Rohingya in Myanmar as will be described shortly) explicitly based
on race. For instance, in Chile, the racialized group at interest in this study is the Mapuche,
Chile’s largest indigenous group (Richards, 2013).1 As will be shortly described, at first glance,
it may seem like the Mapuche are being repressed and othered by the Chilean government
because of their indigenous status and the fact that they are still advocating for the possession of
their ancestral lands and their independence from the Chilean nation-state. While this is true-while their indigenous identity does have a large part to do with why the Chilean government is
suppressing them--as I began my research, it became clear that they are also stigmatized along
another status marker: race.
As will be explored in the race chapter of this thesis, although the Chilean government
promotes the idea of a multicultural nation—in which the Mapuche and other indigenous groups
are said to be harmoniously incorporated into the nation2-- the Mapuche have historically been
described as “barbarous,” “uncivilized,” and even “a wild horde” by the Chilean government and
Chilean racial majority; terms that have always been associated with their innate inferiority to
justify their domination by the Chilean government and the annexation of their territories

1

As of 2020, the Mapuche comprise 84% of Chile’s indigenous population or about 1.3 million people (“Mapuche”,
2020).
2
For instance, in his first State of the Nation Address in 2010, current president, Sebastián Piñera stated, “Our
original peoples are an integral part of Chile” (Richards, 2013: 10). All the while, he supported transnational timber
companies and private interests destroying Mapuche land, as well as specialized police operations tracking and
suppressing Mapuche movements, and the application of anti-terrorism laws to incarcerate them in prisons across
the country as will be discussed throughout the rest of this study.
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(Richards, 2013: 38). Further, racist rhetoric of the Mapuche’s racial difference continues today
and is harbored by many Chilean citizens like Chilean interviewees in Richards (2013) study
who stated that the Mapuche didn’t deserve a right to their land because they “were corrupt and
lacked a work ethic” (136). The Mapuche’s difference was again tied to their biological
inferiority, a sign of racial demarcation and racism (Kendi, 2019). Richards (2013) concludes:
It may seem strange to use words like ‘race’ and ‘racism’ in describing indigenous
peoples who perhaps more often are conceptualized in terms of ethnicity. ‘Ethnicity’
refers to the social meanings associated with cultural difference. Ethnic identities are
often tied to the concept of place—being ‘from’ somewhere in particular (Wade 1997).
However, as Peter Wade has pointed out, understandings of indigeneity also contain
elements of race. Race can be defined as the social meanings, conflicts, and interests
attached to particular differences in phenotype—the range of human bodies’ observable
characteristics (Omi and Winant 1994). In fact, there is a great deal of overlap between
social understandings of race and ethnicity. For example, the cultural and the phenotypic
are often mutually implicated in popular understandings of where purportedly racial and
ethnic attributes come from; both are treated as inheritable traits built into our genetic
makeup, such that we can speak of cultural racism as well as racism based on skin color
and other physical attributes (15).
Using these thoughts and while acknowledging the Mapuche’s distinct indigenous identity, this
study is focusing on the Mapuche’s stigmatization and oppression as a racialized other and how
they have been central to what Richards (2013) describes as the “ongoing racial project going on
in Chile” (18).
Similarly, but in a different form, at first glance, the repression of racialized groups in
China and Myanmar also appears to be based not on race, but rather, religion. The Uyghurs in
China, and the Rohingya in Myanmar, are both Islamic minority groups who exist in an atheist
nation-state (China) or a predominantly Buddhist nation-state (Myanmar). As such, both groups
are highly repressed based on a common Islamophobia present throughout both countries and as
seen in the way both of these group’s religious practices and expressions have been targeted and
repressed by their governments as will be described shortly. Yet, as will also soon be explored,
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in my research, it became clear that religion wasn’t the only difference causing their
ostracization in society. For instance, in their book, The Rohingya in South Asia: People without
a State, authors Chaudhury and Raṇabīra (2018) reveal that since the Citizenship Act of 1982,
that the Rohingya have not been enumerated as one of the 135 national races of Myanmar, and
thus cannot claim citizenship to the country (11). As will be explored in the race chapter of this
study, Buddhist national identity has been implemented since independence from Britain in
1948, and military regimes and democratic governments since this time have worked to position
Rohingya as an innately different and inferior group who are worthy of being a stateless and
excluded population (Chaudhury and Raṇabīra, 2018). Racial narratives of Rohingya difference,
like in Chile, continued into modern day with Buddhist citizens and officials believing fervently
in racial narratives of the Rohingya as distinct. One Burmese diplomat in 2009, for instance,
even stated publicly that the Rohingya were “ugly as ogres” and did not share the “fair and soft
skin” of the Buddhist citizen body (Ibrahim, 2016: 4).3 In his book, Myanmar’s Enemy Within,
Francis Wade (2017) ultimately argues that Buddhist and Islam are religions, but that they are
often conflated with and described with race—with immutable traits--by government officials
and citizens who continue to see religious differences in the innate, the physical, and the
biologically different or inferior.4

3

Chaudhury and Raṇabīra (2018) further reveal that in this same official message, the consulate stated that “in
reality, Rohingya are neither ‘Myanmar people,’ nor Myanmar’s ethnic group…their complexion is ‘dark brown’”
(13). This shows the conflation of race, religion, and ethnicity in one statement (as he was calling Myanmar’s
majority Buddhist group, an “ethnic group”).
4
For instance, in an interview Wade (2017) conducted with a Buddhist man a part of a Buddhist extremist
organization called Ma Ba Tha in Myanmar, the Buddhist interviewee stated, “Even now, you can see kufi caps
everywhere. It can’t be good at all. This country was founded with the Buddhist ideology. And if the Buddhist
cultures vanish, Yangon will become like Saudi and Mecca. Then, there wouldn’t be the influence of peace and
truth. There will be more discrimination and violence...It can be the fall of Yangon. It can also be the fall of
Buddhism. And our race will be eliminated” (5). Here, Buddhism as a religion is explicitly being described as
Buddhism as a race. Another interview with a Rakhine Buddhist man named Ko Myat: “If I don’t protect my race
then it will disappear” (12). Lastly and furthermore, during Ne Win’s military regime, Wade (2017) reveals that the
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In China, it also seems like the Uyghurs are being persecuted solely based on their
religious differences as they practice Islam in a predominately atheist state (Bovingdon, 2010).
The governing force in China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is “largely committed to
atheism” and although the Constitution of 1982 guarantees the “protection of lawful and...
religious beliefs and activities,” the Uyghurs are often repressed for their Islamic religious
expressions and practices (Hillman and Tuttle, 47). Yet, like Myanmar and Chile, this oppression
also ties back to race. As will be discussed in the race section of this thesis, the CCP has focused
its nation-state strategies on promoting the idea of one unified Chinese nation, composed of one
racial stock: zhonghua minzu (Bovingdon, 2010: 16). Recognizing 56 ethnic groups, or what is
known as minzus, the CCP claims that China is multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and
multi-racial (Bovingdon, 2010: 16). Yet, in reality, the CCP is pushing racist assimilationist
strategies to achieve a homogeneous Han Chinese national identity (the majority ethnic group in
China). Through government propaganda and “re-education” camps that will be discussed
shortly in this thesis, the CCP is ultimately trying to elide racial, ethnic, and religious differences
(especially in the Uyghurs) under a Han Chinese identity deemed “superior” in society.
Although, once again, race, ethnicity, and religion merge in China and compound the Uyghurs’
oppression (as will be discussed shortly), it remains clear that racial ideas have shaped the CCP’s
nation-state building goals, and partially account for why the Uyghurs have been a target of
assimilation and repression.

Ministry of Immigration promoted the slogan: “The Earth will not swallow a race to extinction but another race
will” (32). Clearly, Buddhism is also seen as a race in some circumstances in Myanmar.
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In her article, “The House We Live In: Religio-Racial Theories and the Study of
Religion”, scholar Judith Weisenfeld (2020) argues that race and religion are constantly
intertwined. Coining the term “religio-racial domination,” she argues that the “study
of...religions is not only incomplete but damaged if it does not center race as a (perhaps the ?)
formative structure” (446). The study of religion, she continues to argue, needs to “attend to the
kinds of questions about difference and power”, and thus, needs to include race (456).
“Religion,” is ultimately “unknowable without tracking the religious and racialized contours of
power” (448). Applied to this study, while religion again plays a dominant role in the Uyghurs
and Rohingya’s persecution, these two countries, China and Myanmar, were chosen in addition
to Chile to explore how race and racial nation-state building can lead to the exact religio-racial
domination that Weisenfeld (2020) advocates studying.
Thus, and as described previously, the persecution of all racialized groups in this study—
the Mapuche, the Rohingya, and the Uyghurs—are all compounded by other competing minority
statuses like religion, ethnicity, and indigenous identity that will be described throughout this
study. Yet, these three countries were all chosen because of the way that the stigmatization and
persecution of these groups also goes back to race. It is in the complexity of minority statuses
and labels of difference that governing forces in each of these countries can use race to solidify
social hierarchy and create monolithic groups designated as uniformly different, inferior, and
dangerous. While it would be easy to dismiss the way that race plays a role in the persecution of
each group, I specifically chose these three countries—where the role of race in the oppression of
groups is again often hidden—to explore exactly how race and racism is so often denied based
on ethnicity, religion, or other statuses that frequently focus on difference within minority groups
instead of looking at how those in power create minority groups.
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Race, I believe, is hence the best avenue or status maker in this study to explore how
governing bodies create what Weisenfeld (2020) argues is the racialized nature of power and
how they achieve what Kendi (2019) describes as the creation of “hierarchies of value” (62).
And it is exactly in the complexity of Chilean, Chinese, and Burmese racial narratives—
narratives that again overlap with other minority statuses that can often obscure the role of race
in why these groups are persecuted--that I chose these three countries. For, ultimately, as Kendi
(2019) argues when discussing why the exclusion and repression of groups can’t merely be
described as ethnicity, “The fact is, all ethnic groups, once they fall under the gaze and power of
race makers, become racialized” (62). The same can be said for religious and indigenous
minorities who have all been placed under the gaze of race makers in these three countries for
the solidification of government power and authority.
iii. Research Methods
To conduct this study, secondary data was collected from books and articles mostly from
the University of Vermont’s online and physical resource collections, to cross compare racial
narratives, governing bodies, and coercive rule in the three chosen countries. Focusing on
sociological, political science, and critical race theories of nation-state building, the formation of
race, and the legitimization of violence, I first gathered knowledge as to how nation-states
establish rule and authority by building racial caste systems and hierarchies. I then delved into
the historical and racial contexts of each of these four countries, and their current situations of
government rule, government coercion, and the racial stigmatization of minority groups. I spent a
total of three months (November 2020 to January 2021) compiling a plethora of resources and
establishing an extensive data set of quotes, statistics, personal and societal narratives, and
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analytical observations to become enough of an expert for the thorough comparison of each
nation-state.
Although I could have kept reading and compiling resources indefinitely, I eventually
reached a point where I had to decide to start coding, comparing, and eventually, writing. Come
the end of January, certain related themes between each of the countries began to emerge from
the voluminous sets of data I had compiled. The thematic categories of race, capitalism,
citizenship, global flows of individuals, metaphorical and symbolic peripheries, types of
government, means of oppression, terrorism, and the rhetoric of “war” became present as I
systematically coded my data from each country. Not having sufficient time to cross compare
along all of these factors, I narrowed my variables to race, symbolic and metaphorical
peripheries, terrorism, and means of oppression which I believed incorporated all of these other
variables within, and which I thought would provide the most unique and comprehensive lens for
studying racial formation and state building through government coercion in the three chosen
countries.
Cross comparing along these variables, I then looked for how Chile, China, and Myanmar
mirrored each other across these categories, and then, how they differed. Particularly, I began
looking for the “exception” across these categories--the one country that didn’t comply with the
norm the other countries all presented within a thematic category--in order to then build
grounded theory as to what affects the materialization of government coercion, racial narratives,
and the repression of the racialized other in each country. For instance, in my methods of
oppression section, I found that Myanmar’s governing and coercive force, the military or also
called the Tatmadaw, used the most violent and overt mechanisms of suppressing their racialized
other (genocide), which was not present across the two other countries in this study. This
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variance allowed me to build theory that some nation-states have the ability to legitimately
conduct blatant violence against their racialized others, while others have to use more subversive
means—a difference I ultimately predict draws to the type of government present in each country
as will be discussed later in this study. Cross comparing the three countries across the other
thematic categories allowed me to further build theory as to what influences racial nation-state
building strategies and governing forces’ creation, protection, and propagation of racial
narratives across various societies.
…
Findings and Analysis
Chapter One

The Racial State and Identity: Race and Racial Narratives for Nation-State
Dominance and Legitimacy
Returning to Goldberg (2002), race is key for modern states and governing bodies to
establish legitimacy and authority. Because the modern state establishes race through a series of
racial exclusions, Goldberg argues that those with privileged racial identities across societies
internalize racial exclusions into their social and cultural imagining, as well as their physical
bodies (9). Individuals come to believe that race is an essential aspect of their entities, which
allows for the modern, racial state to create what Goldberg calls “racial projects:” constructions
or narratives of race which racial majority groups readily accept and believe are a natural
reflection of reality (9). Racial projects then bring government legitimacy when governing
bodies work to uphold such narratives and work to coercively reaffirm national and personal
(racial majority) identities.
In The Racial Order, Mustafa Emirbayer and Matthew Desmond (2015) similarly argue
that social and state relations produce “racial fields:” “structured spaces of [racial] positions” that
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are constructed based on differing degrees of racial and social capital (85-88). Varying amounts
of resources, assets, and capital (both symbolic and material) contribute to unequal distributions
of power and privileges across racial fields and aligned with Goldberg’s analysis, racial fields are
also defined by collective emotions and identity (85-88; 117). Like Durkheim’s idea of collective
consciousness--the set of shared beliefs or ideas present in a society which create a sense of
solidarity (Giddens, 1972) --Emirbayer and Desmond assert that individual actors in racial fields
experience a similar feeling of communal and mutual belonging (122). Shared racial fields lead
whole groups of people to distrust individuals outside of their group, in turn, reinforcing their
racially constructed, emotionally charged, and socially united identities (117-126). Racial
boundaries and racial narratives must continually be constructed by the state and readily
accepted by society for state stability and legitimacy (176).
Applied to China, Chile and Myanmar, this section looks at how these three countries
have historically and contemporarily built their racial states and their racial fields: their racial
nation-state identities. While each nation-state oppresses distinct racial minority groups--the
Uyghurs in China, the Mapuche in Chile, and the Rohingya in Myanmar—governing bodies in
each of these three countries have physically and symbolically isolated and oppressed its racial
minority population based on a notion of biological difference. These three countries have each
created distinct racial fields and a narrative of the racialized “other'' and in doing so, they have
brought what Goldberg (2002) describes as symbolic and concrete authority to the nation-state;
the racial narratives in Chile, China, and Myanmar have brought a solidification of national
identity and nation-state legitimacy to the governments of each country.
This section looks specifically at the constructed racial narratives of each of these three
countries—Chile, China, and Myanmar--and how they help each nation-state build its national
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identity and dominance in society. Although racial narratives in each of these three countries—
arbitrary meanings derived from phenotype—vary as do the historical contexts in which each
operates, this section argues that racial narratives are vital to the formation and dominance of
each country’s governing forces and rule. In revealing so, and in asserting that race is again,
neither rational nor natural, I ultimately assert that the conditions are created in which coercive
forces in each country become necessitated; I assert that such precarious and complex racial
narratives, such maintenance of nation-states entirely, demand stringent defense and constant
fortification in each country which is ultimately where government coercion and their violent
oppression of racialized others emerge, as will then be discussed throughout the rest of the study.
Racial Projects in Chile: The “Innate” Differences of the Mapuche for Chilean State
Rule, Chilean Identity, and the Dominance of Neoliberal Policies Across Chile
Although the Mapuche population in Chile is an indigenous and native group, they are
also distinctly seen, separated, and persecuted as a racial “other” by the Chilean nation-state and
the non-indigenous, Chilean majority population. As a whole, the Mapuche have a darker skin
color than the Chilean majority polity, especially the Chilean elite and political class (see
appendices 1 through 4). Their darker skin has been tied to objectionable group characteristics
and concepts of inferiority to justify exploitation and state persecution. The social construction of
the Mapuche as a racially distinct group can be traced back to a history of colonization and the
post-colonial challenges of creating a unified Chilean nation-state following the end of Spanish
rule at the beginning of the 19th century (Kowalczyk, 2013). Yet, the construction of the
Mapuche as a racialized “other” continues today as a modern project essential for the Chilean
government’s domination, Chilean identity, and the success of transnational corporations who
operate in their homelands.
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As just mentioned, the social construction of the Mapuche as separate and inferior can be
traced back to the history of Spanish colonization and events preceding and following the
imperial conquest of Chile. Starting in the 16th century when Spanish imperialists began
conquering and establishing empires in Latin America, the Mapuche were surprisingly able to
maintain independence (Kowalczyk, 2013). Unlike most other indigenous groups throughout
South America, the Mapuche successfully resisted Spanish rule and created a harmonious
relationship with the Spanish in which their sovereignty was recognized by Spanish rulers
(Kowalczyk, 2013). The Mapuche and the Spaniards had such an amicable relationship, that the
Mapuche even sided with Spain when the Chilean racial majority proclaimed independence in
1810 (Kowalczyk, 2013: 125). In the wars that resulted between Spain and the Chilean majority
after Chilean independence was declared (called the Wars of Independence), the Mapuche aided
the Spaniards in an attempt to maintain Spanish rule, and hence, Mapuche sovereignty in Chile
(Kowalczyk, 2013: 125). Their efforts were unsuccessful, however, as the Chilean majority came
out victorious and an independent Chilean nation-state was established in 1810 (Kowalczyk,
2013: 125). Subsequently, the Mapuche lost its Spanish allies who allowed for their autonomy in
Chile (Kowalczyk, 2013: 125).
Following Chilean independence, established more formally in 1818 when the Wars of
Independence ceased and a new government under General Bernardo O’Higgins took charge
(“Struggle for Independence”), the newly sovereign Chilean state and governing leaders
attempted to unite and homogenize its population as to solidify their power and dominance
across society (Kowalczyk, 2013: 125). Especially motivated by the economic prospects of the
Mapuche’s land (that they were again able to retain during Spanish rule), as well as a desire to
suppress any identities or movements separate from their newly growing Chilean national
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identity, the new Chilean state and its governing body sought to assimilate the Mapuche and
force their integration into the new nation-state (Kowalczyk, 2013: 125). In what is called the
“Pacification of the Arauncanía,” 5 Mapuche children were forced into the Chilean education
system, adults into the military, and all were subjected to evangelical missions because the
Mapuche worshipped their own deities and possessed their own religious beliefs and had to be
made Christians and Catholics to better fit in with the Chilean racial majority (Kowalczyk, 2013:
125; Course, 2011). Importantly, the Mapuche were also stripped of large portions of their land,
and were forced into reservations called reducciones (Kowalczyk, 2013: 125). Richards (2013),
for instance, reveals that in 1866, the newly formed Chilean state and government declared
themselves owners of Arauncanía and started capturing Mapuche land, stealing their animals,
destroying their crops, and selling their territory to newly arriving European immigrants or
Chilean owners of large estates (39). Camps, Richards (2013) reveals, or reducciones, were then
created to contain the Mapuche displaced by these efforts and to segregate them to certain areas
of the state (40). Course (2011) emphasizes that “between 1884 and 1929, a total of 3,078 land
titles [in the reservations] were issued to the Mapuches, incorporating 475,422 hectares and
77,841 people” (12). Yet, he continues to explain, “Before this, the Mapuches owned
approximately ten million hectares” (Course, 2011:12). As land was taken from the Mapuche, so
too was their sovereignty.6

5

The Araucanía is a region in the south of Chile where the Mapuche have historically lived and where they claim
their ancestral lands (Appendix 16). The Pacification of the Arauncanía is also known as the War of Extermination
or War of Occupation and was when the Chilean state annexed the Mapuche into their territory and no longer
allowed the Mapuche to live sovereignly like the Spanish had allowed them to do (Richards, 2013). Although
Richards (2013) reveals that the War of Pacification is taught in schools as “a victory of civilization over barbarity,”
and that schoolbooks teach that the Arauncanía was unoccupied to begin with, the War of Pacification was clearly
an effort to conquest the Mapuche as to better build the new Chilean nation-state and its hegemony (41-50).
6
It is important to note that not all Mapuches were designated land after the War of Pacification: Richards (2013)
reveals that “at least 30,000 [(Mapuche)] were left with nothing” (40). Further, those who were granted land in the
reservations (reducciones) would lose more and more land in subsequent years as the original 3,000+ reservations
would be converted into private land under dictator Augusto Pinochet and other subsequent leaders (Course, 2011:
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Similar to the colonization that the Chilean majority faced under the Spaniards, the
Mapuche were now the ones being colonized, and racist ideas of their physical and innate
inferiority emerged to justify their domination (Richards, 2013). Racist narratives and discourses
commenced as the Mapuche were portrayed as “barbarous,” “uncivilized,” and even “a wild
horde” (Richards, 2013: 38).7 Their uncivilized state (uneducated and pagan) justified their
subordination. Furthermore, the Mapuche were portrayed as dangerous; as “enemies” of the
Chilean nation (Richards, 2013: 38). Not only did the Mapuche’s previous sovereignty over their
lands threaten the territorial integration of the newly formed Chilean state, but their group
identity also symbolically threatened the state. What message would other Chileans receive if a
group existed outside of Chilean laws, culture, and rule? Would the civil obedience of the
population and the political validity of the state be questioned? As mentioned before, the Chilean
state hence commenced a “War of Pacification”, and as a result, thousands of Mapuche were
dispossessed of their homes and suffered from starvation and disease (Richards, 2013: 29). The
theft of Mapuche land by the Chilean state would continue to the present, as would these racist
narratives to justify the appropriation of their territory.
For example, under dictator Augusto Pinochet’s regime in the 1980s, racist discourse and
racial narratives flourished as Chilean elites and timber companies jointly became interested in
the economic potential of the little land the Mapuche had left (Richards, 2013: 2).8 Located in
Araucanía, a resource rich region in the south of Chile with large lumber potential (Appendix
13). Today, only a small amount of land in the reservations or reducciones remain for the Mapuche (Course, 2011:
13). Course (2011) concludes with the interesting point that the reservations were and are the only way the Mapuche
could retain their land, and yet even these serve as a form of “legal discrimination” and are consistently violated by
the Chilean state (13).
7
Richards (2013) notes that one editorial, in El Mercurio de Valparaíso, stated that the Mapuche “are nothing more
than a wild horde, whom it is urgent to chain or destroy in the interest of humanity and for the good of society” (38).
8
The little land the Mapuche have left is again the land that the state previously granted them in reservations called
the reducciones (Kowalczyk, 2013: 125). Much of this land in the reservations has been taken and privatized by the
Chilean state in recent years, leaving the Mapuche with a very small amount of land left (Course, 2011: 12-13).
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16), the land of the Mapuche started to be seen as a lucrative area in which private interests could
dominate and large companies could earn immense profit from the extraction of resources and
timber (Richards, 2013). Specifically ushered by the start of neoliberal policies established by
Pinochet—neoliberal in the fact that a free market, little governmental regulation of companies,
and privatization became the dominating economic and political ideology—and influenced by
the United States and a group of Chilean economists called the Chicago Boys,9 once previously
socialized policies under proceeding president Salvador Allende were replaced by laws favoring
corporate interest, individual businesses, and little governmental oversight (Drake and Jaksic,
1995: 57-76). New governmental and economic policies now continued the tradition of usurping
Mapuche land and favoring corporations and individual businesses over the Mapuche (Richards,
2013). Richards (2013), for instance, reveals that under Pinochet, “more than four hundred
thousand hectares [of Mapuche land]” were transferred to Chile’s National Forestry Corporation,
CONAF, “and then auctioned off to timber companies” (60).10 None of this newly obtained land
was taxed and under subsidies established by Pinochet, “75% of the costs of timber production”

9

The Chicago Boys were a group of Chilean economists who went to the United States in the 1970s and 1980s and
studied at the University of Chicago (Drake and Jaksic, 1995). They advocated for free market policies and “a more
open society, where everyone had an opportunity to pursue entrepreneurship without being ‘shackled’ by statist and
socialist policies” (Drake and Jaksic, 1995: 57). Although these economists believed that once a country had a more
open economy, that democratic policies would dominate, upon returning to Chile, they were appointed prominent
positions in Pinochet’s government who recognized that a “transformed economic model in society would bring
structural transformations that would legitimize changing society under military rule” (Drake and Jaksic, 1995: 57).
Pinochet, that is, recognized that their neoliberal economic and political ideologies would help legitimize his
authoritarian regime, and would “lead to structural changes in [Chilean] society, that would allow his continued
policies and rule to reign” (Drake and Jaksic, 1995: 61). Further, because the Chilean economy was greatly suffering
at the start of Pinochet’s democracy, the adoption of neoliberal policies and the privatization of the country allowed
the economy to recover, bringing further legitimacy to Pinochet’s authoritarian regime (Drake and Jaksic, 1995: 6176).
10
Richards (2013) reveals that this land was taken from the little land that the Mapuche had left in the reducciones
or reservations that the Chilean government put the Mapuche in after they were annexed to the Chilean nation in the
19th century.
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in these areas was covered by the Chilean government (Richards, 2013: 71-72).11 Timber
companies and Chilean elites hence started to thrive under the neoliberal policies established by
Pinochet,12 and it was these neoliberal policies themselves which then necessitated their support
of racial narratives positing the Mapuche as “other”; in order to continue exploiting Mapuche
land and profiting from their territories, Chilean elites and large companies had to buy into the
belief that the Mapuche were inferior, barbarous, and uncivilized (Richards, 2013: 134-148). As
will be discussed later in the terrorism chapter, it was often these companies who then pushed the
Chilean state to continue othering the Mapuche as a racial minority, and to continue suppressing
their existence as to keep profiting from their land (Richards, 2013). Under Pinochet’s
dictatorship and the emergence of neoliberal policies, new individuals and members of the polity
thus became invested in the racial narratives or racial projects of the Chilean state positioning the
Mapuche as a racial “other.”
Although Pinochet’s rule ended in 1990, his neoliberal policies and support of Chilean
elites and large corporations continued into Chile’s transition to democracy. As explained by
Garretón (2003), Chile’s transition to democracy has been incomplete and insufficient as “Chile
may have moved to a ‘procedural democracy’--i.e., it now has free elections and the guarantee
(for the most part) of basic rights, but it has not moved to a socially democratic/a truly
democratic country” (142). Neoliberal models and structures from the dictatorship still thrive and
despite a plebiscite that will soon change this,13 as for now, Pinochet’s 1980 constitution still

11

Richards (2013) further reveals that between 1976 and 1992 (years mostly under the dictatorship of Pinochet that
occurred from 1973 to 1990), CONAF gave timber companies U.S. $110 million to establish their companies, run
their operations, and make profit off of Mapuche land (72).
12
Today, for instance, Richards (2013) reveals that “in ancestral territory, national and foreign timber companies
own three times more land than the Mapuche” (78).
13
A plebiscite occurred in October of last year (2020) to vote on whether a new Chilean constitution should be
created. The majority of Chilean citizens voted yes, so in April of this year, Chile will start the process of writing a
new document (Bonnefoy, 2020).
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reigns (Garretón, 2003). This has extremely significant consequences for both the Chilean
majority and the Mapuche in Chile. For example, under Pinochet’s Constitution of 1980,
extremely influential provisions continue such as the fact that Pinochet’s generals were
appointed senators for life, the military retains veto powers in the Senate, the military alone is
given four out of the nine senate seats, electoral districts are biased towards the areas won by the
military regime in another plebiscite that occurred in 1988, and regional governments remain
appointed by and controlled by the national government rather than local bodies (Haughney,
2006: 66-67). Substantial changes to the 1980 Constitution are often impossible or extremely
difficult to pass and importantly, Pinochet’s neoliberal institutions and models still reign under
this constitution which privileges a market economy and private interests over the right to basic
government provided services or goods like health care or water (Haughney, 2006).14 Most
Chileans hence suffer from the persistence of such Constitution, and in relation to the Mapuche,
policies favoring the usurpation of their land still continue as does the lack of recognition of their
sovereignty or identity (Richards, 2013).
Beyond the 1980 Constitution, modern legislation enacted after Pinochet’s regime has
worked to continue to suppress the Mapuche and usurp their land despite governmental claims to
the contrary. For instance, in the Indigenous Law of 1993--a law created in response to an
attempt by indigenous leaders to achieve greater recognition after Pinochet’s rule15--legislation

14

Even water is privatized in Chile as a legacy of Pinochet’s rule (Atrakouti, 2020).
Following the end of Pinochet’s regime, various indigenous organizations in Chile attempted to influence the new
government, a coalition called the Concertación, to reform indigenous policies and to better recognize indigenous
rights (Haughney, 2006: 69). Twenty-seven indigenous organizations in 1990 united to form El Consejo Nacional de
Pueblos Indígenas (CNPI), the National Council of Indigenous Peoples, and in response, the new Chilean
democratic president after Pinochet’s reign, Patricio Aylwin, formed a Special Commission for Indigenous Peoples
to work with these indigenous groups (Haughney, 2006: 69). While influential in working to draft proposals for new
indigenous laws, this council (created by President Aylwin) was made up of entirely non-indigenous peoples and
ultimately did not fight for the desires for political autonomy at the core of many indigenous demands (Haughney,
2006: 69-71). The council’s work ultimately fell short on the Mapuche desires for independence and resulted in the
limitations of the Indigenous Law of 1993 (Haughney, 2006).
15
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sought to better acknowledge the Mapuche as an indigenous group and to “‘protect, promote and
develop’ indigenous people in Chile” (Haughney, 2006: 7). The law created a state agency for
indigenous groups called CONADI (la Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena) which was
made responsible for creating new legal protections for indigenous lands, as well as for
distributing subsidies to indigenous people in Chile for indigenous social and educational
programs (Haughney, 2006: 7). Although influential in this manner, the law refused to restore
previously usurped lands to indigenous groups like the Mapuche, and most importantly, it failed
to recognize the group identity of indigenous peoples (Haughney, 2006: 7).16 For instance,
Richards (2013) notes how the Constitution of 1980 makes no reference to indigenous groups in
Chile and because this Constitution lives on and the Indigenous Law of 1993 did not change
indigenous groups’ lack of recognition in Chile, consequently, all Mapuche calls to be formally
recognized as an indigenous group by the Chilean government have been consistently denied by
the state (Richards, 2013). In fact, today, Patridge (2020) reveals that Chile is “the only country
in Latin America that does not recognize its indigenous peoples within its national constitution.”
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The Indigenous Law of 1993, for instance, refused to use the terms “indigenous peoples” in its language
(Haughney, 2006: 81). Fearful of the “nationalist and separatist connotations of the phrase ‘indigenous peoples’” -afraid that it would evoke ideas of indigenous groups being separate from the Chilean nation-state--all references to
“indigenous peoples” were omitted from the final law and instead, only the terms “indigenous” or “indigenous
ethnicities” were included (Haughney, 2006: 80-83). While seemingly inconsequential, in denying the recognition of
indigenous groups like the Mapuche as groups of connected “peoples”, the Indigenous Law of 1993 failed to meet
the most crucial aspect of indigenous and Mapuche demands in post-dictator society: recognition of their collective
sovereignty (Haughney, 2006: 84). Furthermore, and notable, in congressional debates regarding the inclusion or
exclusion of the word “peoples” in the new indigenous law, Haughney (2006) explains how “Rightist Deputy
Francisco Bayo (RN) declared that the use of the word [“peoples”] was ‘dangerous’ as it could provoke racial
conflict that could be manipulated by terrorist groups” (81). He then stated that the “Chilean nation had resulted
from the ‘fusion’ of...the Spanish race with the Araucanian [(Mapuche)]” in an effort to encourage the idea of one
nation (81). Haughney (2006), concludes that although “virtually all politicians avoided the term ‘assimilation’
because of its connotation of forced cultural change,” their calls for integration and their denial of the term
“peoples” for fear of “terrorists” or separatists was advancing exactly that: forced assimilation (83-85). That is, these
statements and the omission of “peoples” in the law shows how fearful politicians were during this time of agitation
for indigenous separation, and how they wanted to exclude the use of the word to promote the idea of one Chilean
nation to ensure assimilation for their own domination. Lastly, it is also important to emphasize that like the refusal
to use the term “peoples” in this law, rhetoric regarding indigenous “territories” was also replaced by concepts like
“development areas” to once again diminish the idea of indigenous sovereignty (Haughney, 2006: 88-89).
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Hence, while the Indigenous Law of 1993 is celebrated for recognizing cultural diversity, it
remains superficial in the fact that the Mapuche and other indigenous groups’ call for group
recognition was denied, and the fact that after its passage, private and Chilean national interests
have been able to continue to exploit the Mapuche and profit from their land (Haughney,
2006).17 Meanwhile, the Chilean government has been able to continue to claim that Chile is a
multicultural and inclusive society, even when it explicitly oppresses the Mapuche as a racialized
and indigenous other.
For instance, in his first State of the Nation Address in 2010, current president, Sebastián
Piñera stated, “Our original peoples are an integral part of Chile” (Richards, 2013: 10). Piñera’s
administration has worked hard to promote an idea of a multicultural and an ethnically, racially,
and culturally inclusive society, even when exclusion is the reality. Ultimately, this talk of
multiculturalism, Richards (2013) argues, is limited by neoliberal policies that the Chilean
government and current President Piñera still implement as means to increase their own profit.
She calls the current situation “neoliberal multiculturalism” and explains:
Throughout Latin America, the shift toward multiculturalism took place as neoliberalism
became hegemonic. Indigenous movements are among the strongest social movements in
the region, and their goals and logic often directly contrast with those of the neoliberal
project. As a result, multiculturalism has become an important means of generating
consent for neoliberalism. Still, rights and recognition are granted to the indigenous only
insofar as they do not threaten state goals in the global economy… All told, neoliberal
multiculturalism represents a racial project that does little to challenge racial dominance
or neocolonialism as manifest in the political-economic agenda of the state (102).
In other words, under neoliberal multiculturalism currently promoted by the Chilean
government, the Mapuche can be nominally recognized by the state as a “integral part of Chile”
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Just four years after the passage of the law in 1993, for instance, Chile’s largest dam--the Ralco dam project—
was built, which relocated ninety-six Mapuche families in Bíobío, a region in the Arauncanía, to poorly fertile areas
(Haughney, 2006: 106-136). This shows how the usurpation of Mapuche land under neoliberal pursuits continued
(and continues) to persist despite the existence of the Indigenous Law of 1993.
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(like President Piñera said in the quotation above), but their recognition is limited when their
calls for autonomy, for legal recognition, or for the recoupment of their land threatens or exceeds
the capital goals of the Chilean government (Richards, 2013: 10). A superficial ideology of
multiculturalism is hence promoted by the Chilean government to promote a myth of social and
political unification, even when, at the end of the day, the Chilean government’s neoliberal
policies and capital exploitation of the Mapuche continue and exclusion once again persists.
Racial hierarchies are obscured in inclusion and assimilation, Mapuche counter movements
demanding autonomy and greater cultural recognition are squashed, and the Chilean
government’s modern racial projects, ensuring its own social and capital wealth, continue to live
on.18
Meanwhile, the perception of the Mapuche as different continues to persist and has only
grown more prominent amongst the greater Chilean citizen body who have accepted racial
narratives of the Mapuche’s innate difference. Drawing to Durkheim’s idea of collective
consciousness (Giddens, 1972), racial narratives have been essential for creating solidarity
among the Chilean racial majority and in creating the idea of who Chileans are not: the
Mapuche. In fervently believing in the idea of the Mapuche as a racialized “other” who are
innately different from themselves, Chilean individuals can maintain their higher status or
position in society. And like corporations who are aligned with Chile’s neoliberal
multiculturalism, Chilean individuals today who have a stake in the usurpation and exploitation
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Richards (2013) concludes that as a result of these assimilationist efforts by the Chilean government, two
indigenous identities are hence created: “One subject,” she argues that is created through neoliberal
multiculturalism, “is the indio permitido or ‘authorized Indian,’” (the indigenous person who assimilates and who
doesn’t demand too much from the state), while the other subject, she explains, is “the indio insurrecto or the
‘insurrectionary Indian’ [who] is criminalized” (the indigenous individual who does not assimilate to Chilean
identity and who continues to make demands to the Chilean state that threaten its neoliberal policies like desires for
indigenous autonomy) (102).
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of Mapuche lands (such as farmers, workers, and community members in Arauncanía), are
especially invested in the racial narratives that maintain the stigmatization and oppression of the
Mapuche. Ultimately, large segments of the Chilean racial majority believe in the racial
narratives fabricated by the Chilean state—mostly about the Mapuche’s incivility, barbarity, and
innate difference—which gives racial narratives more salience throughout society. Their belief in
racial narratives also hides the Chilean government’s construction of such narratives for its own
dominance and nation-state building strategies.
For instance, as the result of interviewing Chilean farmers, workers, and community
members in the Araucanía, Richards’ research reveals the potent racism prevalent among
Chilean citizens up to the present (2013). “Many Chileans harbored beliefs that the Mapuche
were lazy, violent, drunk, uncivilized, and violent,” Richards (2013) writes (134). They didn’t
deserve the right to their land, many believed, because they “were corrupt and lacked a work
ethic” (136). Like anti-affirmative action views in the United States, Chilean interviewees hence
took a blame-the-victim stance where the usurpation of the Mapuche’s land was justified by their
own laziness and inferiority (their own innate shortcomings which displays racialized thinking).
Richards (2013) concludes that these attitudes demonstrate the Chilean government's success in
creating racial narratives as “an effective method of state control” (147). In addition, the
pervasiveness of these beliefs indicate that the Chilean polity has now incorporated this
difference into their identities; to be Chilean is again, to not be Mapuche.19
Drawing to Chilean government coercion, racial narratives also legitimize and call for the
work of Chilean government coercive forces such as police to repress the Mapuche. The

19

For instance, employee of the National Agricultural Development Agency, Gonzalo Arellano, stated that there are
just “intractable cultural differences” between the Mapuche and the Chilean racial majority (Richards, 2013: 3). This
fundamental difference allows him to socially construct Chilean identity at least partially in opposition to that of the
Mapuche.
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degraded status of the Mapuche itself--derived from racist attitudes of their innate inferiority or
difference--calls for their criminalization, their surveillance, and their repression; racial
narratives position the Mapuche as an enemy of the Chilean people, and an enemy in need of the
active control and suppression by the Chilean state. Furthermore, because the Mapuche reject the
racial project of the Chilean nation-state--because they do not wish to be incorporated into the
Chilean national identity and reject the current and historical colonization of their territories-they are further viewed as a population whose moral status almost demands repression (Richards,
2013). They are akin to a disease that must be suppressed because it is a foreign body threatening
the health of the Chilean state. Yet, ironically, their position of “other” is also necessary for a
sense of Chilean national identity; it is, then, in defining who they are not, that the Chilean
nation-state again defines who they are. In this sense, the racialization of the Mapuche and the
positioning of them as “other” is vital for defining the essential national character of true
Chileans. Chilean government coercion such as Chilean police hence become necessary for
establishing racial boundaries and therefore, protecting Chile and the Chilean racial majority
from this threat. Racial narratives and Chilean government coercion to defend these narratives
are again, also essential for the legitimate usurpation of Mapuche land and the continued success
of neoliberal state building strategies in Chile.
Returning to Goldberg (2002) and ideas of the racial state, it is clear that the idea of the
innate and natural racial differences of the Mapuche have always been a touchstone for Chilean
nation-state building: racial projects initially can be seen as essential in the conundrum the
Chilean state faced post-colonization when they were trying to create a coherent national
identity, and currently, as the neoliberal interests of the modern Chilean government lead the
government to support policies that further usurp Mapuche territory in the guise of Chilean
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national interest and a faux idea of multiculturalism and Mapuche inclusion to the nation. Yet,
such racial positioning in support of nation-state building has a cost. As will be discussed later,
in the face of the Mapuche’s vigorous claims to their land and their sovereignty,20 only the most
violent and oppressive means are envisioned as an adequate response; a potent force is seen as
critical in guarding racial boundaries perceived as both precarious and unquestioned. Subsequent
sections will show that it is Chilean government coercion such as Chilean police who are central
to combating threats to the Chilean government and who are vital in maintaining the racial
constructions of the Mapuche as “other”; the rest of the chapters in this study will explore how
Chilean coercive forces ultimately defend the neoliberal policies of the Chilean government, the
continued belief amongst Chilean citizens that the Mapuche are racially different, and the
Chilean government’s racial nation-state and domination completely.
Racial Projects in China: A “United” Nation for a Racially, Ethnically, and Religiously
Exclusive Reality to Establish CCP Dominance and Ideologies
Like the Mapuche, China’s minority ethnic group, the Uyghurs (also spelled “Uighers”),
are also distinguished as “other” by the Chinese government, the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP), and are targeted by Chinese government coercive forces who suppress their identity as
means to uphold CCP dominance and CCP racial narratives. Mirroring Chile, the Uyghurs have
been racialized by the CCP in an effort to dehumanize, ostracize, and exploit these individuals
while simultaneously promoting their assimilation as a goal of the state. Yet, unlike Chile, while
the Mapuche’s indigenous identity compounds how and why they are made “other” in Chilean
society, in China, the Uyghurs’ religious and ethnic minority identities significantly affects and
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As will be discussed later, the Mapuche are not passively standing by as the Chilean state and transnational
companies usurp their land and deny their rights; several Mapuche organizations have recently arisen to demand
their recognition, their ancestral lands, and their rights (Richards, 2013). These organizations pose a huge threat to
the Chilean government and must be squandered by coercive forces like police to maintain the Chilean racial nationstate they have constructed.
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guides their persecution. As will be shortly discussed, the Uyghurs practice Islam in a
predominately atheist nation and they are a transnational group who have ties to other Turkic
countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Turkey (Han, 2016). This
makes them a separate and dangerous group in the eyes of the CCP who believe they have the
potential of threatening their government legitimacy and the national identity they have
established. Consequently, the Uyghurs’ physical presentation as different is the corporeal
manifestation of their more cultural and religious differences and epitomize the threat of their
dissimilarity in CCP society.
For instance, photos of the Uyghurs in Appendix 5 show how they clearly present as
different from the Han Chinese majority--China’s largest ethnic group--and Han CCP
government officials seen in Appendices 6 and 7. The Han Chinese majority, after all, comprises
nearly 92% of China’s population (Appendix 14) (Lewis, 2021), and a little over a half of
China’s population claimed in 2010 that they are non-religious or unaffiliated with religion
(Appendix 12) (“China: Religious Affiliation”). In contrast, as of 2010, the Uyghurs comprise
about 10 million people or only about 0.76% of China’s population making them a minority
group (“List of Ethnic Groups in China”, 2021). Furthermore, the Uyghurs are devout
Muslims—a religion that only 1.8% of people in China practice as of 2010 (Appendix 12)
(“China: Religious Affiliation”). The Uyghurs are clearly a distinct transnational and religious
group in China as will be explored in the rest of this section. Yet, as will also be explored, the
CCP and its preceding forms of government have also racialized the Uyghurs as different and
have advocated for a racially and ethnically homogenous country. The rest of this section will
analyze how, in addition to their religious and ethnic differences, the Uyghurs have also been
racialized as a distinct “other” throughout Chinese history, and how this has affected modern
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CCP nation-state building. Ultimately, I argue that while different from Chile in the fact that
religion and a transnational history also affects the perception of the Uyghurs as different, that
race also has a large influence in how the CCP today is attempting to build its racial nation-state
through racist assimilationist policies and ideologies of a “united” and homogenous society that
ultimately, like Chile, continue to operate on racially exclusive and racially repressive
ideologies.
Before delving into the Uyghurs’ racial exclusion in Chinese society, it is first vital to
recognize that the Uyghurs are an ethnic and religious transnational group who have long laid
claims to being Turkic peoples of Central Asia who are physically and culturally distinct from
the Han Chinese majority (Bovingdon, 2010: 28).21 Existing predominantly in a northwest region
in China called Xinjiang, but also in other Turkic countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Turkey, the Uyghurs arguably have more ties outside of Chinese
society than within (Han, 2016). Although Muslim like the Hui ethnic minority group in China,
most Uyghurs today imagine themselves as socially distinct from all other Chinese ethnic groups
and identities (Han, 2016). The World Uyghur Congress, for instance, claims that “East
Turkistan’s people [(the Uyghurs)] are not Chinese; they are Turks of Central Asia” (Bovingdon,
2010: 28). The fact that the Uyghurs recognize their existence, identities, and kin in neighboring
countries—the fact that they are again, a transnational identity with connections outside of the
country—contributes to the CCP’s perception of them as a threat to CCP rule (Brophy, 2016:
274).
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Brophy (2016), for instance, explains that the Uyghurs arose as a nomadic population in the sixth century and
established themselves in what is now Mongolia (Brophy, 2016: 23). Shortly after, they immigrated to occupy the
position between China and Central Asia in what is Xinjiang today—the region in which the majority of Uyghurs
live in China (Brophy, 2016: 23). Yet, the Uyghurs continue to have many connections with other Turkic countries
(Brophy, 2016).
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Further, because the CCP is a predominately atheist state (Bovingdon, 2010), the
Uyghurs’ practice of Islam positions them as culturally distinct from the Han Chinese majority
and the CCP (Hillman and Tuttle, 2020).22 Although Confucianism was a large part of Chinese
history (“Confucianism”, 2020), 23 the CCP today is “largely committed to atheism” (Hillman
and Tuttle, 47). Ironically, “although the Chinese constitution [of 1982] guarantees protection of
lawful and...religious beliefs and activities,” many religious expressions and practices are
suppressed by the Chinese state (Hillman and Tuttle, 2020: 43-44). Current CCP Party Secretary
and president of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Xi Jinping, for instance, views religion
as detrimental to the CCP’s rule and dominance (Chang, 2018: 37). In his view, religion
challenges integration into “fine traditional Chinese culture” and “especially troublesome [in Xi
Jinping’s mind],” Chang (2018) writes, is “Christianity and Islam, whose followers’ lack of
confidence in Chinese culture has apparently primed them to absorb Western values and
extremism” (37). Religious minority groups such as Christians and Muslims have hence been
made a focus of CCP control and regulation in recent years, especially the Uyghurs who again,
practice Islam (37-38).24
In 2005, for instance, the CCP passed the “Regulations on Religious Affairs” to more
stringently control religion in China and to create new regulations for religious displays or
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The Han majority are mostly atheist, but are also highly influenced by Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism and
some practice folk religions (Albert and Maizland, 2020). A report by the Pew Research Center, for instance, shows
that in 2005, a very small percentage of the Han were “very or somewhat interested” in religion (Grim, 2008).
23
Confucianism has existed in what is now China for more than 2,500 years and promotes a way of living focused
on “personal ethics and morality” (“Confucianism”, 2020). Interestingly, although Confucianism is still an important
part of Chinese society, it is not recognized as the five officially acknowledged religions in China: Taoism,
Buddhism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism (Report for Department of Justice, 2018: 1). This could possibly
be because it is often argued that Confucianism is more of a philosophical way of thinking rather than a religion
(“Confucianism”, 2020). Furthermore, Confucianism was highly suppressed during China’s Cultural Revolution
from 1966-1979 and has just recently been readopted by the CCP (Greenway, 2020).
24
As will be discussed later, the Uyghurs are seen as “extremists” in China, who, along with the Buddhist Tibetans,
hold anti-Chinese ideologies and hence, need to be repressed (Chang, 2018: 42).
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expressions in Chinese society (Chang, 2018: 41). For people who practice Catholicism, for
instance, Regulations on Religious Affairs require that clerical appointment must be “reported
for the record to the county-level Bureau of Religious Affairs, which can accept or revoke the
status of a clergyperson” (Chang, 2018: 42). Similar regulations exist for Buddhists, Muslims,
Christians, and other religious groups across the country (Chang, 2018). For the Uyghurs,
outward display of Islamic dress or other religious expressions is banned by the CCP, as is public
expression of their religious practices and prayers (Hillman and Tuttle, 2020: 47). Uyghur
students at Xinjiang University, for instance, are prohibited from exhibiting Uyghur physical and
religious expressions such as beards, head scarfs, fasting, and public prayers or religious
gatherings (Hillman and Tuttle, 2020: 46-47). 25 At the same time that mosques are being torn
down throughout China (Reger and Szadiewski, 2012), the CCP is also creating billboards across
the country that ironically promote the slogan: “love the country and love religion, protect the
country and benefit the people” (Hillman and Tuttle, 2020: 45). Religion is a universal theme of
these billboards, Hillman and Tuttle (2020) reveal, but national unity and “propaganda
admonishing splittist activities” are the true purposes of such billboards (41). These billboards
ultimately allow the CCP to promote state loyalty while pretending to recognize and support
religious differences. Cumulatively, these billboards create what Hillman and Tuttle (2020) call
“thought management” where Chinese citizens, and the Uyghurs especially, are reminded daily
that religious expression is subordinate to CCP dominance (Appendix 65) (41).
As paradoxical as the CCP’s “acceptance” of separate religious identities at the same
time that the CCP stringently controls religious expressions and practices is the ironic existence
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Hillman and Tuttle (2020) also emphasize that “students in Tibet and Xinjiang receive extra training in MarxismLeninism-Mao Zedong thought” so that the “correct attitudes towards religion” are instilled (43). Although
nominally claiming to respect religious differences (Hillman and Tuttle, 2020), the CCP is again working to ensure
state loyalty above religious allegiance.
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of ethnic autonomous regions throughout China at the same time the CCP pushes for a
homogenous nation-state identity (Han, 2016). Under the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law
(REAL) enacted in 1984, various ethnic minority groups in China have the ability to enact
limited regional governance (Zhang, 2012: 249-250).26 Autonomous areas are designated based
on where ethnic minority groups (non-Han Chinese groups) are concentrated and whether or not
a region has over 20% of an ethnic minority population (Zhang, 2012: 249-250). China currently
has 155 ethnic autonomous areas, which cover “sixty four percent of Chinese territory” (Zhang,
2012: 250). Although minorities of these autonomous areas have “the power to enact
autonomous regulations in the light of the political, economic and cultural characteristics of the
nationality or nationalities in the areas is concerned”27 and are granted the right to establish their
own regional governance, the independence of these regions is minimal as they are frequently
overridden by CCP policies, leadership, and laws (Zhang, 2012: 253-254).
In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), for instance, where the majority of
Uyghurs are located in China, a Han Chinese and CCP leader currently serves as the head of the
regional government, Chen Quanguo (Appendix 7) (Zenz and Leibold, 2020).28 This has not
been inconsequential. Since his appointment to office in 2016 as XUAR’s Communist Party
Secretary, Quanguo has implemented a series of security measures that have sought to target and
suppress the Uyghurs (Zenz and Leibold, 2020).29 His leadership reveals the lack of power the
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Today, the CCP recognizes 55 different ethnic groups or what are called minzus, excluding the Han majority
(Zhang, 2012). It is members of these 55 groups who can establish ethnic autonomous regions in China (Zhang,
2012).
27
As stated in Article 116 of China’s constitution (Zhang, 2012: 251).
28
Not coincidentally, before becoming a top administrator in Xinjiang, Quanguo served as the Communist Party
Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region where he implemented similar security measures (Zenz and Leibold,
2020). In Tibet, he utilized re-education camps and high numbers of security positions to control and repress
Buddhist Tibetans; after taking the position in Xinjiang, he brought these practices with him (Zenz and Leibold,
2020: 334).
29
For instance, in his first year in office, Zenz and Leibold (2020) reveal that Quanguo advertised “100,680
security-related positions” in Xinjiang (Appendices 57-59) (334).
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Uyghurs have in this autonomous area even while it is designated as their region to have limited
rule.30 Similar situations can be seen in other ethnic autonomous areas in China where ethnic
minorities are often overpowered by CCP leadership, laws, or have severely limited autonomy
(Zhang, 2012). Like religion, it appears that the existence of these autonomous regions ultimately
allows the CCP to nominally recognize difference at the same time that they subordinate those
differences to CCP rule; the ideological impacts of the REAL allow the CCP to point to Xinjiang
and other autonomous regions as proof that all ethnic groups within its boundaries have a
political voice, even when that voice is muffled by the influence of the CCP at the local level.
The illusion of political “inclusion” (that’s actually not so inclusive) is hence another mechanism
to disguise the reality of exclusionary practices which dominate CCP rule.
Important thus far when discussing the Chinese Communist Party (the CCP) and its
strategies for implementing rule is the idea of national unity and homogeneity that the CCP is
currently pushing as means to build its dominance. As will be discussed in detail throughout this
thesis, like the Chilean government, the CCP is promoting the idea of a multiethnic,
multireligious, multicultural, and multiracial society, even while it is attempting to elide such
differences in a Han Chinese, uniform national identity (Reger and Szadiewski, 2012). Although
claiming to recognize and incorporate 55 ethnic groups or what are called minzus into its
population (in addition to the Han majority), the CCP is still ultimately guided by differences in
its nation-state building strategies (Appendix 15) (Zhang, 2012). Like Chile, in continuing to
recognize who they are not (the Uyghurs and other ethnic groups), the CCP can establish who
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Bovingdon (2010) further reveals that CCP officials very “carefully” and in a “limited” manner appoint Uyghurs
to the rest of XUAR’s People’s Council (8). They are choosing Uyghur leaders they see as most likely to comply
with CCP policies and leaders who they believe pose the least risk of supporting Uyghur empowerment and
separation (Bovingdon, 2010). Although these leaders are supposed to be elected by the ethnic minority itself, the
selective appointment of Uyghur leaders to the regional government by the CCP ensures that the CCP can continue
to dictate regional policies in Xinjiang (Zenz and Leibold, 2020).
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they are (a unified, homogenous state). Rhetoric of national harmony is ultimately key to
portraying the idea of one content nation—a nation where the CCP has uncontested opposition—
and to establishing CCP domination throughout society. Yet, the CCP ultimately continues to be
guided by difference and continues to implement racist assimilationist policies and ideologies
where Han identity is positioned as the ideal, the superior, and the standard and where minority
integration into the state is again emphasized. This will be first explored in the CCP’s promoted
histographies which emphasize the Uyghurs’ steadfast incorporation and integration with the
Chinese state even when this hasn’t been the reality (Bovingdon, 2010).
For instance, although the Uyghurs have long been a transnational population, and
Xinjiang has had a complex history of shifting rule, Xinjiang today is declared “an integral piece
of Chinese national territory since ancient times,” and the Uyghurs are claimed to be part of the
“great family of the Chinese nation” (Bovingdon, 2010). Yet, this is not the reality as first ruled
by the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.E.- 220 C.E.), then the Tang Dynasty (618-907), next the Qing
Dynasty (1644-1911), and finally, a series of warlords before its incorporation into the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Xinjiang was not always ruled by what we consider China
today (Bovingdon, 2010: 26). In fact, China wasn’t always what we consider the current nationstate to be today. Bovingdon (2010) explains, “‘The Chinese nation was a modern invention
dating to no earlier than the late nineteenth century,” and as such, “the various Central Plains
dynasties were not, properly speaking, ‘China’” (26). These empires were Chinese affiliated, he
continues to explain, but “there was no ‘China’ in a formal sense under dynastic rule, neither was
there an idea of a nation” (26). Subsequently, CCP narratives of steadfast Uyghur and Xinjiang
incorporation into Chinese society today ignores the reality that China is a fairly modern
invention, and that Xinjiang was historically under various leaderships. Further, it ignores the
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fact that the individual empires who ruled Xinjiang throughout the 17th to 20th centuries
oftentimes saw and racialized the Uyghurs as different and often debated whether the Uyghurs
should stay a part of the empires’ territories or not. Ideas of Xinjiang and Uyghur steadfast
incorporation into modern China is ultimately a narrative fabricated by the CCP today in an
attempt to further propagate an idea of a harmonious and well united Chinese nation where CCP
rule is uncontested.
For instance, during the Qing Dynasty from 1644-1911, Xinjiang and the Uyghurs were
viewed as a distinct area and population that had to be imperially ruled (Brophy, 2016: 10). The
Uyghurs were thought to have “much more in common with each other than they did with those
ruling them” (Brophy, 2016: 10), and as such, scholars such as the literatus Zhang Binglin stated
in the 1890s that there was little doubt that Xinjiang would “separate from a future ‘purified’
China,” but that “it might ultimately be reabsorbed since it did not ‘belong to anyone else’”
(Bovingdon, 2010: 34). To prevent separation, Binglin, along with another scholar, Liang
Qichao, advocated for a racially and culturally unified Chinese nation in which the “various
peoples of the Qing belonged to the ‘yellow race’ and differed only in culture” (Bovingdon,
2010: 24). Ironically, these scholars distinguished Xinjiang as separate from a “purified” China,
and yet, they still advocated for its incorporation into a racially unified nation, connected under
the “yellow race” in a false idea of racial homogeneity that is still promoted by the CCP today.
After the fall of the Qing empire, and a series of different warlords briefly reigned
Xinjiang during the Republic of China (ROC) from 1912 to 1949 (before the founding of the
PRC), debate over the separation or integration of Xinjiang continued as did rhetoric of the racial
similarity or dissimilarity of the Uyghurs with the greater Chinese nation (Bovingdon, 2010). A
series of policies under new Xinjiang governors such as Jin Shuren in the late 1920’s and early
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1930’s31 sparked discontent among the peoples of Xinjiang32 and subsequent uprisings led to the
establishment of an independent Eastern Turkestan Republic (ETR) from 1933-193433
(Bovingdon, 2010: 36). Soviet presence aided the ROC in suppressing the ETR,34 and leaders of
the then ruling Chinese nationalist party, the Guomindang or Kuomintang (GMD or KMT),
continued to debate whether Xinjiang should be incorporated into their state (Bovingdon, 2010:
36-37). Wu Qiyu, an adviser to the Nationalist Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for instance, wrote in
1947 that “given the tide of national self-determination (minzu zijue) in today’s world, we
seemingly have reason to let go of Xinjiang” (Bovingdon, 2010: 37). “After all,” he continued,
“Britain had already let go of Ireland…and India. America has given up the Philippines”
(Bovingdon, 2010: 37). In comparing Xinjiang with Ireland, India, and the Philippines,
Bovingdon (2010), emphasizes that these Chinese nationalist leaders “made plain that they
considered [Xinjiang] a colonial possession” (38). Xinjiang, that is, was largely viewed as an
imperial conquest over racially and culturally distinct individuals.35

31

Governor Jin Shuren sparked discontent as similar to today, he forced “Turkis off their land” to make room for
new Han immigrants to the region (Bovingdon, 2010: 35-36). The Turks (the Uyghurs) were still forced to pay taxes
even though they were now living on poor quality land. This fueled discontent in Xinjiang and led to a series of
uprisings (Bovingdon, 2010: 35-36).
32
It is important to note that the term “Uyghurs'' has not consistently been used throughout history to describe the
peoples of Xinjiang. Although there was a Uighur Empire in the eighth century, the term “Uyghur” disappeared for
some time until it is thought to have been reimplemented by a Soviet conference in 1921, when Soviet officials
“divided Turkic-speaking Central Asians into ‘national’ groups to ward off the threat of a Pan-Turkist revolt”
(Bovingdon, 2010: 28). Although some claim that this term was used earlier by Turks in the late nineteenth century,
the Uyghurs have again had an ambiguous and pan-national identity in which they have historically comprised
Muslim groups such as the Taranchis, the Dungans, and the Kashgaris (Brophy, 2016: 183). Although Uyghur
separatists today will claim that they have existed in Xinjiang for six thousand years, like Chinese nationalist claims
today stating that China was one nation throughout time, these narratives are also historically inaccurate
(Bovingdon, 2010: 12).
33
Another East Turkestan Republic was established from 1944 until 1949 (Bovingdon, 2010: 36).
34
For instance, under leader Sheng Shicai’s rule of Xinjiang, Russian troops were deployed in Xinjiang to suppress
ETR-affiliated revolts and riots in 1937 (Bovingdon, 2010: 36). A Soviet presence remained in Xinjiang and largely
influenced Xinjiang (economically and politically), until Sheng broke with the Soviets and joined the Chinese
Nationalist Party (Guomindang/GMD) in 1942 (Bovingdon, 2010: 36).
35
Interestingly, Han (2016) emphasizes that colonization and decolonization have always led to the shifting of
boundaries and the conglomeration of distinct groups of people into one nation-state (7). During imperialism, he
writes, “borders were artificially cut across groups of people who previously had little or nothing to do with the
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Yet, despite talk about letting Xinjiang go, the start of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) in 1949 and CCP rule led to Xinjiang’s resolute incorporation into the Chinese nation
from then forward; fearful that Xinjiang would fall to Soviet rule and as part of its nationbuilding efforts to create a harmonious and seemingly homogenous nation, the CCP began
creating and spreading false historiographies that assumed that Xinjiang had been peacefully
incorporated into China throughout history (Bovingdon, 2010: 37-39). “In asserting that Uyghurs
had never separated from the ‘Chinese nation,’” Bovingdon (2010) writes, the PRC “sought to
demonstrate that they could never do so in the future” (28). However, despite claiming a
historically integrated nation, the Chinese government simultaneously continued to imagine
Chinese citizens as belonging to distinct racial and ethnic minority groups who could be swayed
by this narrative to buy into state unification and hegemony.
One of the first projects of the newly established PRC, for example, was the “Ethnic
Identification Project,” a census-like project to define the number and types of ethnic groups in
China (Han, 2016: 33). Carried out by the CCP, it first allowed people to declare which ethnic
group they belonged to (Han, 2016). Yet, when more than 400 ethnic groups self-reported in the
1953 national census, the government instead “classified groups according to what historical
development stage it considered them to be at such as ‘primitive,’ ‘slave,’ or ‘feudal’” (Han,
2016: 34). Han majority groups were located at the most advanced, feudal stage, and Muslimaffiliated groups were placed near primitive stage (Han, 2016: 34). The CCP then advocated that
“the Han therefore had a duty to help the less-developed groups progress towards socialism”
(Han, 2016: 34). The fact that the CCP under the newly formed PRC sorted ethnic groups in

nearly independent states” (7). Thinking about empires, warlords, and imperialism further expands an understanding
of the Uyghurs a racialized group who throughout time have been viewed as needing to be assimilated and
acculturated into the Chinese nation-state; people who have been seen as colonial subjects needing to be ruled and
contained within artificial borderlines demarking the Chinese nation-state.
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China and then assigned innate characteristics of “civilized” v. “uncivilized” to these groups
clearly shows the start of the CCP’s modern racial narratives; the start of the CCP recognizing
and categorizing various peoples in China according to their physical and perceived ethnic and
religious differences, and then assigning innate personality traits to these characteristics. The
physical was connected to the innate: a clear sign of racialized and colonial thinking.
Race and racial narratives were further adapted by the CCP from the influence of the
Republic of China (ROC) who years earlier, established that five races-- the Manchus, Mongols,
Tibetans, Chinese, and Muslims--existed in a unified and harmonious Chinese nation or Chinese
race: “zhonghua minzu” (Appendix 11) (114). These racial groups were portrayed as living
harmoniously and the flag of the republic even reflected each of these racially distinct groups
existing together in good will (Appendix 11) (Brophy, 2010). Interestingly, Brophy (2010)
reveals that the founding text of Chinese Republicanism, Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s
Principles, referred to the ‘Muslims’ of China’s five races as specifically the ‘Turks who profess
Islam’” (144). This reveals that while Muslims like the Uyghurs were designated as a different
race throughout history, that this status label was also greatly conflated with their transnational
and religious differences as well. Although Chinese Communist Party leader (CCP) leader Mao
Zedong briefly paused zhonghua minzu and the recognition of these distinct racial groups under
his rule from 1949 to 1976 --as he sought to suppress recognition of any ethnic or cultural
differences--from his death to today, these ideas have reemerged in the modern PRC
(Bovingdon, 2010: 16).36 Like the scholar Liang Qichao’s idea of a unified yellow race in the
1890s (Bovingdon, 2010: 34), an idea of both a racially homogenous Chinese society, as well as

36

Bovingdon (2010) emphasizes that during the Cultural Revolution, consistent with Marxist ideology, class, rather
than race or ethnicity, was posited as the main difference between citizens (15).
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Uyghurs’ racially, ethnically, and religiously distinct identity remains a dominant part of Chinese
society today.
For instance, and as will be explored throughout the rest of this essay, under CCP rule
today, the Uyghurs are viewed by the CCP as a religiously, racially, and ethnically different
group who need to be assimilated or converted to Han majority identity. Running a series of
what the CCP claims are “vocational” or “re-education” camps, the CCP has recently detained
thousands of Uyghurs in Xinjiang to transform their cultural and religious practices and to even
elide their Uyghur identities or expressions completely (Ruser, 2020). As will be discussed in the
methods of oppression chapter of this study, in these camps, the Uyghurs are forced to listen to
and recite CCP ideologies, to learn Mandarin, and they are not allowed to practice their Muslim
religion (Ruser, 2020). These camps are highly suppressive and reveal CCP attempts of
transforming the Uyghurs to better fit into the Han majority national identity. While appearing to
be an attempt of ethnically, culturally, or religiously converting the Uyghurs to Han majority,
racial assimilation purposes also seem to guide these camps. For instance, focused on the
psychological—the Uyghurs’ beliefs, language, and mindsets—it seems as if the CCP has taken
the physical and cultural differences of the Uyghurs and associated these traits with something
innately inferior in them; something intimately subordinate in their bodies that needs to be
converted or replaced with Han Chinese identity. As if the Uyghurs were still existing under the
Qing dynasty, these assimilation camps portray a colonial mindset the CCP still holds towards
the Uyghurs where they must be conquered, dominated, and then forced to change their ethnic
and religious practices, appearances, and selves. The Uyghurs in these camps are expected to
convert to the racial and ethnic majority—the Han Chinese—in a faux idea of equality and
national harmony.
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In their book, Postmodernism, Unraveling Racism, and Democratic Institutions, authors
John W. Murphy and Jung Min Choi (1997) explain how assimilation projects are racist projects
in themselves. “Assimilation,” they write, “reflects a racist ontology” as “it is based on dualistic
conceptions that say that one racial group is good or superior and the other is bad or inferior and
should try to become like the other group” (45). They continue to explain that because
assimilation efforts place the blame on minorities for failing to assimilate, rather than the
problem of those in power imposing their own culture, practices, and ideologies onto these
groups (colonizing these groups), assimilation projects are racist; assimilation projects again
place that which is wrong, inferior, or problematic onto the individual being conquered and
connect the physical or cultural to the innate. Kendi (2019) similarly argues, “Assimilationist
ideas are racist ideas. Assimilationists can position any racial group as the superior standard that
another racial group should be measuring themselves against, the benchmark they should be
trying to reach” (29). Meanwhile, he continues to explain, “assimilationist ideas are rooted in the
notion that certain racial groups are culturally or behaviorally inferior” (31). He concludes by
stating that assimilation projects and ideologies are often deployed in “post-racial” societies
where governments hide clear racist policies and practices under fabricated rhetoric of inclusion,
multiculturalism, and, just like the CCP, national harmony (Kendi, 2019: 54). Under assimilation
policies and ideologies, governments like the CCP can continue pretending they are including
and integrating racial minorities—that they recognize and accept racial, ethnic, and religious
differences—while they ultimately continue to be led by fabricated ideas of a group’s cultural
and racial superiority (in this case, the Han majority); assimilationist policies bring government
legitimacy when in reality, governments like the CCP are again, often working to eliminate all
signs of difference amongst its citizen body.
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In this sense, the CCP’s “re-education” camps which are attempting to assimilate the
Uyghurs into Han majority identity are clear racist practices in which the Han Chinese identity
has been designated the racially and culturally superior identity and in which the Uyghurs
continue to be colonized and forced to adopt this identity. Despite claiming to be a united and
harmonious nation, the CCP harbors clear racist beliefs in which racial difference still guides
their nation-state strategies and coercive actions like the re-education camps. Outside of reeducation camps, ethnic autonomous regions allow the CCP to “acknowledge” minority group
difference and identity, while at the same time, the CCP obscures this difference in propaganda
portraying state unification (Appendix 65). All signs of difference, like Chile, are hidden in an
idea of a multiracial, multiethnic, and multireligious society, when the reality is that the CCP and
its state building strategies again depend on the recognition of and elision of differences to
establish its state identity (zhonghua minzu). Consequently, racial narratives are still essential in
the CCP’s state building strategies, but these narratives remain extremely hidden and concealed
in Chinese society.
Despite the fact that CCP racial narratives are concealed in rhetoric of national unity, like
Chileans, Han Chinese majority citizens have incorporated these beliefs into their entities and
believe fervently in the CCP’s racial nation-state building strategies. For instance, in his book,
Under the Heel of the Dragon: Islam, Racism, Crime, and the Uighur in China, author Blaine
Kaltman (2007) reveals some of the deeply racist ideas that some Han majority interviewees
harbor towards Uyghurs. He explains how many of his Han interviewees “believed that the
Uighur are a ‘fierce’ and ‘unreasonable’ people. They have a ‘primitive mentality’ and are
‘apathetic to development’” (Kaltman, 2007: 64). Many Han interviewees, Kaltman (2007)
continues to explain, believed that the Uyghurs are thieves such as one Han person who stated,
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“Wherever they [the Uighur] are, they cause trouble. They steal, they sell drugs—mostly they
steal. I think that even if the Uighur had good jobs, they would still steal” (64). Another Han
interviewee in Urumqi, Xinjiang, stated, “Relations [between Uyghurs and the Han] are poor, but
it’s not the fault of the Han. You know, the Han have developed Urumqi, but the Uighur don’t
care. They don’t have rules to govern their culture the way we do. They have no principles”
(Kaltman, 2007: 66-67). This interviewer went on to explain:
Their Uighur minds are more primitive. You know, the Uighur originally came from
Turkey, and at one time were a great race. But now they have fallen behind. They don’t
do anything. They don’t know how to develop in the city…They don’t seem to care about
anything. They are an apathetic people…Maybe they don’t want to be part of that. Maybe
they hate the Han because of our history. But most Uighur know they will never have
their own country. Xinjiang is part of China, and most Uighur accept this. So why can’t
they act more Chinese? (Kaltman, 2007: 67).
These statements reflect clear racist beliefs of Uyghur incivility and inferiority; this Han
interviewee is connecting Uyghur identity to innate and inferior characteristics of their “primitive
mentality” (Kaltman, 2007: 67). “It shouldn’t be up to only the Han to help Urumqi grow,” the
interviewer concluded denoting that the Uyghurs need to develop, “but the Uighur have such a
primitive mentality and are so apathetic to development, that it has to be” (Kaltman, 2007: 67).
The Uyghurs are again generalized as uncivil, undeveloped, and “apathetic” in the eyes of some
Han Chinese interviewees, while assimilation for the Uyghurs to “act more Chinese” is
simultaneously being promoted (Kaltman, 2007: 67). Clearly, some Han Chinese have thus
adopted the CCP racial state narratives of Han superiority and the necessity of the Uyghurs to
assimilate into their beliefs.
On the other hand, the majority of Uyghur interviewees in Kaltman’s (2007) study stated
that while they didn’t view the Han majority in such a negative light, that they did believe that

52

Han racist attitudes negatively impacted Uyghur relations with them, “both on personal and
governmental policy levels” (Kaltman, 2007: 65). As one Uyghur interviewee summarized:
I’m not angry [at the Han], but I am aware. I think the situation is regrettable. I think it’s
difficult for Uighur to excel in a Han society that is racist toward its non-Han members. I
think it’s too bad that Han government policies, including hiring practices and education
policies, hold Uighur back (Kaltman, 2007: 65).
This interviewer’s use of the label “racist” in the statement above (that “Han society is racist
toward its non-Han members”) clearly shows that the Uyghurs recognize how race and racism
impact their life and negatively influences their relationships and bodies (Kaltman, 2007: 65).
Some Uyghur interviewees, Kaltman (2007) reveals, have even incorporated racist narratives
into themselves and now believe in the idea that they need to assimilate (65-66). Some stated that
the Uyghurs “must make the changes”; that they must “become educated and work hard—even
harder than the Han” (Kaltman, 2007: 66). Such beliefs portray internalized racism in which
racist assimilationist ideas have been accepted as true by some Uyghurs.
Furthermore, Kaltman (2007) found that many Han interviewees associated the Uyghurs
with criminality (73). “Among Han,” Kaltman (2007) writes, “Xinjiang has a reputation for
being dangerous and primitive because of its Uighur population” (73). The Uyghurs are again
often portrayed to be thieves and are portrayed to be dangerous peoples, predisposed to crime
(Kaltman, 2007: 73-76). Many Han Chinese in Kaltman’s (2007) study hence stated that they
supported Xinjiang police and stated that “the Chinese police treat all races within China equally
and that minorities are not discriminated against,” even though, Kaltman (2007) continues to
explain, many Uyghurs he interviewed complained of police harassment (78). For instance, of
the 92 Uyghurs that Kaltman (2007) interviewed in the three Chinese cities of Beijing, Shanghai,
and Urumqi, 9% of Uyghurs in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, said that the police treat
everyone equally (i.e., that the Uyghurs are not harassed or picked on), while 99% of the 125
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Han he interviewed across all locations said that the police treat everybody equally and that the
Uyghurs are not harassed or picked on (137). The Uyghurs and Han in this study hence harbor
different beliefs towards police which could again go back to Han's belief in Uyghur criminality.
The idea of the Uyghurs innate danger, threat, and predisposition towards crime again denotes
racist attitudes amongst the Han of their intrinsic difference. And it promotes the idea that the
Uyghurs need to be repressed by Chinese coercive forces; that assimilation sometimes needs to
be enforced by the harsh punishment of police.
Despite the fact that racial narratives are used to push for unity and harmony under one
Chinese society, the CCP likewise promotes the idea that assimilation sometimes needs to be
enforced violently. Although apparently wishing to recognize a natural and seamless
incorporation of a multiracial, multiethnic, and multireligious polity into one Chinese nation, this
is an unachievable façade of sameness which often requires suppression, displacement and even
elimination to achieve. It is an unattainable ideal that isn’t possible without eliding all elements
inconsistent with the greater homogenous Han Chinese national identity the CCP is pushing to
achieve. This is where the work of Chinese coercive forces surfaces: it is in this contradiction
that Chinese coercive forces like re-education camps, security cameras, and police in Xinjiang
become necessary to repress and eliminate all signs of a separate Uyghur identity existing within
its boundaries.
Ultimately, although the Uyghurs again possess a distinct religious and ethnic identity, as
seen in the racist beliefs many Han citizens harbor as portrayed in Kaltman’s (2007) study, the
racism that Kendi (2019) and Murphy and Choi (1997) argue are at the roots of assimilationist
ideas and policies, and the racial discourse surrounding the Uyghurs and Chinese nation-state
building throughout history (zhonghua minzu), it is clear that the Uyghurs are also racialized as a
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distinct racial “other” in Chinese society. While unlike Chile, religion and the Uyghurs’
transnational identity again complicates and compounds these narratives, similar to Chile, racial
narratives of one multicultural and multiracial nation are also how the CCP constructs its modern
racial nation-state: it is how the CCP creates a Han national identity; how it conceals the work of
coercive forces just mentioned who work to eliminate Uyghur difference; and it is how the CCP
further gains support from its Han Chinese citizen body, who, as just show, have incorporated
racist beliefs into their beings. Though concealed in rhetoric of unity and religious and ethnic
differences, race still seems to guide the CCP’s racial state building strategies and as will be
discussed throughout the rest of this study, the CCP’s deployment of coercive forces who
enforce those narratives.
Racial Projects in Myanmar: The Rohingya as the Dangerous and Foreign Racialized
Other for Tatmadaw Dominance and Legitimacy
Akin to China and Chile, Myanmar has a racial project with historical roots in
colonization, decolonization, and the integration of various peoples into one nation-state under
arbitrary boundaries. Formerly named Burma, Myanmar was previously a British colony (Wade,
2017). From 1824 to 1948, it was dominated by British rule and subjected to imperialist
disruption, the importation of race and racist ideas, and then, the challenge of forming a nationstate after finally achieving independence in the middle of the twentieth century (Wade, 2017).
The British planted the seeds for racial hierarchies and racial narratives in Myanmar, but like
Chile, these narratives became a modern effort. As will be discussed shortly, a military regime
from 1962 to 2010 solidified ideas of a threatening and darker skin tone subsection of its polity,
the Rohingya, as racially distinct and worthy of oppressing (Wade, 2017). These ideas were
carried into the transition to democracy in 2015, where, under leadership of State Counsellor,
Aung San Suu Kyi, the state ramped up its racial persecution and, indeed, genocidal action
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against the Rohingya (Wade, 2017). The Rohingya today remain the nation’s scapegoat, blamed
for the problems of the state and used by the country’s military, the Tatmadaw, to garner support
for its oppressive rule (Wade, 2017).
Like the other countries in this study, the darker skin tone of the Rohingya is the most
visual display of their difference, is seen as a symbol of their natural and innate inferiority, and is
a mechanism upon which their dehumanization, oppression, and outright massacre is justified
(Appendix 9 compared to Appendix 8). But whereas the racial narratives and control of the
Mapuche in Chile and the Uyghurs in China arise from the challenge they pose to a desired
racially pure or homogeneous state, the Rohingya have been designated as so extraordinarily and
inescapably threatening by their very presence that in recent years they have actually been
openly targeted for racialized exterminated. The Rohingya and the racial narratives existent in
Myanmar are the most extreme of these three countries, as the very skin color of the Rohingya,
along with their Muslim religion as will be discussed later, ultimately serves as both motivation
and justification for their literal genocide. Myanmar is hence an exception in this study as
compared to Chile and China rhetoric of inclusion or multiculturalism is replaced with public
discourse and actions of exclusion.
When analyzing Myanmar’s current racial project and the massacre of the Rohingya, it is
critical to examine the historical influence of Britain’s colonization and the role it played in
creating racial differences that eventually would be carried into post-colonial society. As
mentioned previously, the British occupied Myanmar, or what was then called Burma, from 1824
to 1948 (Wade, 2017). Important in this occupation was the arbitrary boundaries that it drew to
unite diverse groups of peoples—peoples who had never before had been connected under a
common nation-state--under one rule (Ibrahim, 2016). For instance, the Arakan state--what is
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currently the Rakhine state in west Myanmar where the majority of Rohingya live today—was at
the time of colonization a state separate from Myanmar (Ibrahim, 2016: 33). The Arakan state
was historically Muslim and existed as the Mrauku Dynasty, a mostly independent area until
conquest by the British (Ibrahim, 2016: 33). Britain’s invasion of this region and other distinct
areas led to a united nation-state that “was on average many times larger than the political
systems [it] displaced” (Steinberg, 2010: 193). Bringing some social order to these diverse
groups and regions was hence desperately needed after Britain merged them. Race, Wade (2017)
argues, was key to establishing this order and emerged under a system called luumyo in Burmese
(193).37 To achieve legitimacy over diverse groups, and consistent with colonial conquest in
general, Wade (2017) concludes that the “British imported race” (193).
Although there was a “regular mingling of different ethnic and religious communities
throughout the history of Myanmar,” once the British occupied the whole area, racial differences
and tension between Muslims in the now incorporated Arakan state and Buddhists in the rest of
then Burma commenced (Ibrahim, 2016: 9). In order to gain legitimacy and support for their new
rule—support that they were not receiving from Buddhists in the rest of then Burma--the British
began favoring the Rohingya Muslims and implementing pro-India immigration policies to
promote trade (Steinburg, 2010: 39). A new policy “of unlimited Indian immigration” was later
created which significantly changed the demographics in Myanmar (Steinberg, 2010: 39). The
Buddhist polity felt disadvantaged by these immigration policies and resentment for the British
and the Rohingya started to grow (Steinberg, 2010). Divisions were further entrenched during
WWII when the British lobbied for Rohingya support against the Japanese invasion and the
Japanese mobilized the Buddhists (Wade, 2017: 80). Although the Rohingya were promised
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luumyo (otherwise spelt Lu-myo or Lumyo) literally means “type of person” (Ferguson, 2015: 6). As will be
discussed shortly, luumyo emerged as the British began classifying its citizens under its censuses (Ferguson, 2015).
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independence in exchange for their help, the newly formed Burma Independence Army (BIA)-established by Buddhist members of then Burma--helped the Japanese overthrow the British in
1942 so Rohingya autonomy was never achieved (Ibrahim, 2016: 27). Instead, in 1948, the BIA
liberated Burma completely from all imperial rule and the Rohingya remained a part of the
nation (28). Myanmar was finally free, but the two groups, the Rohingya Muslims and the rest of
the Buddhist citizen body, remained pitted against one another.
Although British imperial rule ended, for instance, tensions between the Rohingya
Muslims and the Buddhists in Myanmar survived. Deep resentment for the Rohingya (who had
again, been favored under British rule) carried into independence, as were ideas of racial
differences. In fact, race itself and racial classifications started by the British were carried in
transition out of colonization. For instance, in 1872, Britain conducted its first census in British
India and Burma to attempt to sort its colonial subjects into races or what they called luumyo or
“type of person” (Ferguson, 2016: 6). Because Myanmar was never before separated into distinct
racial categories, Ferguson (2016) reveals that British enumerators greatly struggled to secure
“single, discrete, unqualified answers for their race” (6). Separating people based on physical
appearance proved difficult for both the enumerators and the Burmese respondents who had
never before had faced such classifications, so language was decided upon as the “criterion of
difference” (Ferguson, 2015: 7). This led to significant fluidity between categories and for a long
time, the people of Myanmar were able to freely pass between races (Ferguson, 2015: 7).38 While
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For instance, when the census was reformed in 1931, Captain J.H. Green stated, “Some races or tribes in Burma
change their language almost as often as they change their clothes. Languages are changed by conquest, by
absorption, by isolation, and by a general tendency to adopt the language of a neighbour who is considered to belong
to a more powerful, more numerous, or more advanced race or tribe” (Ferguson, 2015: 8). This suggests that the
British already saw races before they created official censuses, but that they used language in this census to
officially designate people along these categories. Further, this statement reveals just how fluid these categories
were. Ware and Laoutides (2018), for instance, similarly emphasize that many people in Myanmar would frequently
change their lu-myo (175).
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denoting differences based on language wasn’t the same as denoting differences based on
physical presentation, just the act of counting and classifying people based on explicit
differences signaled the importation of Anglo and Westernized ideas of race.39 Census gathering,
and the sorting and classification of peoples into discrete categories would then carry into the
future.
For instance, after the end of colonial rule, civilian governments briefly ruled in
Myanmar, until a military coup took power in 1962 and established the Burma Socialist
Programme Party (BSPP) (Wade, 2017). Headed by General Ne Win, a former officer for the
BIA, the new coup sought to garner support for its rule (Wade, 2017). Like the British, the
military needed to achieve legitimacy and citizen obedience, and race and racial classifications
served as exactly this legitimizing force (Ibrahim, 2016). So too did religion: recognizing that
religion was how he could easily get the Buddhist majority to support the new rule, General Ne
Win and his military (now called the Tatmadaw) chose to create a “unifying ideology” and
unifying national identity centered on Buddhism (Ibrahim, 2016: 36). Wade (2017) explains, the
military coup “used...fears of the demise of Buddhism and the breakup of the nation as a
principal tool in its efforts to cultivate loyalty among a resentful population. It knew how to
manufacture communal violence that appeared, from a distance, spontaneous, and that warranted
the presence of the military as protector of the nation” (15). The military and General Ne Win,
that is, capitalized on the Muslim-Buddhist differences established by the British and
particularly, capitalized on the anti-British sentiment present amongst the Buddhist polity (who
again, had been disfavored under colonial occupation) to legitimize its rule. Ibrahim (2016)
concludes, for the first time, “the logic of equating Burmese with Buddhism became

39

Wade (2017) argues that at the time of British invasion, “the science of racial classification was popular” amongst
European, Western, and imperialist powers (42).
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entrenched,” all while Ne Win and his military could achieve dominance throughout society
(36).40
Although deeply rooted in religious differences, Ne Win’s administration ultimately
carried forward the British tradition of justifying separation on the basis of innate racial
differences. In 1973, for instance, Ne Win ordered a census to be conducted which concluded
that there were “135 national races” or taing-yin-tha41 in Myanmar (Wade, 2017: 47).
Importantly, the Rohingya were not included among these enumerated races. Their omission has
been vital in denying their citizenship and legal incorporation into Myanmar today (Wade, 2017:
50). For instance, in the Citizenship Act of 1982, created by Ne Win, a tiered hierarchy of who
could politically integrate into the nation was created: on the top resided national citizens, then
associate citizens, and finally, naturalized citizens (Chaudhury and Raṇabīra, 2018: 11). National
citizens were citizens among the identified 135 national races of Myanmar, or people “who could
prove their ancestors resided in Burma before the first Anglo-Burmese war,” or before the
British occupied then Burma (Chaudhury and Raṇabīra, 2018: 11). Associate citizens then
comprised people who didn’t qualify for citizenship under this new law, but who qualified in
1948 (at the end of British rule) (Chaudhury and Raṇabīra, 2018: 11). And lastly, naturalized
citizens were people who could prove that their ancestors resided in Myanmar before 1948 and
who were applying for citizenship after 1982 (Chaudhury and Raṇabīra, 2018: 11). Because the
Rohingya were not recognized as being one of the national races in Myanmar and despite the fact
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Ne Win’s efforts to create a unified, purely Buddhist state is often described as his quest for “burmanization”
(Wade, 2017: 63). In attempts to acculturate and assimilate non-Buddhists peoples in Myanmar, Buddhist monks
were sent to the Rakhine and only Burmese officials, not Muslim officials, were appointed in leadership positions
across the state (63). Further, to ensure Buddhist hegemony, Ne Win began positioning military troops in areas
across the state, especially ethnic areas, to monitor and track non-Buddhist citizens (63-65).
41
Ware and Laoutides (2018) reveal that taing-yin-tha literally means “offspring of the land”, or indigenous (22).
The 135 taing-yin-tha established under Ne Win were claimed to have been present in Myanmar before the British
arrived in 1824 (22). Given Myanmar’s negation of the Rohingya’s historical presence in Myanmar and the Rakhine
state, it isn’t surprising that they were not considered a national race in this census.
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that they were able to prove that they resided in Myanmar before and after British invasion,42
they were denied citizenship through any of these categories (Wade, 2017: 48). Previously
allocated Foreign National Identity Card (FRCs) which gave them access to citizenship in
1974,43 were replaced with temporary identity cards, known as “white cards” and the Rohingya
were officially designated as foreign (Wade, 2017: 51).44 The Rohingya now became officially
stateless and as such, so commenced the denial of their right to vote, their right to hold office,
right to education, and other basic human and legal rights; so commenced their state exclusion
and hence, their utmost vulnerability to the violent actions of the military moving forward
(Wade, 2017).45
The power of race and the fact that the Rohingya were excluded from the enumerated 135
races under General Ne Win’s rule thus cannot be overstated: like Britain, it is clear that Ne Win
ultimately adopted a British-style racial classification system and census gathering strategies
rooted in skin color order to build a racially and religiously pure, Buddhist state and in order to
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Ibrahim (2016) emphasizes that the Rohingya have historically resided in the land that is now Myanmar today:
the Rohingya lived in the Arakan before the British invaded, and they were recognized when the British arrived. For
instance, when the British began tracking and noting its ethnic populations, they identified the Rohingya as living in
what is now the Rakhine state (6). Further, Ibrahim (2016) argues “where people may or may not have lived in 1826
is irrelevant to their entitlement to citizenship today” (5).
43
Foreign National Identity Cards (FRCs) were issued in Myanmar’s 1974 Constitution that stated that the
Rohingya must accept identity cards denoting that they were foreign (Ibrahim, 2016: 8). This can be seen as the first
steps of denying citizenship to the Rohingya as this constitution laid the groundwork of not recognizing them as a
part of the nation.
44
Wade (2017) reveals that even these “white cards” were stripped from the Rohingya in the 2015 multiparty
elections that led Myanmar to becoming a democracy for six years (2015-2021).
45
In a world of nation-states, Chaudhury and Samāddāra (2018) explain, the Rohingya do not have a place. They
are deemed people not deserving or part of any larger governing body, and their sole existence is ignored politically,
legally, and socially (Chaudhury and Samāddāra, 2018). As a result, the Rohingya live in a dehumanized state
where, unlike any other racialized group in this study, they are legislatively made to be sub-human; they have no
claims to the land, no grounds for recognition, and most importantly, they have no means to contest the violence and
genocide being committed against them by the military (Chaudhury and Samāddāra, 2018). Furthermore, in their
statelessness, they are made peoples hidden in obscurity, and statistics as to their poverty, their disappearance, their
dying, and their suffering become elided and disguised in invisibility (Chaudhury and Samāddāra, 2018). The denial
of citizenship to the Rohingya hence allows the Tatmadaw to massacre them as a threat to the nation state and more
than the Mapuche and the Uyghurs, leave the Rohingya in a position of pure vulnerability.
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legislatively exclude the Rohingya from the nation completely.46 The notion that Buddhists
comprised the “indigenous races” of Myanmar and that Rohingya were foreign “Bengali
immigrants” (as will be discussed shortly), was a clever trope for the military to build a nationstate and to legitimate its rule through ideological hegemony (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 126).
In designating the Rohingya as racially and religiously distinct—as not worthy of citizenship or
national incorporation--the military could build its own nation-state identity, cohesion, and again,
legitimacy. The military could also perpetuate ideas about the Rohingya’s racial difference,
danger, and inferiority that in a circular fashion justify their denial of citizenship. For instance,
shortly after the 1982 Citizenship Act was broadcasted, Ne Win stated, “This is not because we
hate [the Rohingya],” but rather, he continued, “If we were to allow them to get into positions
where they can decide the destiny of the State and if they were to betray us, we would be in
trouble” (Wade, 2017: 51-52).47 The Rohingya were officially designated as disloyal, as inferior,
and as racially distinct while simultaneously, the identity of the Buddhist nation was solidified.
“The distinction between the civilised Bamar centre and the unruly border peoples,” Wade
(2017) concludes, “came to determine the fortunes of millions” (52): the Rohingya were not only
disenfranchised and made stateless, but the identity of the Buddhist nation-state and military
legitimacy was also solidified in that very exclusion. Race ultimately “became perhaps the most
powerful political tool in the regime’s armory” (Wade, 2017: 48-49).48
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Ne Win himself claimed that Burma Buddhists “have pure blood” (Wade, 2017: 54-55).
During the military regime under Ne Win’s leadership, Wade (2017) reveals that the Ministry of Immigration
promoted the slogan: “The Earth will not swallow a race to extinction but another race will,” referring to the threat
that the Rohingya posed to the Buddhist citizen body and Buddhist majority and reinforcing the idea of the
Rohingya as a racial “other” (32).
48
Following this census, for instance, Buddhist nationalism, identity, and superiority would be utilized to justify
military dominance and violence; instead of viewing military authoritarianism as unwanted and violating, the
Buddhist polity was now predisposed to see the military as a nation-saving and identity-protecting force. As Wade
(2017) concludes, a narrative was now in place in which “the military [was viewed] not so much as nation builders
but nation restorers;” they would “restore Myanmar to its pre-colonial identity and power” by promoting an idea of
Buddhist purity (34).
47
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Ironically, race would also become the most powerful political tool as the country
transitioned into democracy in 2015, after forty-eight years of military reign (1962 to 2010) and
five years of leadership under the military’s Union Solidarity and Development Party (USPD)
(Wade, 2017: 90). First triggered by protests headed by now State Chancellor Aung San Suu Kyi
in 1988, the military held multiparty elections in 1990 (Wade, 2017: 126-128). The National
League of Democracy (NLD) was one of these parties, founded by Aung San Suu Kyi and her
followers, and the military created its own political party, the Union Solidarity and Development
Party (USDP) (Wade, 2017: 173). Although the NLD won 81% of seats in the 1990 multiparty
elections, the military nullified these results, refused to give up power, and put Aung San Suu
Kyi in house arrest for fifteen years (Wade, 2017: 126-127). The military would then spend the
next eighteen years constructing a new constitution that would solidify its power and dominance
in society before Myanmar would actually move into democracy (Wade, 2017). For instance,
passed in 2008, Myanmar’s current constitution was created by the military and establishes its
legislative dominance in society (Wade, 2017). 25% of the seats in parliament are reserved for
the military and the military retains the power to veto anything (Wade, 2017).49 This constitution
also gives them the power to create states of emergencies and gives them an avenue to
implement rules like the fact that NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi cannot become president
(Taylor, 2009).50 Given the fact that the military used the states of emergencies provision to

49

It is important to note that in some ways, Myanmar’s Constitution of 2008 mirrors Chile’s constitution where the
military retains veto powers in the Senate, the military alone is given four out of the nine senate seats, electoral
districts are biased towards the areas won by the military regime in another plebiscite that occurred in 1988, and
regional governments remain appointed by and controlled by the national government rather than local bodies
(Haughney, 2006: 66-67). Like Myanmar, the military still holds large amounts of power in Chile because of
constitutional provisions.
50
Chapter 3, no. 59(f) of Myanmar’s 2008 constitution requires that the president of Myanmar be someone who “he
himself, one of the parents, the spouse, one of the legitimate children or their spouses not owe allegiance to a foregin
power” (Steinburg, 2010: 144). “[They shall] not be subject of a foreign power or citizen of a foreign country…[or]
e persons entitled to enjoy the rights and privileges of a subject of a foreign government or citizen of a foreign
country” (144). Because Aung San Suu Kyi’s children are British citizens, she hence cannot become president. This
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throw their recent coup this year (2021) and end democracy (as will be discussed later), this
constitution would become extraordinarily important to the military’s continued rule in society
(Faulder, 2021). As Steinberg (2010) describes, as a result of this constitution, the military would
remain a “state within a state” in which it would remain largely independent and still dominant in
Myanmar society (101).51
Returning to race and Myanmar’s transition to democracy, however, the military finally
did give up nominal rule in 2015 when multiparty elections were again held, and the NLD won
the election once more (Wade, 2017). This time, the military accepted the results (as its newly
formed constitution now ensured the military’s continued rule in society) and under Aung San
Suu Kyi’s leadership, Myanmar began its titular transition to democracy. It is important to note
just how important the 2015 elections were for Myanmar who had never before possessed
autonomy from a colonial or military regime. Yet, consistent with the rest of its history and as
mentioned previously, this transition was more nominal than anything as the military still held
power through its 2008 Constitution (Steinberg, 2010). Further, democracy was extremely
hindered by the fact that racial projects continued to be a vital part of the NLD’s nation-state
building strategies (Wade, 2017). Although Aung San Suu Kyi is hailed as a human rights
activist and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991 for her work protesting the Tatmadaw
(Appendix 10), like both the British and the military regime, she also utilized racial narratives in
her rule to strengthen her and the NLD’s legitimacy (Kuhn, 2012). Recognizing how the
military’s use of racial narratives and the exclusion of the Rohingya brought them legitimacy,

rule was created to specifically bar her from becoming president, so she acts as the State Counsellor of Myanmar
(like a prime minister).
51
For instance, Steinberg (2010) reveals that “the military was only the size of 186,000 at the time of the 1988 coup
and it has now expanded to approach the half-million mark” (75). “It is truly an enveloping society,” he writes,
separate (and more powerful) from Myanmar and its recent democratic party (the NLD).
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and caught in a bind where she needed the Buddhist majority’s political support as to ensure her
own reelection (support that as will shortly be discussed, relies on the perpetuation of racial
narratives as large segments of the Buddhist polity have incorporated ideas of racial superiority
into their own beings), in her six years in office (2015-2021), Aung San Suu Kyi never spoke out
against the Rohingya genocide (Wade, 2017). As the Tatmadaw continued to persecute the
Rohingya during democracy and as they triggered Buddhist nationalist groups to aid in the
repression of the Rohingya, Aung San Suu Kyi never tried to squander their efforts nor protect
the Rohingya (Wade, 2017); instead, she herself continued to perpetuate an idea of the Rohingya
as racially different.52
For instance, in a United Nations International Court of Justice (ICJ) case brought against
Myanmar in 2019 for the genocide of the Rohingya, Aung San Suu Kyi repeatedly referred to the
Rohingya as Bengali immigrants53 and denied any responsibility for the genocide of the
Rohingya (Simons and Beech, 2019). Further, during her rule with the NLD, and as will be
discussed in detail later, Aung San Suu Kyi passed several restrictive laws called the “Race and
Religion Protection Laws” that gave the government control over the reproductive rights of
minority groups like the Rohingya (Wade, 2017: 170). Ware and Laoutides (2018) further state
that during the Tatmadaw’s clearance operations in 2017—violent operations to clear the
Rohingya from their land as will also be discussed later--Aung San Suu Kyi did not sanction or
condemn the military or Buddhist nationalist groups in anyway; instead, she blamed the
Rohingya’s small militia, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), themselves for the
persecution and violence that erupted (55). These are just a few of the numerous instances in
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It is important to note that during Aung San Suu Kyi’s rule and still today, the Rohingya are still excluded from
the enumerated 135 national races in Myanmar (Wade, 2017).
53
Wade (2017) emphasizes that this was a common label that Aung San Suu Kyi used to describe the Rohingya
during her rule. This label is important as it denotes the Rohingya as foreign and as not a part of Myanmar.
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which Aung San Suu Kyi and her democratic government further contributed to the persecution
of the Rohingya and further entrenched the idea of their racial difference as justification of
violent exclusion directed at them.54 Ultimately, under her and the NLD’s rule, the Rohingya
fared no better in democracy, and racial narratives became an even more entrenched part of
Myanmar society.
Today, for instance, the Buddhist majority have incorporated racial narratives into their
entities and have come to truly believe in the validity of the Rohingya’s innate difference,
foreignness, and amorphous threat as a racialized other. Like what was seen in Chile with the
Chilean racial majority believing in the racial narratives of the Mapuche as different as to
internalize their own superiority and work for their own high status in society (Richards, 2013),
and as seen in China with the Han majority believing in racial narratives of the Uyghurs as
innately different and “uncivilized” (Kaltman, 2007), large segments of the Buddhist majority
have come to believe that the Rohingya are biologically different, inferior, and subhuman (Wade,
2017). This has led to active support of Tatmadaw violence against the Rohingya, as well as
militant civilian efforts of repression against the Rohingya (Wade, 2017). Buddhist monks and
Buddhist extremists, for instance, have recently conducted highly violent extermination efforts
against the Rohingya due to a fear of losing their high status and position of religious and racial
superiority in Myanmar society (Wade, 2017: 141). They have truly come to believe that the
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Interestingly, not only was not standing up for the Rohingya or fighting racial narratives again key for NLD
legitimacy and citizen support—as again, the reelection of Aung San Suu Kyi depended on the support of the
Buddhist majority who believe in such racial narratives --but Wade (2017) reveals that it is likely that Aung San Suu
Kyi believes in these racial narratives herself (129). Aung San Suu Kyi, he writes, is “an elite Bamar and thus a
beneficiary of the ethnic hierarchy that had formed in Myanmar” (129). Thus, why would she change or combat
these racial narratives when she, herself, is also benefiting from the racial and religious superiority her Buddhist
identity has been made to hold in Myanmar society? Also interesting is the fact that Aung San Suu Kyi’s father was
General Aung San who headed the Burma Independence Army (BIA) and who led the country to independence in
1948 (Wade, 2017: 126-128). Like the NLD’s intimate connection with the military that continued as Myanmar
transitioned to democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi also has connections with the militaristic autocracy. This again could
be a reason why she never fought the racial narratives of the Rohingya as different during her rule.
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Rohingya’s darker skin color denotes innate danger and difference and have used this as
justification to commit their own violent atrocities with intent to eliminate the Rohingya
completely.
For instance, Wade (2017) conducted an interview with Buddhist monk and member of a
Buddhist nationalist organization called Ma Ba Tha,55 U Parmoukkha, and found that he
associated the Rohingyas’ darker skin tone as revealing something more innate about their
presumed inferior characteristics. In the interview, U Parmoukkha stated that “Christians didn’t
possess the capability for violence that Muslims had,” suggesting that it was innate for Muslims
to be aggressive (192). Another Buddhist interviewee and Ma Ba Tha member stated:
Even now, you can see kufi caps everywhere. It can’t be good at all. This country was
founded with the Buddhist ideology. And if the Buddhist culture vanishes, Yangon will
become like Saudi and Mecca. Then, there wouldn’t be the influence of peace and
truth...There will be more discrimination and violence…It can be the fall of Yangon. It
can also be the fall of Buddhism. And our race will be eliminated (Wade, 2017: 5-6).
These statements again expose a belief in the inherent violence of the Rohingya (“there will be
more discrimination and violence”), as well as a deep conflation of religion and race (“our race
will be eliminated”), accompanied by fear of a loss of identity; these statements once more show
how racial differences are inflated by religious differences and how both combine to create an
idea of a dangerous Rohingya “other.”56 These interviews ultimately show how ideas of innate
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As will be discussed later, the Ma Ba Tha, the Organization for the Protection of Race and Religion, is a Buddhist
Nationalist Organization that was formed in 2013 (Ibrahim, 2016: 11). They are explicitly anti-Muslim and have
been involved in “almost all ethnic related violence since 2010” (11). The organization is super helpful to the
Tatmadaw as they help execute violence against the Rohingya and they promote support for the military’s party, the
USDP (14). Ibrahim (2016) even reveals that “there is evidence that they were created by the Tatmadaw as “an
alternative power base” (12).
56
Ironically, although the Rohingya are posited as innately violent, it is Buddhist nationalist and political groups
such as MaBaTha who are conducting extreme violence against them. The Rakhine Nationalities Development
Party, for instance, formed in 2010, ran an editorial in its magazine, Development Journal, that stated: ”HItler and
Eichmann were the enemy of the Jews, but they were probably heroes to the Germans….in order for a country’s
survival, the survival of a race, or in defense of national sovereignty, crimes against humanity or in-human acts may
justifiably be committed...so, if that survival principle or justification is applied or permitted equally...our endeavors
to protect our Rakhine race and defend the sovereignty and longevity of the Union of Myanmar cannot be labeled as
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difference return to a racial basis (focused on the innate and immutable), and how the larger
Buddhist citizen body has accepted and incorporated these racial narratives into their entities as
to reassert their own status group and supremacy in Myanmar society.57
Other examples of the Buddhist polity believing in the innate racial difference of the
Rohingya can be seen in the widespread use of disparaging racial slurs such as “kalar” or “kala”
used by the Buddhist majority to describe the Rohingya (Wade, 2017: 102). Historically, these
terms have been used to refer to people with dark skin or South Asian features and have often
been derogatorily used to refer to Indians (Wade, 2017: 102; Ferguson, 2015: 8). Ware and
Laoutides (2018) further explain that “kala” has the same impact as the n-word in the U.S.
(Introduction: xvii). Beyond these racially pejorative terms, the Rohingya are also frequently
described as “Bengali immigrants” indicating again, that they are not a part of the 135 national
races in Myanmar (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 126). Wade (2017) reveals that one magazine in
Myanmar called the Rohingya “a Black tsunami in humble disguise,” while another said that the
“Bengalis [(referring to the Rohingya)] are very deceptive” (101). Despite the fact that the
Rohingya have lived in what is now the Rakhine state throughout recorded history, claims about
their “Bengali” identity again have roots in British immigration policies during colonization and
are a modern attempt to transform historical animosities into modern attempts of racial state
building (Wade, 2017: 66). In positing the Rohingya as racially foreign, the racial and religious
in-group identity of Myanmar (Buddhist and Buddhist presenting) gets solidified. Meanwhile,

‘crimes against humanity’ or ‘inhuman’ or ‘in-humane’” (134). And yet, it is these same people who are labeling the
Rohingya as innately violent...
57
Wade (2017) further reveals that in one YouTube video entitled, “Disappearance of the Race--is a Thing to Fear,”
in the 1990s, a monk detailed the threat of Muslims to Myanmar when he stated, “My lay followers, do not be
complacent about protecting our race from extinction…the Muslims are relentlessly working to swallow up Burma’s
ethnic populations” (25). Here, race, religion, and ethnicity are all being conflated to portray the threat of the
Buddhist citizen body losing their power and supremacy in Myanmar to the Rohingya (the Muslims).
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the racial nation-state as a whole--the creation of unifying ideologies that again, contribute to
state cohesion, obedience, and legitimacy--grows stronger as a direct consequence of the
Rohingya’s racialization and repression.
Akin to China and China, racial narratives and the positioning of the Rohingya as racially
different are hence extraordinarily powerful for nation-state building projects in Myanmar. As
seen in the transformation from British rule, to the leadership of General Ne Win under the
military regime, to the recent “democracy” headed by Aung San Suu Kyi (2015-2021), racial
narratives have clearly been harnessed throughout Myanmar’s history as to bring legitimacy to
the nation-state and those in power. Currently and in recent history, such narratives are
imperative to the military and to the very existence of the Tatmadaw. As will be discussed
throughout the rest of this study, it is in enforcing genocide against the Rohingya that the
Tatmadaw has been able to legitimatize its presence throughout society; in getting the Buddhist
majority to so fervently believe in the racial narratives of the Rohingya as “other” and
dangerous,58 and in then getting the NLD to also support such genocide as to not lose its political
Buddhist support during the recent democracy, the Tatmadaw has been able to garner authority,
dominance, and support across all of Myanmar (Wade, 2017).59
Ultimately, while similar in the fact that the Tatmadaw is using race to assert its authority
in society, the Tatmadaw is distinct from governing forces Chile and China and their racial state
building strategies in the fact that it is publicly trying to exclude and eliminate the Rohingya;
unlike governing forces in Chile and China who promote an idea of multiculturalism to hide their
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In capitalizing, that is, on Buddhist fear that Myanmar will become “Islamized” and that the Buddhist race and
religion will disappear (Wade, 2017: 78).
59
Wade (2017) call this the “tripartite nature” of the persecution of the Rohingya where the Tatmadaw, the NLD,
and the Buddhist polity are all invested in the persecution of the Rohingya, and where the Tatmadaw is controlling
everybody as it has gotten all of these actors invested in racial narratives while its own dominance and influence
remains hidden in society (Appendix 18) (141).
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true efforts of exclusion, the Tatmadaw today is visibly and publicly targeting the Rohingya and
is promoting narratives that the Rohingya need to be excluded from the country completely.
Furthermore, unlike the Uyghurs and the Mapuche who are more politically integrated with their
nations, the Rohingya today remain a disenfranchised and completely stateless population. This
leaves them without any political or legal protections and makes them the most vulnerable
racialized group in this study. Also unique from Chile and China is the fact that the Tatmadaw is
both a governing body in itself (as seen in the recent coup d’état it just threw), and the coercive
force carrying out violent actions to defend and legitimize such governance; unlike Chile and
China who deploy other coercive forces such as police or detention camps to enforce racial
narratives, the Tatmadaw carries out the genocide of the Rohingya itself, along with Buddhist
extremists as will be explored shortly. These two aspects—the fact that the Tatmadaw conducts
violence itself and the fact that its racial exclusion is highly visible and publicly promoted—will
be analyzed more in the methods of oppression chapter as to why it chooses to do so, or why it
can do so, in comparison to Chile and China. For now, though, it is important to emphasize that
even when its reign paused briefly from 2015-2021, and while using a different racial state
building strategy than Chile or China (again, using narratives and actions of explicit racist
exclusion rather than narratives of multiculturalism), that the Tatmadaw has ultimately been
successful in deploying racial narratives and coercive action to create and maintain its
dominance in Myanmar.
Conclusion: Racial Narratives as Means of Building Racial Nation-states and Garnering
State Legitimacy, Stability, and Identity
Clearly, racial narratives are imperative to nation-state construction, legitimacy, and
success throughout all three of these countries: as seen in the symbolic and capitalistic profits the
Chilean state receives from positing the Mapuche as racially distinct and therefore worthy of
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exploitation and domination (and not worthy of their own sovereignty); as seen in the ideas of
national unity and homogeneity the CCP can emphasize—one Chinese nation or racial stock,
zhonghua minzu (Bovingdon, 2010: 16)--even when racial and religious differences are clearly
recognized and feared by the CCP; and as seen in the legitimacy, power, and authority the
Tatmadaw brings to itself by making everybody in society fearful of the Rohingya and thus, in
support of its genocide against this minority group and its continued dominance in society, racial
narratives and the construction of the racialized other are again imperative to building what
Goldberg (2002) calls the construction of the racial nation-state (9). It is clear that racist
ideologies connecting the physical to a narrative of inferiority, danger, and criminality runs
through each chosen country in this study—a common practice of assigning judgement values to
the physical appearances and identities of minority groups--as to again, construct their own
nation-state authority and supremacy throughout society. Racial narratives ultimately become
utterly essential to each racial nation-state or governing body, which is why such extreme and
coercive forces to defend such narratives become necessary. Government coercion ultimately
arises in order to defend such critical narratives for state dominance and authority.
As seen across Myanmar, Chile, and China, however, such means to build a racial nationstate are not uniform across nations, and the forms in which racial narratives manifest vary
greatly depending on the governing body. For instance, as seen in Chile and China, the Chilean
government and the CCP have adopted a faux idea of multiculturalism where differences in
indigenous status, religion, and ethnicity have been promoted even when racist policies and
ideologies are the reality. For instance, in Chile, racist ideas of the Mapuche’s inferiority,
incivility, and criminality still persist as to justify the exploitation of their lands and the
neoliberal interests of the Chilean state. Meanwhile, in China, racist assimilationist strategies—
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through re-education camps or propaganda emphasizing integration into a Han centered
identity—persist as to continue positioning the Han majority as the racially superior and the
standard in Chinese society. Hence, in these two countries, racist practices get obscured in
narratives emphasizing unity. I predict that because China and Chile are a communist and
democratic country, respectively, that such racial state building strategies are necessary for these
governing forces to not lose legitimacy in their countries.
Meanwhile, and as seen in Myanmar, the Tatmadaw (and the NLD during the past six
years of democracy), have deployed a racial state building strategy of explicit racial exclusion.
The Rohingya are publicly denounced as other and no attempt to create a false idea of national
harmony is deployed by the military. Instead, it is this highly public discourse of division itself
that is key for building the Buddhist national identity. I predict that such racial state building
practices and the ability of the Tatmadaw to execute such explicit genocide is legitimized
through its authoritarian regime as will be discussed more in the methods of oppression section
of this thesis. Overall, while starkly different from the racial state building strategies and racial
narratives in Chile and China, the Buddhist citizen body have still incorporated racial narratives
into their beings, just like large segments of the Chilean majority and the Han majority. This
suggests that regardless of if explicit or covert forms of racial narratives are promoted by
governing bodies to enforce their dominance in society, that the citizen body still recognizes the
boundary making that is happening and that they still believe in racial narratives as to establish
the superiority of their own status group. As Wade (2017) concludes, “The construction of an
identity is often done by antithesis—I am what you are not” (58). Meanwhile, each governing
force again gains legitimacy as the citizen body is believing in the racial narratives—the social
order--that they are promoting.
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Returning to theory more broadly, race and racial classification for nation-state formation
is not a new phenomenon, but rather, has existed globally for centuries. As early as 1795, for
instance, German anthropologist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach categorized people based on
different physical features said to be caused by environmental differences and causes (what is
now called polygenism, the belief in distinct races who have different origins) (Maier and
Waxman, 1983). By studying the skulls of diverse groups of people, Blumenbach created five
categories of peoples: “the Caucasian variety, the Mongolian variety, the Ethiopian variety, the
American variety, and the Malayan variety,” and then attributed internal characteristics to each
category (141). The Caucasian variety, for instance, he described as “most handsome and
becoming,” while the other races like the Ethiopian variety were “likened to apes'' (142).
Blumenbach’s classifications show how lightness has been valued throughout centuries and how
the biological has always been a proxy for the personal characteristics of entire groups of people.
While Blumenbach’s five racial categories no longer exist in the three chosen countries in this
study, Chile, China, and Myanmar have all clearly adopted their own racial narratives that have a
similar anti-dark ideology and that similarly place innate personality judgements onto whole
groups of people because of their physical appearances and their religious, ethnic, and
indigenous identities.
Interestingly, it is important to note that two of these three countries, Chile and Myanmar,
were completely colonized by Western powers who, in the act of conquering these countries,
were deploying a global, anti-dark dogma or theory. Racism, Stone and Rizova (2014) explain in
their book, Racial Conflict in Global Society, fueled colonialism, and yet, was the exact
mechanism deployed by those very colonized countries after imperial rule seized around the
world in the twentieth century. Having been subjected to racial narratives and racial domination
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themselves, governing bodies in Chile and Myanmar adopted their own racial narratives to
enforce their own authority and state building; they too used this global anti-dark ideology to
establish their own position as a nation-state in global society. Again, this fact shows the power
of racial narratives in state formation, and how racial ideas of difference are again, perpetuated
throughout time as to establish nation-state authority.
Ultimately, now that racial narratives and racial state building strategies have been
established for Chile, China, and Myanmar, the rest of this study will explore how coercive
forces (both physical and symbolic) have arisen in each of these countries as to enforce such
racial narratives. Subsequent sections will now analyze how the oppression of peripheral areas,
the rhetoric of terrorism, and mechanisms of oppression or government coercion are deployed
against racialized groups in Chile, China, and Myanmar as to better understand how governing
forces in each of these countries defend constructions of race and therefore, their nation-states
completely. For, as mentioned previously, although race and racial narratives are key to the
establishment of nation-states across the world, the reality remains that race is constructed daily;
although having real consequences and material repercussions, it is as fictitious as the nationstate and its boundaries, which is why it ultimately needs such stringent defending in all of these
countries. Government coercion in each country ultimately reveals important insight into the
precarity of race and the precarity of racial narratives present in global society.
Chapter Two

Peripheries of Vulnerability: Racial Minorities on Symbolic and Literal Fringes
of Nation-State Territory and Identity
When analyzing nation-states and their racial state building strategies for government
dominance across societies, the importance of boundaries, both physical and metaphorical,
becomes starkly apparent. Boundaries, both concretely and more symbolically, help define who a
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nation-state is, and more importantly, who a nation-state is not. Physical boundaries, for instance,
often demark who is part of a nation’s citizen body and who is subjected to the rules and laws of
a particular governing authority. Symbolic boundaries, on the other hand, often demark who is
metaphorically imagined to be part of a nation’s identity, and who is included in more socially
constructed ideas of a particular society. “One of the surest ways to confirm an identity, for
communities as well as for individuals,” Kai Erikson (1996) writes in his book, Wayward
Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance, “is to find some way of measuring what one is
not” (64)
Boundaries, real and emblematic, are highly significant in nation-state formation and
racial narratives to build national and personal identity. So too are peripheral areas: real and
symbolic areas where physical and symbolic boundaries are located. Peripheries, as defined by
Merriam-Webster, are “the external boundary or surface of a body”; “the outward bounds of
something as distinguished from its internal regions or center”; and “an area lying beyond the
strict limits of a thing” (“Periphery,” 2021). Peripheral areas are the extremities or the furthest
points from something and applied to this study, peripheral areas are where the three racialized
groups in this study--the Mapuche, the Uyghurs, and the Rohingya--are located both physically
and metaphorically. Physically, for instance, the Mapuche, the Uyghurs, and the Rohingya all
reside on the outskirts of Chilean, Chinese, and Burmese territory; as will be discussed shortly,
all of these racialized groups live on the edges of these three nation-states, far from centric
territory and centric concentrations of people. Metaphorically, then, the Mapuche, the Uyghurs,
and the Rohingya all also reside in the symbolic peripheries of each nation-state. As discussed in
the last section, the Mapuche, the Uyghurs, and the Rohingya have all made peripheral racial
groups who are designated as different, inferior, and “other” in each of these three societies. In
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fact, all of these minority groups can be labeled peripheral, racialized groups in themselves as
they have been designated to the outermost territories of Chilean, Chinese, and Burmese nationstate identity.
Examining peripheral areas, both physical and metaphorical, is crucial in the
vulnerability they pose for nation-states in Chile, China, and Myanmar. Because peripheries are
located on the fringes of both a nation-state’s literal physical territory, as well as on the fringes of
its symbolic constructions of racial state identity, they are conceptualized by nation-state
governments and citizen bodies as insecure and precarious spaces. For instance, in his book,
Territories in Resistance, Raúl Zibechi (2012) emphasizes how peripheries are often “black
holes” existing outside of state control where people “rehearse their challenges to the state”
(190). He continues to argue that peripheries are often spaces where the power of the state’s
concentric metaphorical and physical core has diminished significantly towards the edges, and
where “popular counter-power” has begun posing challenges to state systems (Zibechi, 2012:
198).
In both their real and imagined constructions, peripheries represent exposed areas that are
susceptible to outside influence and that are left dangerous because of a threat of separation, in
the case of physical peripheries, or because of a threat of changing boundaries that redefine the
nation-state’s entire identity, as in the case of metaphorical, racial boundaries. Ironically, while
physically, nation-states and their governing bodies fear the separation of peripheral areas from
their territory, metaphorically, they fear the incorporation of racially peripheral groups into their
nation-state identity; as talked about in the last section, the exclusion of racially peripheral
groups is key to establishing nation-state identity in itself (again, whether through blatant
exclusion like in Myanmar or in more convert exclusion covered by rhetoric of multiculturalism
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like in Chile and China). Hence, in physical and metaphorical peripheral areas, there often exists
a tension of state building strategies; how, after all, do nation-states maintain physical control of
peripheral areas while simultaneously metaphorically excluding racialized groups who often live
in these same territories? Because of the fact that physical and metaphorical peripheral areas
often overlap (as will be discussed in these three countries), governing bodies and their racial
nation-states must decipher how to control the same peripheral areas and populations in a way
that fits both their needs (physical incorporation and at the same time, symbolic exclusion of
racialized groups).
As found in Chile, China, and Myanmar, and as will be explored throughout the rest of
this section, government coercion is one mechanism that has emerged in some nation-states to
confront such contradictory goals of the racial nation-state.60 Given the plethora of capital
resources in the physical peripheral areas of these three nation-states, and given the fact that
nation-states and their governing bodies seek to maintain control of its literal, physical expanse
and land, each of these three nation-states and their governing bodies have resorted to
government coercion to maintain its rule of its outer territory; government coercion in Chile,
China, and Myanmar have all deployed violent and repressive means of control to retain its
physically peripheral areas in its boundaries. Yet, as will be further explored, Chile, China, and
Myanmar have also deployed government coercion to maintain its minority groups—the
Mapuche, the Uyghurs, and the Rohingya—as a peripheral group on the fringes of its symbolic
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For instance, Zibechi (2012) argues that because social movements and calls for separation often arise from
peripheral areas, that various nation-states have militarized their peripheries and have deployed coercive forces to
squander such separatist attempts. “Biopolitical methods of governance,” he states, calls for “increased
militarization of these spaces” in an attempt to suppress any real or falsely perceived social movements and social
identities existing on the fringes (197-198). Ironically, while social movements and social resistance to state
hegemony can occur in any space, Zibechi exposes how perceived insecurity, fear, and vulnerability of peripheral
areas have led nation-states to disproportionately deploy coercive forces and efforts to peripheral areas in their
territories.
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nation-state identity. Drawing back to Wilkerson (2020), racialized groups are essential for racial
nation-states to create a scapegoat worthy of blame for the country’s problems and effective in
solidifying in-group national identity; it is again, in defining who a nation is not, that a nationstate can define who it is. Repressive governmental actions and coercion against racial minorities
in these three countries ultimately becomes essential in symbolically keeping these racialized
groups on the edges of society and in doing so, reaffirming a racial nation-state and its racial
majority citizen identity.
This section intends to explore the intersections among space, race, capitalist pursuits,
and the subsequent use of government coercion to control literal peripheral areas and
symbolically peripheral groups (the Mapuche, the Uyghurs, and the Rohingya). As briefly
mentioned previously, I will argue that in Chile, China, and Myanmar, racialized minority
groups all exist on the fringes of the various nation-states’ both physical and metaphorical
territories which compounds their perceived danger as a racialized other. I conclude that the
location of the Mapuche, Uyghurs, and the Rohingya in physically peripheral areas, and as
symbolically peripheral groups, further motivates the governing bodies of each country to
maintain the physical control, integration, and economic exploitation of the peripheral areas in
which these racial minority groups live (Arauncanía in Chile, Xinjiang in China, and the Rakhine
state in Myanmar), while also, further entrenching racist ideologies of the Mapuche, Uyghurs,
and Rohingya as racially different and inferior. Aligned with the last section on racial narratives
and racial state dominance and identity, this section aims to explore how peripheral areas
(physical and symbolic) are impacted by and further solidify racial narratives, how governments
wish to exploit these areas for their own capital gain, and how peripheries ultimately create the
material and social conditions from which nation-states and their governing bodies are driven to
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implement government coercion to control such precarious and important physical and symbolic
spaces. For ultimately, I conclude, control of the physical and symbolic areas in which the
racialized minorities in this study exist are again key to establishing governing bodies’
dominance and legitimacy throughout these three societies.
Araucanía and the Mapuche: The Physical and Metaphorical Fringes of Chile
Located in the south of Chile, in a region called Araucanía, and being a racialized group
made “other” in Chile, the Mapuche are physically and metaphorically conceptualized as
existing on the fringes of state control and centralized Chilean racial state identity: the “periphery
of the periphery” as Haughney (2006) describes, meaning that the Mapuche’s physical location
on the periphery in Chile is compounded by the fact that they are also symbolically located on
the outskirts of Chilean nation-state identity (25). Although existing in what looks like the
middle of Chile (Appendix 16), because most of Chile’s population is concentrated in northern
metropolitan areas of Santiago, Valparaíso, and Concepción61 (“Chile Population 2021”),
Arauncanía is still imagined by large segments of the Chilean majority and the Chilean
government as physically lying on the edges of Chilean society (Richards, 2013). For instance,
Richards (2013) writes, “Geographically, the Arauncanía is better described as located in SouthCentral Chile. However, the region is colloquially understood and described as in the Chilean
South” (227). Arauncanía is widely understood as residing in the country’s physical periphery.
Drawing back to the previous section and the fact that the Mapuche were originally
separated from the Chilean nation-state pre-independence, Richards (2013) also reiterates that
the Mapuche have been, and continue to be, metaphorically conceptualized as a peripheral,
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According to a report by the World Population Review, as of 2021, the Santiago Metropolis region has 7.2
million inhabitants (“Chile Population 2021”). The next two largest cities in Chile, the greater Valparaíso region as
well as the Concepción region have populations close to 1 million (“Chile Population 2021”). The capital of
Araucanía, Temuco, on the other hand, has a population of only 238,129 people (“Chile Population 2021”).
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racialized group made “other” and distinct from Chilean racial state identity. For example, before
the War of Pacification62 and before the Mapuche and Arauncanía were incorporated into the
newly founded Chilean nation-state, Richards (2013) writes that the Mapuche were largely
viewed by the Chilean government and Chilean majority as “the external other, the enemy who
threatened the integrity of the Chilean nation” (Richards, 2013: 43). “Later,” she continues to
explain, referring to when the Mapuche were then conquered by the new Chilean nation-state
and placed in reducciones (or reservations) at the beginning of the 19th century, the Mapuche
“became an internal other, either negated or set apart from Chileans” (Richards, 2013: 43). At
this time, “the Mapuche were marginalized in their interactions with Chileans and colonos,63”
she writes, and “although authorities nominally expected the Mapuche to become like anyone
else…daily life in the borderlands relentlessly underscored the Mapuche’s purported racial and
cultural inferiority” (44). The Mapuche, although now physically incorporated in the new nation,
were still symbolically seen as existing on the extremities of symbolic Chilean racial identity.
Such cultural and social conceptualizations of the Mapuche as symbolically existing far
from Chilean central identity—constructions that position the Mapuche as a racialized,
peripheral group--continue today as the Chilean national government, large segments of the
Chilean racial majority, and many Chilean and transnational businesses view the Mapuche as a
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Once more, Pacification, or the War of Extermination, occurred after the Chilean state annexed Mapuche territory
in 1881 and then immediately forced assimilation upon them (Kowalczyk, 2013: 125). The Mapuche were forced
into the Chilean education system, the military, and were subjected to evangelical missions (Kowalczyk, 2013: 125).
63
“Colonos” are who Richards (2013) describes as European settlers who came to Chile post-independence and
who bought or were granted land in Chile’s South (2). Interestingly, and making Chilean racial narratives even more
complex, as the Chilean nation-state built its nation in post-colonial society, the Chilean government frequently
recruited European immigrants to occupy what previously was Mapuche land or what Richards (2013) calls the
“Frontera” (the border) (Richards, 2013: 41). The Chilean government granted colonos or European settlers large
amounts of land, animals, a monthly pension, and medical care for two years upon coming, and in years that
followed, continued to sell Mapuche land to nonindigenous peoples (whether Chileans or Europeans) (Richards,
2013: 42). All efforts, Richards (2013) concludes, was to make the newly founded Chilean nation-state look “more
civilized” and to aid in the Mapuche’s suppression and conquest (41-43). As a result, these efforts also, perhaps not
coincidentally, made Chile whiter.

80

danger existing far from state control and as a threat that could split off from the Chilean nationstate completely (Richards, 2013). The Mapuche as a group also continue to imagine themselves
as distinct from the Chilean nation-state and Chilean majority. For instance, with their own
culture, customs, and worldviews64 (Course, 2011), the Mapuche possess their own unique
identity and have continuously made calls for their separatism from the Chilean nation-state
(Richards, 2013). Today, for example, Richards (2013) explains how the Mapuche have a
number of organizations working for Mapuche rights and recuperation of their ancestral lands.
Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco (CAM), for instance, is a Mapuche organization that is
fighting for the recovery of Mapuche territory, and the creation of an autonomous Mapuche state
in Arauncanía (Kowalczyk, 2013: 120-131); they are fighting for the “recuperation of admapu
(ancestral traditions, laws, and norms)” or to “recover Mapuche essence” (Richards, 2013: 175).
Because the protection of their lands is again integral to Mapuche identity and group-formation,
it is thus a focus of their resistance.65 In protest of the exploitation of their land by transnational
businesses and corporations, they have been accused of setting various trucks, equipment, and
land of these companies on fire (Kowalczyk, 2013: 120-131).66 Not all Mapuche advocacy
organizations are working for Mapuche independence completely. The Wallmapuwen political
party, for instance, is working within the Chilean political system by seeking to establish a
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For instance, in his book, Becoming Mapuche: Person and Ritual in Indigenous Chile, Course (2011) writes that
the Mapuche hold distinct worldviews from the rest of the Chilean racial majority and Chilean government in the
fact that they highly value the land, in the fact that they reject neoliberal policies, and in the fact that their society
emphasizes “individual autonomy and responsibility, rather than group belonging and hierarchy” (Introduction, xii).
He further explains how the Mapuche are culturally distinct from the Chilean racial majority and Chilean nationstate in the fact that they worship their own deities, hold distinct traditions, and even have their own language called
Mapudungun (Course, 2011: 17).
65
In an interview with Zibechi and Ryan (2012), for instance, one Mapuche man describes how the struggle to
reclaim Mapuche identity is contingent on reclaiming Mapuche land. He states, “Rejuvenating the Mapuche people
is based on recovering our territory” (116).
66
Because of this, Richards (2013) notes that CAM “has been deemed responsible for most of the violent action”
and that several CAM leaders have been incarcerated under anti-terrorist laws as will be discussed later (81).
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“democratically elected regional assembly with proportional representation of all sectors of the
regional economy” (Richards, 2013: 178). In other words, this organization is seeking to garner
more Mapuche power locally but is not advocating for Mapuche separatism completely
(Richards, 2013). Although the desires and focus of Mapuche organizations hence vary greatly,
all nonetheless show how the Mapuche represent a significant threat to the Chilean nation-state,
transnational corporations, and the Chilean racial majority who depend on the dominance of the
Mapuche and their territory for their own economic success, profit, and identity building
strategies. They also again expose how the Mapuche continue to view themselves as distinct
from Chilean racial nation-state identity.
Interestingly and as mentioned previously, in October 2020 of this last year, Chile held a
plebiscite to vote on the construction of a new constitution and it was approved by the majority
of citizens (Bonnefoy, 2020). This is monumental as Pinochet’s constitution of 1980 will finally
be replaced by a new document made by a commission of writers, a Constitutional Assembly,
who will begin meeting and writing a new constitution this April 2021 (Partridge, 2020).
Significantly, 17 of the 155 seats in this assembly have been set aside for indigenous groups and
the Mapuche will receive seven of these seats (Partridge, 2020). Although extremely
consequential, many Mapuche organizations have already stated that they do not wish to be a
part of the writing process as they still imagine themselves as socially and nationally distinct
from the Chilean state (F., Tomás González, 2019). For instance, in an interview with CAM and
Mapuche leader, Héctor Llaitul, he explained: “The struggle of the Mapuche nation has another
path, it has a path of reconstruction of the Mapuche nation, and within this framework, we
consider that the situation is separate” (F., Tomás González, 2019). Ultimately, he concluded in
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this interview, “The Mapuche nation’s political fight has another path” (Appendix 76) (F.,
Tomás González, 2019).
Perhaps it is the fact that many Mapuche leaders like Llaitul doubt that the new
constitution will bring the Mapuche official recognition or recuperation of their ancestral lands-true independence from the Chilean nation-state which is what many Mapuche organizations like
CAM are again fighting for--but these statements reveal that many prominent Mapuche leaders
and Mapuche peoples still view themselves as distinct and separate from the Chilean nationstate.67 The distinctiveness they feel, once again, could create fear among the Chilean
government, transnational companies, and the Chilean racial majority that the Mapuche are at
risk of separating from the state, and therefore, are a danger threatening the material and
symbolic profit each of these parties receive from the exploitation of Arauncanía and the
repression of the Mapuche as a racialized other. The Mapuche’s own conceptualization of being
separate from the Chilean nation-state is ultimately a large source of motivation for the Chilean
government to continue maintaining control and incorporation of Arauncanía (the physical,
peripheral area) within its territories, while at the same time, continuing to position the Mapuche
as a racialized group on the symbolic outskirts of its identity (as a metaphorically peripheral
group); the Mapuche must continue to be made distinct, but under the Chilean racial nationstate’s own narratives and stories (not the Mapuche’s own creation of their separate identity),
and while Mapuche land is still integrated in the Chilean nation’s physical territory.
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It is possible that because the Mapuche’s territorial and political integration and role as the racialized other is
critical for Chilean nation-state building, Mapuche leaders and Mapuche people ultimately recognize that the
Chilean state will probably never allow for their independence and for their separation from the state which is what
many Mapuche organizations like CAM are fighting for (Richards, 2013); it is possible, that is, that Llaitul and other
Mapuche leaders acknowledge that even if the constitution no longer has Pinochet’s signature at the bottom, that as
long as the Chilean nation-state and racial project lives on, that they will be excluded and repressed as a racialized
other for the profit and identity building strategies of the Chilean nation-state to continue on.
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Mentioned thus far, but highly important to reiterate is the capital pursuits and economic
drives that motivate the Chilean government to continue dominating the Mapuche in physical
and metaphorical peripheries. Being highly lucrative in resources and with large timber and
water potential, Arauncanía is key for the economic success and profit of the Chilean
government and individual companies (Richards, 2013). As mentioned in the last chapter, the
Arauncanía is subjected to the neoliberal policies—neoliberal again in the sense that a free
market and little governmental regulation of companies is the dominating economic and political
ideology--of the Chilean nation-state who, throughout time, have favored private interests and
businesses over the Mapuche’s right to their land (Richards, 2013). Today, because Pinochet’s
1980 constitution is still in effect,68 neoliberal policies still reign in Chile as does the continued
usurpation and domination of Mapuche land for economic gain; both neoliberal policies and the
occupation of Mapuche land for profit are key to constructing the modern Chilean nation-state
and are key to the Chilean government’s economic and material wealth (Drake and Jaksic, 1995:
307-308).
Yet, at the root of the conflict and tension in these capitalistic pursuits is again the fact
that the Mapuche are explicitly anti-capitalistic in nature. On the one hand, Kowalczyk (2013)
argues, the Chilean government, Chilean business owners, and transnational corporations seek to
strip the Arauncanía of its resources and exploit its trees and water for capital gain, while on the
other hand, the Mapuche want to preserve and protect those very lands (Kowalczyk, 2013).
Because the Mapuche refuse to concede to the capitalist demands of the Chilean government and
because they often act in “explicitly antisystemic and anticapitalist” ways, the Mapuche are
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Again, Chile just recently voted to change this constitution in the plebiscite that took place last year, 2020, but the
writing and implementation of the new constitution is still yet to take place (Bonnefoy, 2020).
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hence conceptualized as a danger to the Chilean government who, again, is deeply committed to
neoliberal policies (Kowalczyk, 2013: 131). More than any other fact, conflicting ideologies or
attitudes toward the land fuel both Mapuche resistance to the usurpation of their lands and the
Chilean government’s subsequent suppression of the Mapuche; it is a cycle of conflict where the
Chilean government’s neoliberal policies trigger Mapuche resistance, which then triggers the
Chilean government to view the Mapuche as dangerous and to repress them through government
coercion. This cycle will be explored more in the next two chapters, but ultimately, the economic
motivations and capitalistic ideologies guiding the repression of the Mapuche by the Chilean
government cannot be overstressed.
As a result of neoliberal policies and the state usurping their territory, Richards (2013)
reveals that today, the Mapuche now hold very little land and are widely poor. “According to the
Agricultural Census in 2007,” she writes, “rural Mapuche in the Arauncanía held about 12
hectares per household—9.8 in Cautín and 24.7 in Malleco” (Richards, 2013: 82). Yet, according
to her research, she continues to explain, “these figures seem inflated,” and are “somewhat
misleading” as “the largest Mapuche landholdings are extremely mountainous and therefore not
apt for agriculture” (Richards, 2013: 82). The Mapuche, peoples whose name, Mapuche, literally
means “people of the land,”69 are ultimately stripped of their land, and hence, large aspects of
their identity whose culture and history are so intricately connected to that territory70
(Kowalczyk, 2013).
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“Mapu” means “of the earth and “che” means person (Kowalczyk, 2013). In this sense, for the Mapuche, the land
is more than a source of autonomy: it is a part of their culture and identity (Kowalczyk, 2013). Profound tension
hence results as timber and hydroelectric corporations continue to destroy the Mapuche land, and thus undermine the
Mapuche cultural identity
70
The usurpation of Mapuche land by the Chilean state and transnational companies ultimately have consequences
larger than the capital loss of territory the Mapuche face under neoliberal policies: Kowalczyk (2013) reveals that
transnational water and timber companies have caused profound environmental damage to Arauncanía. Native
forests in Arauncanía have almost been completely eliminated, extreme water pollution has resulted, the fertility of
the soil has decreased, etc. (Kowalczyk, 2013: 123). Given that the land is so important to Mapuche identity, the
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So too does Arauncanía remain extremely poor: although Araucanía is highly rich in
resources, it remains one of the poorest regions in Chile (Haughney, 2006: 25). According to
Haughney (2006), it had “one of the lowest average [economic] growth rates between 1960 and
1992,” a period characterized by the huge influx of transnational companies (25). Low economic
growth and high rates of poverty in the region can be attributed to the fact that transnational
companies and the Chilean government do not invest resources back into the region: they make
profit off of exports from this region without returning any money to the community (Haughney,
2006). As a result, the Mapuche are deprived of economic wealth and prosperity which in turn,
hinders their ability to protest the action of the Chilean nation-state: if the Mapuche are
struggling to make a living and meet their basic needs, how can they channel energy into
protesting the Chilean government? Capital is ultimately key for social power and so, by
exploiting peripheral areas and keeping Arauncanía poor, the Chilean government can further
maintain its dominance over the Mapuche; exploiting Arauncanía allows the Chilean government
to ultimately squander Mapuche separatist calls while also increasing its own economic wealth
and power. Clearly, the control and exploitation of Arauncanía benefits the Chilean government
in a multitude of material and social gains.
Because Arauncanía and the Mapuche remain in significant poverty, neoliberal policies
and capital pursuits of the Chilean government and transnational companies have ultimately led
large numbers of the Mapuche to migrate away from Arauncanía and into central Chilean cities
like Santiago in recent years; neoliberal policies and capital pursuits of the Chilean government
have ultimately led to the desired effect for Chilean racial nation-state building efforts: the

ambivalent and destructive attitude the Chilean government and transnational companies have towards Arauncanía
cause the Mapuche to not only suffer the physical consequences, but also to experience the symbolic disrespect this
shows for the land and their identification with it.
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physical integration of its literal periphery, Arauncanía and the Mapuche, with the rest of the
country. For instance, Haughney (2006) describes how the recent boom of transnational
companies in Arauncanía has ironically caused mass unemployment for the Mapuche. Despite
the fact that multinational corporations and industries in the Araucanía are growing and, indeed,
thriving, she explains, “the rural Mapuche population has difficulty finding employment within
the ninth region [(Arauncanía)]” (32). They aren’t being hired by these companies and as a
result, large segments of the Mapuche population have migrated to core Chilean regions such as
Santiago to find work (Haughney, 2006: 30-32). From having once again been a group that used
to live off the land and reside far from any Chilean city, Haughney (2006) concludes that the
Mapuche now predominantly live in urban areas71 (30). The Mapuche are now exiled from the
physical periphery of Arauncanía and hence also from the ancestral lands that ground their calls
for autonomy.72
Although the majority of the Mapuche no longer reside in the physical periphery,
Arauncanía is ultimately still where many Mapuche calls for autonomy and separatism continue
to arise (Richards, 2013). The Mapuche still symbolically view themselves as peoples of
Arauncanía, and as discussed earlier, this is where some Mapuche organizations such as CAM
are leading a movement to recuperate Mapuche lands and build their own nation-state (Richards,
2013). Subsequently, although many Mapuche physically do not live in the periphery of

71

Haughney (2006) reveals that today, “two thirds of the Mapuche now live in urban areas” (30).
In this sense, a series of reciprocal relationships exist in which Chilean neoliberal policies welcome the
exploitation of Arauncanía land by transnational companies, who are then essential in displacing the Mapuche from
their ancestral lands and undercutting any separatist movements. Then, as will be explored in future sections,
Chilean government coercion becomes essential to protecting both the Chilean government’s and transnational
corporations’ exploitation of Arauncanía and in suppressing any resistance that still remains in the region on the part
of the Mapuche who do not physically move to the physical core of Chile. Clearly, a highly coordinated and
complementary relationship between the Chilean racial nation-state, transnational companies, and Chilean
governmental coercion exists which ultimately forces the Mapuche to the physical heart of the Chilean nation-state,
while still positing them as a metaphorically distinct group.
72
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Arauncanía any longer, this area is still imagined by the Chilean nation-state as an area needing
the control, suppression, and the rule of the Chilean government as to suppress any separatist
movements and as to continue exploiting the resources of Arauncanía. This is still the area that
needs to be subjected to Chilean government coercion for both the social domination and
economic wealth of the Chilean nation-state and its supporters: transnational companies and the
Chilean racial majority. As will be discussed in more detail in future sections, this drive to
control the physical periphery of Arauncanía ultimately accounts for why government coercion
such as highly suppressive policing efforts are concentrated in this area.
Moreover, returning to Chilean racial narratives and Chile’s racial state building efforts,
the drive to continue positioning the Mapuche as a racialized, symbolically peripheral other
continues to motivate the Chilean nation-state to retain dominance over the Mapuche. Because
the Mapuche are so critical to the Chilean racial state’s identity—again, for the success of its
neoliberal policies and for a scapegoat to distract the rest of the citizen body of their own
exploitation under the neoliberal policies of the Chilean nation-state—as well as for the Chilean
racial majority identity—who again, incorporate racial narratives into their beings—it is vital for
the Chilean nation-state to control and position the Mapuche on its metaphorical peripheries; it is
essential for the Chilean nation-state to keep the Mapuche on the symbolic edges of its national
identity while still keeping the Mapuche within its physical borders. Squandering any calls of
Mapuche identity and Mapuche separatism on physical and metaphorical peripheries ultimately
becomes an imperative goal of the Chilean nation-state, and conclusively, creates the conditions
in which Chilean government coercion becomes necessary. Such important control of the
Mapuche in physical and metaphorical peripheries ultimately requires lofty and extensive
mechanisms of coercion as will be discussed in later sections.
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Xinjiang and the Uyghurs: China’s Lucrative Physical Periphery and Vulnerable
Symbolic Periphery
Like Chile and the Mapuche, the Uyghurs exist on both the physical and metaphorical
peripheries of China. Physically, the majority of the Uyghurs reside in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR), which is located far from China’s political and populated core,
Beijing (Appendix 24) (Zenz and Leibold, 2020). Located in China’s northwest, north of Tibet,
Bovingdon (2010) emphasizes that throughout history, Xinjiang has been extremely isolated.
Modern transportation to Xinjiang, he explains, is a relatively new development, and “as recently
as 1935, the journey from Beijing to the region’s capital, Urumqi, took two months by car” (11).
“Today,” he continues to explain, it still takes “two days by train or five hours by plane” to travel
between Xinjiang and Beijing (11). Like Arauncanía, Xinjiang is hence located on the physical
fringes of the Chinese nation-state, far from physically centric areas, and the metaphorical core
of Beijing, Shanghai, and other key Chinese cities.73
Symbolically, the Uyghurs are also imagined by the CCP and the Chinese majority as
being a racially and religiously peripheral group. As mentioned in the last section, despite the
fact that the CCP has continuously emphasized national unity over racial and religious group
difference, the CCP and the Chinese Han citizen majority still imagine the Uyghurs as racially
and religiously distinct; as a group made “other” and therefore repressed just like the Mapuche.
Although Laruelle and Peyrouse (2012) emphasize that the Uyghurs in China truly do not pose
any threat of separatism or challenge to state security, because of their distinct transnational,
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While Beijing and Shanghai also exist in peripheral regions (in the east, rather than the northwest like Xinjiang),
because most of China’s population are concentrated in these cities, I am considering them China’s symbolic centric
areas. For instance, just looking at population, Beijing currently has a population of 20,896,820 people--16,353,136
more people than Xinjiang’s capital, Urumqi, which is recorded to have a current population of 4,543,684 (“Beijing
Population 2021”; “Urumqi Population 2021”). Further, because, according to the 2010 census, 95.69% of Beijing’s
residents are Han Chinese, this study is considering this area as a key centric area of the racial majority; as the
central area of Chinese national identity and the ethnic, racial, and religious makeup that the CCP is trying to make
dominant throughout Chinese society (Han).
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religious, and racial identity, the CCP and its coercive efforts have sought to suppress the
Uyghurs and even eliminate their existence from the nation-state completely. For instance, as
will be discussed in subsequent sections, the CCP now claims to be fighting what it calls its three
evils--separatism, extremism, and terrorism—and uses this rhetoric to arrest and detain Uyghurs
in what they call “re-educational camps”74 (Clarke, 2015: 137). While again emphasizing
national unity, the CCP and its coercive forces ultimately see the Uyghurs as a metaphorical
peripheral “other” and use this symbolic otherness to suppress their existence in the Chinese
nation-state. Retaining control over the Uyghurs’ symbolic otherness or symbolic peripheral
nature ultimately allows China to again define who it is (a racially and religiously homogenous
nation-state) by proxy of defining who it is not (Muslim, transnational, Turkic, or darker in skin
color like the Uyghurs). In this sense, continuing to position the Uyghurs as a racialized,
peripheral group thus remains imperative to the CCP and its racial nation-state, just like in Chile.
Further paralleling Chile and Arauncanía, continuing to retain control of the physical
periphery of Xinjiang remains essential for the CCP to expand its capital wealth; bordering
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Mongolia, Pakistan, and a portion of India, Xinjiang occupies a
key location in relation to China’s international trade and is a gateway for the exchange of
resources and goods with the rest of Asia, the Middle East, and even Europe (Reger and
Szadiewski. 2012). Historically, Xinjiang has always held this economic importance as it was
located along the Silk Road, a key transportation route where goods from China to the West
passed (Appendix 25) (“Silk Road.” Encyclopædia Britannica). Today, the CCP is trying to
convert it back into a key trade route through a series of development projects called the Great
Western Development Project (GWDP) (Laurelle and Peyrouse, 2012: 54). Implemented in
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As will be discussed shortly, these are actually highly repressive detention facilities.
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2000, this project is focused on transforming Xinjiang back into a booming business region, and
a hub for international trade (Han, 2016).75 With huge capital investments and loans being
distributed to the area,76 as well as the encouragement of the Han majority to migrate to Xinjiang
for employment and business opportunity as will be discussed shortly, the CCP has ultimately
sought to restore the economic importance of Xinjiang and reconvert it into a modern Silk Road
(Laurelle and Peyrouse, 2012). Such efforts have important nation-state building and control
strategies to bring profit to the state while at the same time, repressing the Uyghurs and
continuing to designate them as an excluded and peripheral racial group, even when Chinese
harmony is again emphasized by the state.
For instance, developing Xinjiang has clear purposes of working towards the larger
economic goals of the Chinese state. Being a communist country with a state-based form of
capitalism,77 most trade and economic activity in China are directed by the CCP and run by statebased companies (Amadeo, 2020). The CCP controls almost all of the economic projects of the
state and importantly, has recently dedicated itself to opening up China’s economy for
international trade78 (Lin, 2013). Projects like the Great Western Development Project which has
helped expand China’s international trade and international relations have hence become
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For instance, Reger and Szadiewski (2012) emphasize that the Great Western Development Project was created,
in part, to convert the capital of Xinjiang, Urumqi, into a “core city” in Western China and an “international trade
center” (40). The development of new businesses, housing complexes, and plans to develop the international airport
in Xinjiang sought to achieve exactly this (Reger and Szadiewski, 2012).
76
Hillman and Tuttle (2020) reveal that capital investments, “four times the rate of Beijing in 2012” are currently
being poured into Xinjiang (126).
77
China has a mixed economy in which both state-owned and private enterprises exist in the country, but in which
the state (the CCP) controls most economic activities (Amadeo, 2020). Lin (2013), for instance, calls the Chinese
economy a “dual track approach” in which the CCP has “liberalized the entry of private enterprises, joint ventures
and foreign direct investment in labour-intensive sectors,” while at the same time, they control and regulate most
economic activity. This model has been extremely successful: China, Lin (2013) emphasizes, currently has the
second largest economy in the world, after the United States.
78
As recently as 1979, Lin (2013) explains that China began a process of opening itself up to trade with the global
economy.
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essential to the CCP and its new economic goals (Reger and Szadiewski, 2012: 40). To illustrate,
due to its location as a perfect port of trade with the rest of Central Asia and Europe, the CCP
sees Xinjiang’s economic potential as a “continental Eurasian land bridge”; as a key area to
continue opening up trade internationally; and as a place where the CCP can hence expand itself
as a global superpower and key global economic figure (Clarke, 2015). The development of
Xinjiang as a physical, peripheral area is thus ladened with material and economic goals of
expanding international trade that works to benefit the CCP and the Chinese nation-state.79
Moreover, and beyond goals of expanding international trade, the CCP is looking to
develop and control Xinjiang (the physical periphery) because of the abundance of resources that
lay within this area, and the profit the Chinese state can earn by exploiting this region. Like
Arauncanía, Xinjiang is extremely resource rich, despite being industrially underdeveloped and
materially poor (Laurelle and Peyrouse, 2012). For instance, although Xinjiang accounts for “70
percent of regional production,” and is essential for its possession of large amounts of oil, cotton,
metals, minerals, gas, salt, and coal, it is still impoverished because most of the wealth goes to
the state (Laurelle and Peyrouse, 2012: 48; Zenz and Leibold, 2020: 325). Resources accrue to
the CCP, rather than the Uyghurs, and, as a result, the Uyghurs who live in Xinjiang remain
chronically poor (Zenz and Leibold, 2020: 325). Combined with land dispossession and high
employment exclusion that will be discussed shortly, the Uyghurs are economically suffering
like the Mapuche, all the while, the CCP is becoming increasingly rich (Laruelle and Peyrouse,
2012).
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It is important to note, however, that such development and international trade triggers CCP fear that Xinjiang
and the Uyghurs will be exposed to non-Chinese ideas and influences; the CCP is fearful that along with economic
exchange, Xinjiang will be exposed to non-CCP ideas that will encourage them to separate from China or challenge
Han identity (Hillman and Tuttle, 2020). To counter such fear, Hillman and Tuttle (2020) explain that the CCP is
implementing state propaganda throughout Xinjiang which emphasizes Chinese identity and unity.
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Furthermore, it isn’t just the resources in Xinjiang that work to benefit the CCP, but also
the labor of Uyghurs in detention or “re-education” camps located throughout Xinjiang (Ruser,
2020). As will be discussed in detail later in this study, the CCP is currently running thousands
of detention facilities across Xinjiang where Uyghurs charged with terrorism, or accused of
violating the state, are detained, repressed, and are subjugated to CCP propaganda (Ruser,
2020).80 Important in these facilities have been allegations of forced labor that have arisen from
advocacy groups and governmental bodies across the world. For instance, a report by the Bureau
of International Labor Affairs (under the U.S. Department of Labor) estimates that “100,000
Uyghurs and other ethnic minority ex-detainees in China may be working in conditions of forced
labor following detention in re-education camps” (“Against Their Will: The Situation in
Xinjiang”). They continue to explain that “many more rural poor workers also may experience
coercion without detention,” and that that China may be using Uyghur child labor (“Against
Their Will: The Situation in Xinjiang”). They cite gloves, hair products,81 textiles, thread/yarn,
and tomato products as items made by forced labor in Xinjiang (“Against Their Will: The
Situation in Xinjiang”). Similarly, a March 2020 report by the Australian Strategic Policy
Institute (ASPI) estimates that at least 80,000 Uyghurs have been coercively assigned to factories
producing goods for up to 83 foreign and Chinese companies (Xu, et al., 2020). Uyghurs are
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As will be discussed later in this study, Uyghurs in these detention facilities are subjugated to CCP propaganda
which tries to convert their transnational, Muslim, and culturally distinct identity to a Han majority identity (Ruser,
2020).
81
Specifically appalling in regard to the Uyghurs’ forced labor and production of hair products such as wigs, is a
2021 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) report that stated: “U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
officers at the Port of New York/Newark detained a shipment of products/accessories suspected to be made with
human hair...that originated in Xinjiang, China” (“CBP Detains Chinese Shipment of…”, 2021). These hair
products, they write, composed “almost 13 tons of hair products worth over $800,000 dollars” (“CBP Detains
Chinese Shipment of...”, 2021). It is probable, the report goes on to conclude, that these products were a result of
“human right abuses of forced child labor and imprisonment” (Appendix 50) (“CBP Detains Chinese Shipment
of...”, 2021). Such atrocities and extreme exploitation of the Uyghurs, again, further suppresses the Uyghurs while
the CCP benefits economically.
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transported from detention facilities to factories to work for the profit of the CCP, all while they
remain vigilantly surveilled, prevented from practicing their religion, are very minimally paid (or
not at all), and are subjected to “patriotic education,” including forced Mandarin classes
(Appendices 43 - 49) (Xu, et al., 2020).82 Products made from these facilities are ultimately
exported to major international companies such as Nike, Adidas, Samsung, Apple, Gap, amongst
others (Appendix 53) (Xu, et al., 2020).83 Profit again goes to the CCP and Chinese and
international companies who are invested in the products produced by such cheap Uyghur labor
(Appendices 51-55) (Xu, et al., 2020).84
Although the CCP is profiting from just described Uyghur labor, as well as from Xinjiang
resources and development projects like the GWDP, it is important to return to the fact that such
exploitation of Xinjiang and of the Uyghurs is also implemented for the more symbolic CCP
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This report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) emphasizes that Uyghurs are often forcibly
transferred to factories across China after they “graduate” from the “reeducation” facilities that they were previously
placed in (Xu, et al., 2020). Like the detention camps they are leaving, Xu, et al. (2020) emphasize that the Uyghurs
in these facilities live in guarded dormitories and have very little freedom of movement. Clearly, with such forced
labor of the Uyghurs, the CCP can profit off their labor while simultaneously suppressing their existence
completely.
83
This report identifies 82 foreign and Chinese companies who are benefiting from or using Uyghur forced labor
through factories and what they call “labor transfer programs” located outside of Xinjiang: “Abercrombie & Fitch,
Acer, Adidas, Alstom, Amazon, Apple, ASUS, BAIC Motor, Bestway, BMW, Bombardier, Bosch, BYD, Calvin
Klein, Candy, Carter’s, Cerruti 1881, Changan Automobile, Cisco, CRRC, Dell, Electrolux, Fila, Founder Group,
GAC Group (automobiles), Gap, Geely Auto, General Motors, Google, Goertek, H&M, Haier, Hart Schaffner Marx,
Hisense, Hitachi, HP, HTC, Huawei, iFlyTek, Jack & Jones, Jaguar, Japan Display Inc., L.L.Bean, Lacoste, Land
Rover, Lenovo, LG, Li-Ning, Marks & Spencer, Mayor, Meizu, Mercedes-Benz, MG, Microsoft, Mitsubishi,
Mitsumi, Nike, Nintendo, Nokia, Oculus, Oppo, Panasonic, Polo Ralph Lauren, Puma, SAIC Motor, Samsung,
SGMW, Sharp, Siemens, Skechers, Sony, TDK, Tommy Hilfiger, Toshiba, Tsinghua Tongfang, Uniqlo, Victoria’s
Secret, Vivo, Volkswagen, Xiaomi, Zara, Zegna, ZTE” (Xu, et al., 2020).
84
Interestingly, Chinese consumers are also emotionally invested in the use of Uyghur labor. For instance, in recent
months (2021), several foreign companies who use the imports of materials made from forced Uyghur labor have
threatened to boycott certain Chinese exports (thought to involve Uyghur labor) like cotton (Goodman, et al., 2021).
In response, a 2021 New York Times article reveals that “the Chinese government has weaponized China’s consumer
market” in the fact that Chinese consumers are now denouncing these foreign companies, even posting on social
media photos of them throwing away their Nikes (Goodman, et al., 2021). So invested have Chinese consumers
become in the nationalist narratives that the CCP is feeding them—the outrage they feel at foreign companies
criticizing and reexamining the role of forced Uyghur labor in the creation of their products—that they are ignoring
the forced labor of thousands of Uyghurs across the country and are instead criticizing foreign companies like Nike
who have started to oppose such use of Uyghur labor (Goodman, et al., 2021).
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goals of continuing to relegate the Uyghurs as a racialized, peripheral group, while pushing for a
faux idea of a harmonious and unified Chinese nation-state. Although the CCP has spread
propaganda around the nation that economic development projects like the GWDP are
economically helping religious and racial minorities like the Uyghurs,85 the fact remains that the
Uyghurs remain in greater poverty and greater isolation than they did before these projects were
implemented (Appendix 32) (Hillman and Tuttle, 2020). For instance, under the GWDP, Uyghur
homes were demolished as well as entire Uyghur communities in order to build new shopping
malls, housing complexes, and other buildings via gentrification (Appendices 26-33) (Reger and
Szadiewski, 2012: 42).86 The Kashgar Old City, for instance--the historical and cultural core of
the Uyghurs in Xinjiang--was completely destroyed in 2009, and many Uyghurs were displaced
to more peripheral areas as will be discussed shortly (Appendices 26-33) (Reger and Szadiewski,
2012: 33).87 State rhetoric claimed that the complete demolition of the Kashgar Old City was for
the purpose of “earthquake safety, poor drainage, and other public safety issues,” but the reality
was clear: it was an attempt by the CCP to culturally destroy and physically remove the Uyghurs
from the region (Reger and Szadiewski, 2012: 37).88 As Reger and Szadiewski (2012)
summarize, “The demolition of Uyghur neighborhoods is a physical manifestation of the CCP
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For example, Hillman and Tuttle (2020) reveal that propaganda across the country promotes the idea that “the
state’s primary motive for economic development of peripheral regions is to improve the livelihoods of ‘people of
all ethnic groups’” (128).
86
Because all land in China belongs to the CCP, the CCP has the right to seize land and rebuild without
consequence (Reger and Szadiewski, 2012: 24-26).
87
Reger and Szadiewski (2012) emphasize that the Kashgar Old City was “a hub of Uyghur culture” (33). It was
located along the Silk Road, and a plethora of trade and exchange happened here (34). “It preserved Uyghur ways of
life for centuries,” they argue, and it can be thought of as akin to “Jerusalem [for]...Christians, Jews, and Muslims”
(33). Its demolition can hence be viewed as the CCP seeking to destroy Uyghur culture completely.
88
Other state rhetoric and state media sources claimed that before the demolition, Kashgar Old City residents were
consulted and had consented to this project (Reger and Szadiewski, 2012: 37-39). This could not be farther from the
truth as Uyghurs were not consulted and most did not wish to lose their homes nor cultural homeland. Reger and
Szadiewski (2012) explain that the true purpose of these projects was to “dilute Uyghur culture and identity” (37).
For instance, as a part of this project, all of the mosques in Kashgar were also torn down, allowing the CCP to
further suppress Uyghur religious identity and expression.
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takeover of Uyghur society and cultural life” (7); it is a means of homogenizing or “sinicizing”89
the nation-state so as to eradicate all forms of Uyghur expressions or identity (Laurelle and
Peyrouse, 2012: 1).90 In other words, gentrification and economic development is a means of
more physically destroying Uyghur identity and culture—destroying their space—and is hence
means to push for Uyghur assimilation consistent with the CCP racial nation state project.
Although the CCP would use the GWDP and similar efforts to claim that they were supporting
Uyghur development, it is clear that it is just a further mechanism to repress and eliminate their
non-Han identities completely from Chinese society (Appendices 26-33).
Furthermore, as a result of the GWDP, new jobs and businesses have opened in Xinjiang
which encourage Han migration to the area and which subsequently send the Uyghurs farther to
the physical and metaphorical margins of Chinese society (Hillman and Tuttle, 2020: 126-130).
As more Han peoples move into the region, Uyghurs are simultaneously being displaced
(Hillman and Tuttle, 2020). In the last 2010 census, for instance, the Uyghurs only comprised
45% of the population in Xinjiang, while the Han majority comprised 41% (Reger and
Szadiewski, 2012: 4).91 This is a huge contrast to the 1953 census when Uyghurs comprised 75%
of Xinjiang’s population and the Han majority only 6% (Reger and Szadiewski, 2012: 4). Given
the fact that these trends have probably only become more pronounced in recent years, it is clear
that as a result of development projects in Xinjiang, that the Uyghurs are being forced out of
their homeland and are replaced by a Han majority counterflow of people (Hillman and Tuttle,
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To make Chinese in character or form (Oxford Dictionary).
For instance, Laruelle and Peyrouse (2012) argue that “in two decades (as a result of the Great Western
Development Plan), the Uyghurs have partially lost the unique niche that they had occupied in Central Asia” (120).
This seems to be the CCP’s ultimate goal: eradication of Uyghur identity and conversion to a Han national identity.
91
In Urumqi, the capital city of Xinjiang, the transformation has been especially pronounced. As of the 2000
Census, the Han majority comprised 75% of the population (Reger and Szadiewski, 2012: 7).
90
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2020).92 As a result, Hillman and Tuttle (2020) summarize that under such economic
development efforts, the CCP is ultimately trying to integrate Xinjiang with China’s Handominated core, which is referred to with the term neidi (124).93 Racist assimilationist projects to
convert China to a Han dominated identity hence persist through these economic development
projects.
Yet, such efforts of economically developing Xinjiang and assimilating the Uyghurs to
Han identity and Chinese territory, is ironically having the opposite effect; the GWDP and the
influx of Han peoples to the region, Han (2016) emphasizes, has merely led to the greater
segregation of Uyghurs from the Han majority, not their integration. For example, “the majority
of the Han Chinese in Xinjiang (90%),” he writes, “live in urban areas in Northern Xinjiang
while the majority of the Uyghurs [(who still remain)] live in southern Xinjiang” (18). Hillman
and Tuttle (2020) similarly reveal that in 2010, the Uyghurs had a 98.6 dissimilarity-index (dindex) score with the Han majority core (235).94 In this sense, large numbers of Uyghurs are not
incorporated into communist China as a result of these economic projects, despite the fact that
this is the proclaimed CCP goal of these strategies (Hillman and Tuttle, 2020); instead, the
Uyghurs are clearly being pushed farther away from the symbolic centric (Han) Chinese identity
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As a result of Han migration to Xinjiang, many Uyghurs are also losing their jobs and are being paid less. Hillman
and Tuttle (2020) emphasize that as a result of employment discrimination, in a 2005 survey, Uyghur workers were
“found to earn 52% less than Han workers” (234). This is occurring at the same time that Uyghur businesses are
being overpowered by Han majority businesses and the cross border trade that the Uyghurs used to engage in
(setting up “restaurants, flea markets and businesses along the border”) is being dissuaded by the CCP (Laruelle and
Peyrouse, 2012).
93
Neidi, they write, is the term for inland China, often used to refer to the Han-dominated core as a whole (Hillman
and Tuttle, 2020: 124). Hillman and Tuttle conclude, “Normalization, in this context, is the process of making
Xinjiang more like Neidi and, in particular, making people in Xinjiang more like people in Neidi” (Hillman and
Tuttle, 2020: 124).
94
The dissimilarity-index is a method for measuring the level of segregation within a country and how separate one
sub-group in a population is compared to another (Peuquet). An index of 0 indicates complete integration between
two groups in a country, while an index of 1.00 represents complete segregation (Peuquet). Hence, when comparing
the Uyghurs and the Han majority within China, a dissimilarity-index of .986 represents extreme segregation
between the two groups. With the recent migration of many Han peoples to Xinjiang, this statistic remains extremely
surprising and shows how the Uyghurs are still physically separated from the Han majority.
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and the central territory of the nation, preventing their integration or assimilation with Han
identity and the Chinese nation-state. This suggests that elimination of the Uyghurs, more than
their assimilation, are again the true goals of such projects and the CCP’s racial state building
efforts.
Ultimately, the segregation that directly results from these economic projects has
profound effects on the Han majority and their belief in the racial narratives of the Uyghurs as
innately different. Drawing back to Wilkerson’s (2020) argument that racial scapegoating and
the creation of a racialized other requires both metaphorical and physical distance for
dehumanization to take place, physical distance prevents the Chinese citizen body from seeing
their similarities with the Uyghurs and therefore their common humanity (Hillman and Tuttle,
2020). For instance, Hillman and Tuttle (2020) explain that residential segregation limits contact
between the Han and the Uyghurs and hence prevents “the sort of daily interactions that could
foster tolerance and even acceptance of ethnocultural differences in the long run” (235). This
leads them to believe racial narratives of Uyghurs as different, inferior, and dangerous, and leads
many Han Chinese to support the government coercion currently being directed against the
Uyghurs. The CCP’s racial nation state is again reaffirmed through such segregation.
Moreover, given the fact that CCP government checkpoints, security measures, and high
police presence in Xinjiang enforce residential segregation between the Uyghurs and the Han
majority (as will be discussed later in this study), 95 suggests that the CCP’s proclaimed goals of
Uyghur assimilation and incorporation with the Chinese nation are a façade for something else
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As will be discussed later in this study, the CCP is currently deploying security officers to restrict the Uyghurs’
mobility (Hillman and Tuttle, 2020: 235-236). These security checkpoints, Hillman and Tuttle (2020) emphasize,
limit contact among the Uyghurs and Han majority and make Uyghur travel to central Chinese cities extremely
difficult. Is Uyghur integration with China and Chinese unity hence the true goal of the CCP? Or is the complete
isolation and repression of the Uyghurs the goal in reality?
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(Hillman and Tuttle, 2020: 235-236). Just like what is happening with the racial narratives
promoted by the CCP in which national unity is emphasized despite the fact that the Uyghurs are
still persecuted as a racially and religiously distinct “other” who need to be converted to Han
identity, development projects in Xinjiang also give off a false idea of national harmony. Despite
saying otherwise in outward propaganda throughout the country, the CCP recognizes that the
economic development and exploitation of Xinjiang is an effective means to further repress and
marginalize the Uyghurs. For instance, Laurelle and Perouse (2012) argue that economic
development projects allow the CCP to support a “policy of forced Hanicization” of the Uyghurs
(179), while Hillman and Tuttle (2020) reveal that publications from the CCP surrounding the
Great Western Development Project repeatedly state that “development” is the “key to solving
the problems concerning ethnic groups” (126); that “economic development can outrun social
instability” (126). Clearly, economic projects to develop Xinjiang have partly been implemented
by the CCP as a form of social control in which the CCP can further repress the Uyghurs while
again, promoting an idea of national unity and while gaining, not losing, government
legitimacy.96
To conclude this section, nowhere is the connection between economic development as
means of Uyghur oppression and possibly elimination clearer than in the events that followed
unrest and protest in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital, in 2009 (Reger and Szadiewski, 2012: 41).
After a series of violent incidents occurred between the Uyghurs and the Han majority during
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The CCP gains government legitimacy through these projects as it is again positioned as a benevolent
organization helping with the economic development of Uyghurs areas. Economic development hence allows the
CCP to be highly subversive in its oppression of the Uyghurs.
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this time,97 both police surveillance was increased in this city,98 as was the pace of the
destruction and rebuilding of Urumqi (Hillman and Tuttle, 2020; Reger and Szadiewski, 2012).99
In 2010, for instance, Reger and Szadiewski (2012) explain that “Chinese authorities began
demolishing residences in the Tashbulaw district of Urumqi” where “more than 200,000 people
formerly lived in this district,” the majority being Uyghurs (42). Meanwhile, “In Urumqi alone,”
Zenz and Leibold (2020) emphasize, “Over 160,000 security cameras were installed by 2016,
with 1,000 video surveillance staff to monitor them on a 24-hour basis” (333). The pairing of the
gentrification of Urumqi at the same time that surveillance was rampantly increased in this
region again reveals that like surveillance and police efforts, that economic development is
another way the CCP sees an avenue to enforce social stability and government control; that
development is another way to economically and politically hinder Uyghur protest and resistance
and ensure the dominance of Han identity throughout the country. What happened in Urumqi
following the 2009 protests, however, shows that economic development is not enough to alone
guard the CCP’s dominance and authority in society; it shows that other coercive efforts like
surveillance are also necessary as will be discussed throughout the rest of this study.
Ultimately, the fact that the Uyghurs are still greatly segregated from the Han majority,
the fact that they are being detained and exploited for their labor, the fact that their homes are
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During 2009, probably as a result of Uyghur discontentment with the destruction of their homes and the
development of their neighborhoods, massive conflict resulted between the Han majority and the Uyghurs in
Urumqi (Hillman and Tuttle, 2020: 226-228). More than 200 civilians were killed during this conflict, which
resulted in increased surveillance of the Uyghurs (Hillman and Tuttle, 2020: 226).
98
New military checkpoints were established in Urumqi after the conflict of 2009, as were huge numbers of
surveillance cameras. Since 2009, for instance, “seventeen thousand surveillance cameras have been installed in
Urumqi alone” (Hillman and Tuttle, 2020: 237).
99
Human Rights Watch researcher, Nicholas Bequelin, also believes that protests in Tibet in 2008 triggered both an
increase in economic development strategies and an increase of surveillance and police officers in Xinjiang. “[The
Tibetan protests are] what really made the government decide it has to be quite aggressive on Xinjiang,” he writes
(Regers and Szadiewski, 2012: 37). This could partly explain why the two (capital development and security) have
been so intimately paired in recent years in Xinjiang as will be explored throughout the rest of this study.
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being destroyed, and the fact that they are faring no better economically than they were before
the development projects (Han, 2016), suggests that CCP economic development projects and
their economic control of Xinjiang could be a front for the CCP’s true goal of Uyghur erasure
and elimination completely. By using economic development as a way to garner domestic and
international legitimacy while the CCP actually uses such methods to further push the Uyghurs
to physical and metaphorical peripheral areas, the CCP can again put on a front of national
harmony when it ultimately continues to see and repress racially and religiously distinct groups.
The CCP’s physical control of the periphery through economic development projects and
exploitation efforts of Xinjiang ultimately aids the CCP in further designating and suppressing
the Uyghurs as a symbolically peripheral group, all while an aura of national unity and good will
is again put forward and the CCP is again, also economically profiting from these efforts.
Hence, while similar to Chile in the fact that the Uyghurs are made to be a metaphorically
peripheral group and are highly suppressed by CCP government coercion upon this designation,
and while like Arauncanía, Xinjiang is being adamantly controlled by the CCP for the economic
pursuits of the nation-state, unlike Chile, the Uyghurs are ultimately being pushed farther into the
physical peripheries, not to the center like the Mapuche. As just explained, the displacement of
the Uyghurs under development projects like the GWDP has led them further to the physical
margins of China where it seems that the CCP wishes them to be, despite rhetoric, again, of
national integration and harmony. What does this reveal about CCP racial nation building
strategies? While it appears that in Chile, the real, physical inclusion and integration of the
Mapuche—through the domination of their land which displaces the Mapuche to core cities-seems to be one of the national strategies to suppressing their separatist movements, in China, it
appears that the physical banishment of the Uyghurs to places farther along the outskirts, and
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places such as “re-education centers” as will be discussed later in this study, is the technique of
eliminating the Uyghurs’ distinct identity completely. The Uyghurs, both physically and
metaphorically, are ultimately being pushed farther to the peripheries, and genocide, rather than
assimilation, ultimately seems to be occurring.
The Rakhine State and the Rohingya: Migration, Economic Pursuits, and Genocide in the
Borderland
The Rakhine state, the area where the majority of the Rohingya live, also exists on the
physical periphery of Myanmar. Located in western Myanmar, bordering Bangladesh in the
north and the Bay of Bengal to the west, the Rakhine state, like Arauncanía and Xinjiang, exists
along the literal edges of the country (Appendix 17). The Rakhine state’s capital city, Sittwe, for
instance, is over thirteen hours driving by car away from Myanmar’s capital, Nay Pyi Taw
(otherwise spelt Naypyidaw), and the Rakhine state is highly isolated from other densely
populated Myanmar core-located cities like Mandalay (Google Maps; Population of Cities in
Myanmar (2021)). While not highly significant in itself in the fact that the Rakhine state
physically lays on the outskirts or borderlands of the country, like in Chile and China, this
physical location becomes noteworthy because it overlaps with the Rohingya’s metaphorical
position as a racially peripheral group.
As mentioned in the last section, because of their minority Muslim religious identity and
Myanmar’s unique history of colonization where the British’s favoring of the Rohingya during
colonization allowed General Ne Win’s subsequent military regime to capitalize on Buddhist
resentment of the Rohingya and build racial nation-state legitimacy (Wade, 2017), the Rohingya
have historically been stigmatized as a racially distinct and innately inferior group worthy of
suppression; they have been made the racial and religious scapegoat of the country and have
been made a symbolically isolated and ostracized group existing on the edges of the country’s
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metaphorical identity (Appendix 18). Such exclusion continues today as the Tatmadaw continues
to position the Rohingya as a symbolically different and inferior peripheral group, while also
working to control the physical periphery in which they live: the Rakhine state (Appendix 18).
Like Chile and China, controlling both of these literal and metaphorical peripheries ultimately
become key to its rule and the Tatmadaw’s material and social capital in society.
To control the Rakhine periphery and to continue maintaining the Rohingya’s
metaphorical position on the outskirts of national identity, the Tatmadaw has and is currently
deploying many techniques. Three of these techniques will be explored in this section: one is the
religious and cultural elimination of the Rohingya by encouraging Buddhist majority migration
to the Rakhine state like the CCP is doing with Xinjiang and the Han majority; another is the
economic control of the Rakhine state where the Tatmadaw is extracting oil and gas from the
region to expand its material wealth, and hence, power and independence (especially important
during Myanmar’s short period of democracy from 2015 to 2021); and the last method is the
literal massacre of the Rohingya. Such methods of control are used as tools to retain dominance
of the Rakhine state, to garner greater Buddhist citizen support for the Tatmadaw and its policies,
and to again, increase the Tatmadaw’s economic power and wealth. Such methods are also used
to solidify the narrative of the Rohingya as a racialized “other” and to further entrench the
Rohingya’s position in the metaphorical peripheries of the nation’s symbolic identity. As in
Chile and China, physically controlling this racialized group’s physical and metaphorical
peripheries is once more imperative to the Tatmadaw’s racial nation-state building and
dominance throughout society.
Looking first at how the Tatmadaw has historically encouraged Buddhist migration to the
Rakhine state as a way to control the Rakhine periphery, the Tatmadaw’s efforts to make the
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Rakhine state predominantly Buddhist dates as far back as the 1990s (Wade, 2017). Following
the nullified multiparty elections in 1990--when the then military regime electorally lost to the
National League of Democracy (NLD) but refused to give up power and retained control of the
country--the Tatmadaw focused some of its racial nation building efforts on recruiting Buddhist
migration to the Rakhine state (Wade, 2017).100 Visiting penitentiaries throughout the country,
for instance, Tatmadaw and Buddhist officials offered Buddhist inmates across Myanmar the
possibility of release if they resettled in the Rakhine state (Wade, 2017: 69). Not only were these
inmates released from prison if they agreed, but they were also given a home, monthly rations,
and a cow, merely for living in the Rakhine state for at least two years (Wade, 2017: 69).
Homeless Buddhist families were also recruited to resettle in the Rakhine state (Wade, 2017: 70).
Fearful that large numbers of Bengali immigrants were entering from Bangladesh and that the
Rakhine state was becoming increasingly Muslim, the military regime initiated such recruitment
in order to “purify” the land (Wade, 2017: 78).101 More so, such efforts were part of their racial
nation-state building strategies of making the Rakhine state primarily Buddhist and therefore,
dominated by people invested in the Tatmadaw’s racial narratives and ideologies; the
Tatmadaw’s goal was to make the Rakhine state full of Buddhists who would then support their
regime.
In 1996, the military regime then implemented an “11-point strategy to turn back the tide
of Islam” (Wade, 2017: 71). Under the Ministry for the Progress of Border Areas and National
Races (known as Na Ta La), new villages also named Na Ta La102 were created in the Rakhine
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Not coincidentally, these efforts were probably to reestablish the Tatmadaw’s legitimacy and dominance in
Myanmar society after these elections by trying to once again spread Buddhist nationalism and the Buddhist national
identity it was creating in its racial nation-state building strategies.
101
Wade (2015), writes when describing the recruited Buddhists, “Criminal or not, they were Buddhist and
therefore sons of the soil.”
102
The villages and the program were called Na Ta La (Wade, 2017).
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state in order to draw more Buddhist settlers into the area (Wade, 2017: 71). Although the regime
previously feared the infiltration of “Bengali” immigrants to the Rakhine state,103 military
officials and Buddhist monks ironically crossed into Bangladesh to recruit Buddhist Bengali
peoples to live in these villages (Wade, 2015). Like they did with Buddhist prisoners, the
Tatmadaw and Buddhist monks offered a home, food, and money to anyone who would cross
over and live in these new villages (Wade, 2015).104 All of this recruitment was again undertaken
with hopes of increasing the Buddhist population and diluting the number of Rohingya in the
Rakhine state. The Tatmadaw succeeded at both of these goals.
For instance, not only did these efforts spread Buddhist culture and Buddhist dominant
identity to the Rakhine periphery, but under such efforts, the Rohingya also lost their land and
were triumphantly either displaced to Bangladesh or placed in internally displaced person (IDP)
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As mentioned before, fear of Bengali immigrants crossing into the Rakhine state is what initially made the
military regime start recruiting Buddhist prisoners to the area (Wade, 2017: 78). So fearful was the military of
Bengali immigration to the Rakhine state that in 1978, Nee Win ordered an effort called Operation Nagamin or King
Dragon where immigration officials were deployed to the Myanmar-Bangladesh border to crack down on
immigration (Wade, 2017: 92). This operation was extremely violent and as a result, Wade (2017) states that
“200,000 [peoples] fled to Bangladesh and some 10,000 people died” (92-93). Given this history of cracking down
on immigration, it doesn’t make sense that Tatmadaw officials and Buddhist monks would then actively recruit
Buddhist Bengali immigrants during this time. This reveals that it was not truly Bengali immigrants that the regime
was fearful of, but rather, Rohingya peoples who have historically and are currently called “Bengali immigrants” to
deny their claims to the land.
104
Christian children and schools were also actively subjected to conversion missions; Wade (2015) reveals that
poor Christian children were given food and access to Na Ta La schools in exchange for converting to Buddhism. In
this sense, like the Buddhist prisoners convinced to move to the Rakhine state, Christian peoples were likewise
incentivized through material rewards to become Buddhist. Perhaps it was because the Muslim-Buddhist divisions in
Myanmar had already been established and preyed upon to legitimize the Tatmadaw’s rule, or perhaps it was
because these Christians were and are lighter skinned like the Jinghpaw or Jingpo people who practice Christianity
in the Kachin State (Appendix 19) (“Jingpo People”, 2021) or Eurasians who have immigrated to Myanmar
throughout time and who have practiced Christianity (“Christianity in Myanmar”, 2021), but these material
inducements were ultimately only used for Christians and other religious minority groups, not for the Rohingya
(Wade, 2017). While favored and converted during this time, today, Christian minority groups such as the Jingpo
people in the Kachin State are now persecuted by the Tatmadaw, just like the Rohingya (“Myanmar”, 2021). Those
Christians who didn’t convert to Buddhists have now also been targeted by the Tatmadaw and Buddhist extremists
and like the Rohingya, are displaced to internally displaced persons camps (IDPs) (“Myanmar”, 2021). For instance,
a report by Open Doors USA notes that as of 2021, “more than 100,000 people—mostly Christian—are living as
internally displaced persons (IDP)” in Kachin State (“Myanmar”, 2021). This suggests the power of religion and
religious difference in motivating Tatmadaw and Buddhist extremist persecution; persecution that is then justified
and explained with racial narratives as seen with the Rohingya throughout this study.
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camps throughout Rakhine state.105 Rohingya exile and displacement has continued throughout
time and Na Ta La villages still exist in the Rakhine state, forming “a network of nearly 50
settlements in northern Rakhine state” (Wade, 2015).106 As of 2015, for example, Wade (2015)
estimates that over 150,000 Rohingya live in IDP camps throughout the Rakhine state.107 A UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights report (2016) further estimates that between 2012 and
2015, “some 2,000 Rohingya and Bangladeshi died at sea” crossing the Bay of Bengal to get to
Bangladesh. Hence, as similarly seen in Xinjiang where the Uyghurs are being displaced from
their homes by the Han majority, the influx of the Buddhist majority to the Rakhine state is also
successfully displacing and eliminating large numbers of the Rohingya from the Rakhine
periphery; the Tatmadaw, like the CCP, has been successful in getting its racial majority to
overpower and displace a racialized group as to retain racial nation-state control of a physical
periphery (for, once again, the Buddhist polity and the Han majority buy into and support the
racial nation-state ideologies of the Tatmadaw and the CCP which support these two governing
forces’ dominance across these two societies).
As mentioned previously, another way the Tatmadaw has sought to control the Rakhine
periphery is through the economic exploitation of this region which, like China and Chile,
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As in China and Xinjiang, not only were Buddhists actively recruited to the Rakhine state, but Rohingya were
actively displaced and eliminated as well. An influx of people was central to attempts to eradicate the Rohingya
through both cultural dilution and physical displacement. For instance, as a result of efforts like Na Ta La and other
persecution conducted by the Tatmadaw throughout time, hundreds of thousands of Rohingya now live in internally
displaced persons camps (IDPs) throughout Myanmar and thousands of others have been exiled to Bangladesh and
other neighboring countries (Wade, 2015).
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According to Motaher (2019), in addition to the Na Ta La villages, the Tatmadaw have also allegedly stolen land
from small landholders such as the Rohingya since the 1990s and have yielded them to “corporate acquisitions”
(10); like in Chile, displacing Rohingya from their land has been key for timber export that increases state wealth as
well.
107
These Rohingya were displaced from the construction of Na Ta La villages as well as from widespread
persecution of the Tatmadaw (Wade, 2015). Such internally displaced Rohingya persons have only increased in
recent years with clearance operations conducted by the Tatmadaw as will be discussed shortly (Ware and
Laoutides, 2018).
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increases the Tatmadaw’s economic power--further solidifying its dominance in society--while
simultaneously aiding in the military’s suppression of the Rohingya. For instance, because the
Rakhine state is rich with large oil and gas reserves108 and possesses a pipeline which runs
through “21 townships of the Rakhine state,” transporting around “22 million tons of oil” and
“12 billion cubic meter gas annually [to areas throughout Myanmar and to the rest of Asia like
China109],” the Tatmadaw has sought to physically control this region to increase its own wealth
(Appendix 20) (Motaher, 2019). For instance, along with the most recent government (the NLD),
former and current officers of the Tatmadaw currently run one of Myanmar’s main state
companies extracting resources from the Rakhine state, the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise
(MOGE) (Motaher, 2019: 10). A Guardian article from earlier this year (2021) notes that MOGE
has been one of the greatest sources of revenue for the Tatmadaw as from 2016 to 2017 alone,
they reveal that U.S. $8.3 million of gas extracted by MOGE and global gas and oil companies
such as Chevron and Total “went to the Myanmar military [and] its conglomerates – Myanmar
Economic Corporation (MEC) and Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd (MEHL) [(the Tatmadaw’s
two main economic organizations as will be discussed shortly)]” (Butler and Doherty, 2021). In
light of the recent coup conducted earlier this year, international oil and gas companies now fear
that the Tatmadaw will take control of all of the government’s (what was just the NLD’s) assets,
and in response, activists in the global community are now calling on global oil and gas
companies to seize their relationships with Myanmar completely (Butler and Doherty, 2021).110

108

For instance, Motaher (2019) reveals that of 105 oil and gas fields in Myanmar, 25 are located in the Rakhine
state. These 105 oil and gas fields are estimated to have “10 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves and an
estimated 50 million barrels of proven oil reserves” (Motaher, 2019: 8).
109
China, for instance, is currently extracting oil and gas from the Rakhine state, and they have also built an oil and
gas pipeline to transport that oil and gas to its country (Appendix 21) (Motaher, 2019: 12).
110
Throughout history, the United States and the international community have similarly called for and placed
sanctions on Myanmar because of the Tatmadaw’s human rights violations they are conducting against the Rohingya
(Steinburg, 2008). Yet, because the Tatmadaw is so economically powerful, Steinburg (2008) emphasizes that such
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For, as this article states, “Any revenue from offshore gas [(drilled from the coast of the Rakhine
state)] flowing to the now military government could go to military operations, military interests,
including the generals and military units responsible for the coup and the recent atrocities against
the Rohingya” (Butler and Doherty, 2021). Meanwhile, the Rakhine state is becoming
increasingly impoverished and the Rohingya, further suppressed at the hands of the military.111
Beyond MOGE and the extraction of gas and oil for the military’s profit, the Tatmadaw
influences and controls a variety of other capitalistic organizations, coalitions, and endeavors
which contribute to its economic domination and power in Myanmar. The Tatmadaw, for
instance, controls two large economic organizations called the Myanmar Economic Holdings
Limited (MEHL) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC)112 that employ thousands of
workers, operate over a hundred businesses in Myanmar, and that even have their own stocks
and private shares in Myanmar113 (Appendix 22) (Steinberg, 2010: 163). A 2019 report by the

economic sanctions have little or no effect on the military. Instead, he emphasizes, it is mostly Myanmar’s citizen
body who suffers from international sanctions as they do not have a huge economic bedrock to combat the loss of
such revenue like the Tatmadaw (Steinburg, 2008).
111
For instance, despite the fact that the 2014 census excluded the Rohingya (who would have been the poorest in
the Rakhine state had they been included), the Rakhine state still registered as one of the poorest in the country
(Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 29). Following the Chin state, the Rakhine state is the second poorest in Myanmar
(Motaher, 2019). As a result of the military’s economic monopoly in Myanmar, the Rohingya are ultimately driven
farther into poverty (Ware and Laoutides, 2018). Furthermore, under the military’s reign, the rest of the country is
also suffering economically. Myanmar, for instance, is one of the poorest countries in the world with high rates of
malnutrition, poor healthcare, high food insecurity, huge income gaps, and large portions of the population living in
poverty (Steinberg, 2008: 53). This can be attributed, in part, to the Tatmadaw exploitation of resources for their
own profit, without investing money back into the country. Ultimately, because the Rohingya remain stateless, the
Tatmadaw do not pay for any programs of governmental support for them such as health care (Steinberg, 2010).
112
Both of these organizations were formed by the military in 1997 (the MEC), and 1988 (the MEHL) (The United
Nations Human Rights Council, Forty-Second Session, 2019). The stated goals of these organizations are to increase
the economic prosperity of the Tatmadaw, to increase the welfare of former war veterans, and to contribute to
Myanmar’s economy (19). It is vital to recognize that these two organizations are economic legacies of the
military’s 20th century regime to understand how the Tatmadaw’s rule has persisted throughout time; these two
companies, in part, have helped the Tatmadaw retain dominance in Myanmar’s society from 1997 and 1988 until
now.
113
For instance, a 2021 report from the U.S. Department of the Treasury states that “MEHL also has 1,793
institutional shareholders, which include regional military commands and subordinate battalions, divisions, platoons,
squadrons, and border guard forces. Shares are distributed across the armed forces with no public accountability,
creating secret slush funds that the military uses to augment its operational budget” (“U.S. Department of the
Treasury”, 2021).
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United Nations Human Rights Council on the “Economic Interests of the Myanmar Military”, for
instance, explains that the MEC and the MEHL own 106 businesses throughout Myanmar in
various industries such as mining, tourism, transportation, telecommunications, and more (1819). Importantly, the MEHL and the MEC both own their own banks114 which allowed for the
Tatmadaw’s independence from the National League of Democracy (NLD) during democracy
(18-19). The report reveals that although the Tatmadaw refuses to disclose their financial reports
to the public, they “generate revenue that dwarfs that of any civilian-owned companies in
Myanmar” (18). Furthermore, Tatmadaw run businesses and factories, a 2021 report from the
U.S. Department of the Treasury further reveals, produce the material goods used by the military
like weaponry (“U.S. Department of the Treasury”, 2021). These two economic organizations—
made richer from the extraction of oil and gas from the Rakhine state—ultimately strengthen the
Tatmadaw’s material power in Myanmar and increase its legitimacy and dominance as will be
discussed shortly.115
Beyond the capital drives that motivate and allow the Tatmadaw to dominate and exploit
the Rakhine state, the last way in which the Tatmadaw controls the Rakhine periphery is through
the physical elimination of the Rohingya through genocide: what the UN Convention on the
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MEHL’s bank is called Myawaddy bank and was established in 1993 while MEC’s bank is called Innwa bank
and was established in 1997. Together they comprise two of Myanmar’s largest private banks (The United Nations
Human Rights Council, Forty-Second Session, 2019).
115
Beyond the MEHL and the MEC, the Tatmadaw also runs its own schools, health care facilities, weaponry
factories, etc. (Steinberg, 2010: 102). Citizens often view the Tatmadaw as the only means for economic mobility,
and many families even encourage their sons to join the Tatmadaw as a path to economic prosperity (Steinberg,
2010: 164). Because of this, Steinberg (2010) argues that the Tatmadaw is creating “a self-perpetuating elite” by
encouraging Buddhist citizens to attend military academies, and also putting their own children in these institutions
(75). All this truly contributes to what Steinberg (2010) describes as the Tatmadaw being “a state within a state”
(169); a force completely independent from the central state with complete economic and structural autonomy. For,
the more that citizens depend on the Tatmadaw financially--for instance, by putting their money into the MEC and
the MEHL’s banks or relying on them for social mobility-- the less likely they will scrutinize the Tatmadaw’s
coercive actions against the Rohingya and the way in which the military has subversively retained dominance and
control in Myanmar, even throughout democracy.
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Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines as “the attempt to destroy, in
whole or part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group” (Ibrahim, 2016: 100). Whether
through the forced displacement of the Rohingya to international countries like Bangladesh that
leads to dangerous and deathly international travel, through interethnic conflict between
Buddhist nationalist groups and the Rohingya which is actively instigated by the Tatmadaw as
will be discussed in detail later, or by violent killings by the Tatmadaw itself, thousands of
Rohingya have been slaughtered by the Tatmadaw throughout history (Ware and Laoutides,
2018). Consistent with its racial state building practices, it is clear that the Tatmadaw is
attempting to eliminate the Rohingya from Myanmar completely through massacre.
For instance, in response to Rohingya attacks of border police officers in 2016 and
2017,116 the Tatmadaw initiated what they called “clearance operations” to suppress the
Rohingya and to eradicate their existence in the Rakhine state (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 4950). Lasting more than five months, the Tatmadaw burned Rohingya villages under these
operations, and numerous human rights violations subsequently took place (Ware and Laoutides,
2018: 55). In a report following the clearance operations, for instance, the United Nations
Human Rights Council (UNHRC) enumerated the human rights violations committed by the
Tatmadaw including murder, rape, and sexual violence, forced labor, land confiscation, torture,
and arbitrary arrest and detention amongst others (2018: 6). This report states that “10,000
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These attacks were coordinated by a Rohingya insurgent group called the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
(ARSA) and were largely derived from the extreme repression the Rohingya were facing under border police
officers and the Tatmadaw during this time. Ware and Laoutides (2018) emphasize that in general, the Rohingya
“have never previously been a particularly violently or religiously radicalized population” (47). Recent violence
such as these attacks, they explain, have only arisen because “conditions [have become] ...too unbearable since
2012” (Ware and Laoutides, 2018). There is “growing despair” among the Rohingya, they conclude, which “has led
them to take up violence” (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 48). Despite the fact that the Rohingya’s acts of violence
often hence arise in acts of desperation, in this case, the Tatmadaw still viewed and portrayed these acts as an
illegitimate attack against their rule in order to conduct widespread massacre against the Rohingya and in order to
garner the further support of the Buddhist citizen body as will be discussed shortly.
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[Rohingya] deaths [after the clearance operations] is a conservative [estimate]” (Human Rights
Council, 2018: 8). “Few survived,” the report states, and “bodies were transported in military
vehicles, burned and disposed of in mass graves” (Human Rights Council, 2018: 8). “By midAugust 2018,” they also write, “nearly 725,000 Rohingya had fled to Bangladesh”117 (Human
Rights Council, 2018: 8).
Despite the fact that the “gravest crimes against international law” were thus conducted
by the Tatmadaw during these operations, the central democratic government at this time (the
National League of Democracy under the leadership of State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi)
blamed the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) for the violent events (Ware and
Laoutides, 2018: 55).118 Buddhist nationalist groups, and interethnic violence between the
Rohingya and the Rakhine Buddhists119 were also blamed for the conflict as violence between
the Rohingya and the Rakhine Buddhists also erupted during this time and Buddhist extremists
helped the Tatmadaw execute its massacre of the Rohingya. However, the fact remains that this
genocide was coordinated by the Tatmadaw itself (11). The 2018 UNHRC report writes:
Although the Government’s depiction of the violence as “intercommunal” between the
Rohingya and the Rakhine has prevailed, it is inaccurate. While there certainly was
violence between Rohingya and Rakhine groups, resulting in killing and the destruction
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The report also notes that after these clearance operations, the Tatmadaw further increased its security efforts
against the Rohingya such as increasing detention camps and checkpoints and increasing its patrol over the
Rohingya having a National Verification Card to move through checkpoints (Human Rights Council, 2018: 10).
These cards again, call them “Bengali immigrants,” and at community meetings, the report notes, villagers were told
at gunpoint: “take the card or leave the country” (Human Rights Council, 2018: 10).
118
Founded after violence erupted in the Rakhine state between the Rohingya and the Rakhine Buddhists in 2012 as
will be discussed in the next section focused on terrorism, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) is an
insurgent Rohingya group who is protesting the persecution they face under the Tatmadaw and is working for the
rights of the Rohingya who still remain stateless and without any legal protections or citizen rights in Myanmar
(Bashar, 2019: 14). Although labeled terrorist by the Tatmadaw and the Buddhist majority, the ARSA is not
affiliated with any terrorist groups and their attack on Tatmadaw border police is thought to have arisen from
desperation (Bashar, 2019: 14-15). Bashar (2019) concludes that the actions of the ARSA remain highly limited in
scope and that ultimately, the Rakhine Buddhist army—called Arakan Army (AA)—is much more violent and
heavy handed (Bashar, 2019: 14-15).
119
Rakine Buddhist is the term for Buddhist citizens who live in the Rakhine state.
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of property, these attacks were not spontaneous outbursts of hostility; they resulted from
a plan to instigate violence and amplify tensions (7).120
That is, the Tatmadaw clearly orchestrated the violence and genocidal action against Rohingya
during these events, even if some Rakhine Buddhist groups participated in the slaughter.121 This
continues today as the Tatmadaw is still engaging in the genocide of the Rohingya.122
The question then arises: How does widespread massacre contribute to the Tatmadaw’s
racial nation-state building efforts of both retaining authority of the nation and of further
entrenching narratives of the Rohingya as a racialized and peripheral “other”, deserving such
massacre? In his book, The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar’s Hidden Genocide, Azeem Ibrahim
(2016) writes that beyond killings, “a key act in producing the conditions for genocide, is the
slow legitimization and normalization of the framework used to justify discrimination and
murder on the basis of identity” (103). During the clearance operations of 2017 and throughout
the Tatmadaw’s massacre of the Rohingya, the Tatmadaw has legitimized its murder of the
Rohingya by normalizing its racial state framework of Buddhist domination and supremacy, and
by continuing to position the Rohingya as a racially and religiously distinct group (a
symbolically peripheral group) who is again worthy of such murder. Such racial narratives have
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The report also notes that “the majority of Rohingya and Rakhine Buddhists interviewed by the mission
indicated that relationships with the other community had been good prior to 2012, citing examples of business
dealings and friendships” (Human Rights Council, 2018: 5). As will be discussed later, 2012 is when the label
“terrorist” started to be applied to the Rohingya and when the Tatmadaw started repressing them in earnest. The fact
that the Rohingya and Rakhine Buddhists lived together harmoniously before 2012 reveals that it was largely the
Tatmadaw who created conflict in this region and began massacring the Rohingya.
121
There is even a conspiracy theory that some of the original Rohingya attacks on border police (events that again,
instigated all of these clearance operations), “were perpetrated by Tatmadaw disguised as Muslims” (Ware and
Laoutides, 2018: 56).
122
For instance, in 2018, the Tatmadaw open fired on protestors in Mrauk-U, a town in the Rakhine state, who were
supporting the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and were calling for separate Rohingya independence
(Wares and Laoutides, 2018: 19). More recently, the Tatmadaw has responded violently to protestors challenging its
coup d’état. Social media has shown the Tatmadaw in recent weeks shooting protestors at point-blank range, using
tear gas against protestors, and setting up barricades to prevent their movement (“Myanmar Protesters, Undaunted
by Killings, March Again,” 2021). As will be discussed later, interestingly, the Tatmadaw’s violence and genocide
has moved beyond the Rohingya and is in recent weeks also targeting Buddhist protestors.

112

led the Buddhist citizen body throughout the rest of Myanmar to fervently believe in the
Rohingya’s innate inferiority and thus, to view the genocide of the Rohingya as valid. This, in
turn, solidifies the Tatmadaw’s power and dominance in Myanmar society and allows them to
retain control over everybody.
For instance, in their book Myanmar’s ‘Rohingya’ Conflict, authors Anthony Ware and
Cottas Laoutides (2018) emphasize that the genocide against the Rohingya has “actually
improved the prestige and popular perception of the Tatmadaw, helping re-legitimize them
within the Myanmar polity” (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 57). Returning to the clearance
operations of 2017, for example, a 2019 UN Human Rights Council reports that Tatmadaw
leaders visited three cities: Nay Pyi Taw, Yangon and Sittwe to collect donations in support of
their crusade against the Rohingya (41). The Tatmadaw’s Commander-in-Chief, General Min
Aung Hlaing--the same Commander-in-Chief who notably just launched a coup and seized
power from the most recent democratic government at the beginning of February 2021--framed
Tatmadaw’s request for donations in these cities by suggesting that the Tatmadaw was protecting
the country from the inherent danger and threat of the Rohingya (41). In his speeches to these
towns, he used racist rhetoric to create fear by calling the Rohingya “Bengali” immigrants and
stating, “absolutely, our country has no Rohingya race” (42).
Scared of the racialized other and looking to maintain their status and superiority,
Buddhist businesses and individuals donated to the Tatmadaw’s genocide of the Rohingya.123
These donations were important in the fact that they further contributed to the Tatmadaw’s
assets, but more significantly, this money also represented a symbolic backing of the Tatmadaw
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In total, The United Nations Human Rights Council (2019) reveals that at least forty-five companies donated to
the Tatmadaw for a total of $6.15 million after their campaigning for the 2017 clearance operations (43). This
investment was not a small amount of money and further contributed to the Tatmadaw’s economic and political
monopoly in Myanmar.
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and their explicit genocide of the Rohingya. Through racial narratives and by preying on the
Buddhist citizen body’s fear of losing power in society, the Tatmadaw was able to gain large
support and legitimacy from the Buddhist citizen body. As mentioned previously, this, in turn,
allowed the Tatmadaw to continue creating its necessity and authority in society.124 For, given
that these clearance operations and this just mentioned financial campaigning took place in 2017
when Myanmar was still in democracy, the Tatmadaw was clearly able to use racial narratives
and the genocide of the Rohingya to create support for its continued presence in Myanmar; the
military was again able to establish its prominence in society through the continued control of
the Rakhine periphery and the metaphorical positioning of the Rohingya as a racialized other
through massacre.125 Furthermore, this very massacre reinforced the idea of the Rohingya as a
racial and inferior “other” who needs to be violently suppressed; it supported the Tatmadaw’s
racial state building strategies entirely throughout democracy (2015-2021).
Yet, this exposes the ultimate irony of the military and its control over the Rohingya and
the Rakhine state: if the Tatmadaw is legitimized through the creation and suppression of the
Rohingya—through the continued position of the Rohingya as a symbolically peripheral group-why would it want to eradicate the Rohingya completely? If its rule relies on the Rohingya’s
existence in metaphorical peripheries as racialized others, that is, why would it want to eliminate
that means for domination? As seen in the recent coup that the military conducted earlier this
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As Lall (2016) writes, the Tatmadaw is constantly trying “to make its intervention absolutely necessary” (188).
During Myanmar’s democracy, this was best achieved by creating conflict and conducting genocide in the Rakhine
state which then led to the military needing to intervene when ironically, violence got too extreme (even though at
the same time, the Tatmadaw was conducting genocide against the Rohingya) (Lall, 2016).
125
In other words, genocide brings legitimacy to the Tatmadaw as they create the idea that if there is a whole
population worthy of, or needing suppression, that no one else besides the military is more qualified to repress them.
Throughout history, this has proven true. For example, after the clearance operations in 2017, Ware and Laoutides
(2018) note that the Tatmadaw received greater support from the Buddhist polity (57). Nationalism and again, the
idea that the Buddhist religion, race, and identity is being threatened, leads the Buddhist polity to support the
Tatmadaw and their violent actions to eradicate the Rohingya (Ware and Laoutides, 2018).
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year (2021), it will be interesting to see if the Tatmadaw continues to conduct a genocide against
the Rohingya in future years in efforts to continue garnering legitimacy. Like the military regime
in 1948 under General Ne Win who sought to establish a Buddhist nation, and who began the
tradition of making the Rohingya a racial and religious other in order to build support of the
Buddhist citizen body (Wade, 2017), will the Tatmadaw continue to build on racial narratives
and racial violence to attempt to justify its most recent regime? Moreover, because such few
Rohingya remain in Myanmar, and for those who do, they live in such debilitating poverty in
internally displaced person (IDP) camps as will be explored in the next section, will the
Tatmadaw eventually eliminate the Rohingya from the nation-state completely? Will there be no
more Rohingya in Myanmar in future years?
Clearly, as seen in the situation of the Rohingya today during the global pandemic, the
Rohingya are being shoved further to the metaphorical global periphery of excluded, rejected,
and oppressed peoples (Appendices 94-98); they are becoming a globally peripheral group who
is repressed and made to suffer because of the way they have been racialized and made stateless
in Myanmar. As mentioned before, they are also being shoved further to the literal peripheries of
the Rakhine state and completely out of the country to Bangladesh and other foreign countries. In
this sense, they mirror the Uyghurs in China in the fact that unlike the Mapuche in Chile, both of
these groups (the Rohingya and Uyghurs) are again being pushed out of central nation state
territory. Similar to China, the historical migration of the racial majority to the periphery
(Buddhist citizens) has worked to achieve the displacement of a racial peripheral group (the
Rohingya) in Myanmar. However, unique to China, so too has massacre. Genocide again aligns
with the Tatmadaw’s racial state building strategies of explicit racial exclusion and is permissible
in Myanmar because unlike in China, the Tatmadaw is not pushing narratives of national
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harmony and unity; instead, public exclusion is key for the construction of a Buddhist national
identity from which the Tatmadaw has again been able to gain support, legitimacy, and
dominance in society. Hence, while similar to China in the fact that the Rohingya are being
shoved farther to the physical peripheries of Myanmar (or out of the country completely), the
mechanisms to achieve this exclusion, besides racial majority migration, are severely different,
and frankly, much more violent in Myanmar. Such difference, I believe, is derived from
variances in types of government (communist country v. authoritarian regime), but also from
each country’s unique racial state building strategies (where again, the CCP is concerned about
promoting a false sense of national unity to obscure its racially exclusive reality). Such
differences will be further explored in the methods of oppression chapter of this study, but for
now, it is again important to reiterate that in Myanmar and China, racial minority groups are
being shoved further to real peripheries, while in Chile, the racial minority group (the Mapuche)
is being forced to the physical heart of the country. All racial minority groups in this study,
however, are maintained as a symbolically racial and peripheral other.
Conclusion: Racial Nation-State Dominance Over Peripheral Territory and
Fringe, Racialized Bodies
Returning to a work referenced in the introduction of this chapter (2012), Zibechi
concludes his book, Territories in Resistance, by explaining how “space is the site par excellence
for difference” (68). As seen in this study, the manipulation of space is a key strategy for
governments in Chile, China, and Myanmar to dominate key physical peripheral areas of each
racial nation-state (Arauncanía in Chile, Xinjiang in China, and the Rakhine State in Myanmar)
while simultaneously maintaining racialized groups as symbolically peripheral and different
groups (the Mapuche in Chile, the Uyghurs in China, and the Rohingya in Myanmar); space and
physical and metaphoric peripheries, as seen in this study, are powerful in further entrenching
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narratives of different and racialized others while also contributing to the social and material
dominance of the racial nation-state. Displayed in the common capital exploitation of the
peripheral areas identified in Chile, China, and Myanmar by their governing bodies, and seen in
how racial narratives are made stronger in these societies through Chilean, Chinese, and
Tatmadaw efforts to further regulate the Mapuche, the Uyghurs, and the Rohingya to the
symbolic borderlands, the importance of both real and symbolic peripheries for racial nationstate building becomes utmost apparent throughout each of these societies.
Although racialized minority populations can emerge from any location—although
separated and racialized identities can be fabricated in any parts of a nation-state—the fact that
all of the racialized minority groups in this study also reside or lay claims to physical peripheral
areas represents something more symbolic of how they have been made to be in each of these
societies. As seen throughout this section, the Mapuche, the Uyghurs, and the Rohingya, have all
been pushed further to the symbolic peripheries of each nation-state and this isolation is both
epitomized by, and has been compounded with, their physical location on the fringes of these
nation-state territories. The racialized others in these three nations are ultimately represented by
their physical locations or homelands: on the outskirts of each racial nation state’s territory and
identity.
Looking at differences between countries, the Chilean government and its racial state
policies are the only forces in this study forcing their racial minority group, the Mapuche, into
the physical center of the nation-state by displacing them with a lack of employment
opportunities in Arauncanía and the occupation of their lands by transnational corporations. The
Chilean government is unique, that is, in the fact that intentionally or not, it is pushing its
racialized minority groups (the Mapuche) out of the physical periphery and into cities located
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more in the heart of the country like Santiago and Valparaíso. Important is that although China
claims that it is trying to integrate the Uyghurs with the rest of China through development
projects like the Great Western Development Project (GWDP), the reality remains that these
efforts are just pushing the Uyghurs farther to Xinjiang’s peripheries and is segregating them
more from the Han Chinese majority (Han, 2016). Then, in Myanmar, the Tatmadaw has never
claimed such efforts of Rohingya inclusion: it has instead always focused on excluding the
Rohingya completely from its territory.
Chile’s deliberate or inadvertent push of the Mapuche to more central areas of the state
could arise because the Mapuche occupy a unique spot of advocating for autonomy and for a
separate state that is independent from Chile. As mentioned previously, many Mapuche
organizations like CAM are fighting to usurp ancestral lands, and to reestablish the Mapuche
nation that existed before Chilean independence in the 19th century (Richards, 2013). Integration
of the Mapuche to Chilean dominated cities like Santiago could hence be vital in suppressing
their autonomous calls by disconnecting them from the land they base their calls of separation
from, and by forcing assimilation with the Chilean racial majority. While police checkpoints
exist in Arauncanía as will be described in the methods of oppression chapter, these checkpoints
do not limit Mapuche mobility (like they do for the Uyghurs in China and the Rohingya in
Myanmar). Instead, these checkpoints are merely to enforce fear in the Mapuche that they will be
detained and sentenced by the Chilean police; to control them mentally with fear as Richards
(2013) argues. In fact, such constant police presence could further drive some Mapuche to
migrate to cities like Santiago where they won’t face such constant surveillance and repression.
Contrary, governmental action and policies in Myanmar and China could maintain their
racialized groups on the physical peripheries because in both, there are not such strong calls for
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separatism on behalf of racialized groups, making the location of these groups in these literal
peripheral areas not dangerous to government authority and rule. For instance, although the
Uyghurs are often persecuted under “separatist” actions such as their creation of history books
showing true Chinese history or showing discontent or disapproval of CCP policies,126 as will be
discussed in the terrorism section of this study, Uygur separatist movements have been
historically small and unpowerful, and remain so today (Becquelin, 2004). As will be shortly
discussed, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a historical Uyghur organization that
briefly operated and called for an independent Turkic nation, ceased in 2003 and was highly
limited in scope, never posing a true threat for Uyghur separatism from the state (Xu, Beina, et
al., 2014). Furthermore, Laruelle and Peyrouse (2012) reveal that for the most part, the Uyghurs
in the rest of Central Asia (such as in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkey) are
distant from the Uyghurs in Xinjiang (22). As such, they conclude that any threat of Uyghurs in
China banning together with international Uyghurs and attempting to separate from China is
unlikely (22). A major international Uyghur advocacy organization, the World Uyghur Congress,
they even emphasize, has troubles “in establishing contact with the Xinjiang-based autonomist”
(22). Hence, risk of Uyghur separatism is minimal. Subsequently, maintaining the Uyghurs in
segregated, physically peripheral areas is not as dangerous to the CCP as it is in Chile in regard
to a danger of separatism, and as mentioned before, government checkpoints hence actively try
to maintain the Uyghurs to these segregated areas in Xinjiang; unlike Chile, Uyghur mobility to
central cities on their own accord is again limited by such checkpoints. Interestingly, such
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The CCP is again focused on suppressing what it deems the three evils: “separatism, extremism, and terrorism”,
and will label anything separatist that does not follow or concede to CCP ideologies (Clarke, 2015: 137).
Interestingly, the Tatmadaw in Myanmar also operates on three causes: “non-disintegration of the Union, nondisintegration of national solidarity, and perpetuity of sovereignty” (Steinburg, 2001: 55). While phrased differently,
these ultimately seem to be the CCP’s goals as well, even though they are cloaked in rhetoric of “separatism,
extremism, and terrorism.”
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exclusion does not align with the assimilationist efforts the CCP is pushing in its rhetoric and its
other means of oppression (like “re-education” camps) and give rise to the question of if the CCP
is trying to, in reality, exclude Uyghur identity and the Uyghurs completely from the nation.
Meanwhile, in Myanmar, the Rohingya are so excluded, oppressed, and disenfranchised
that separatism is also not a large threat; they are too repressed to actually form their own nation
or form their own independence movements. Although a small insurgent Rohingya group called
the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) formed in 2012 to protest the persecution the
Rohingya face under the Tatmadaw and to gain more legal protections for the Rohingya, this
organization is not calling for a separate Rohingya state and any attacks they have coordinated
are thought to have arisen from desperation (Bashar, 2019: 14-15).127 Acts in which the
Rohingya have been accused of instigating violence against Rakhine Buddhists are also thought
to have occurred in desperation or in response to severe repression (Wade, 2017). Thus,
maintaining the Rohingya in internally displaced person camps is not threatening to Tatmadaw
rule, especially given that these camps are so impoverished as will be explored in the methods of
oppression chapter of this study.128 Furthermore, and as mentioned before, exclusion in all forms
(rhetoric and action) is vital for the Tatmadaw’s racial nation state building strategies and it is the
Rohingya’s visual location in physically excluded spaces that are vital to keep building a
Buddhist centered national identity formed in opposition of that exclusion.
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Ware and Laoutides (2018) even state, “Given the long-term, direct, and physical oppression the Muslims have
faced, it can be argued that they have mostly adopted a remarkable level of non-violence” (152). Current acts of
Rohingya resistance again seem to come from feelings of desperation that have been created from their harsh
oppression by the Tatmadaw.
128
Ironically, however, if the Rohingya had more resources and power, the Tatmadaw would probably be creating
the exact conditions it is looking to suppress: a powerful Rohingya counter movement that could mirror Mapuche
resistance. Applied to all countries in this study, regulating racial minorities to either physical peripheries or
metaphorical peripheries (or both) is ironically giving rise to subcultures or sub-identities in which these groups are
forming solidarity under shared persecution by governing bodies and their racial nation states. Collective identity,
that is, the exact condition governments are trying to suppress amongst racial minorities, is ironically created
through governments’ exact efforts of oppressing and stigmatizing these groups.
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Hence, key differences arise between China and Myanmar and Chile, but what remains
constant across these three countries is the spread of the racial nation-state’s racial majority into
the peripheries; what is common is the cultural dilution of each racial minority group through the
influx of racial majority citizens. Seen in Chile, in China, and in Myanmar, racial majority
groups (and corporations in Chile’s case) are moving into the physical peripheries of Arauncanía,
Xinjiang, and the Rakhine state to dominate and dilute the concentration of distinct and feared
minority identities. In Chile, for instance, the Chilean government has used neoliberal policies to
favor the dominance of transnational companies and Chilean elites in Arauncanía; in China, the
CCP is encouraging the migration of the Han Chinese majority to Xinjiang under economic
development projects; and in Myanmar, the Tatmadaw is encouraging Buddhist migration to the
Rakhine state while also just massacring the Rohingya completely. Such efforts are an attempt to
spread the dominance of the racial nation-state under those, again, who have fervently bought
into its racial narratives and ideologies: the racial majority. And in Chile’s case, such efforts are
again also an attempt to squander calls of Mapuche separatist identity.
Returning to the vulnerability that nation-states feel from their physical and metaphorical
peripheral regions, space is also essential for the creation of separate, oppositional identities.
Zibechi (2012) continues to explain that spaces are areas where collective action can rise, group
solidarity can emerge, and groups can form counter-power movements to the state (198). As seen
in Chile and in the calls for separatism amongst the Mapuche, space can give rise to whole
groups of people who do not even believe they are part of a particular nation-state nor part of its
racial or cultural identity. This is where the danger of space, and peripheral areas in particular,
emerge; this is why the state so often feels so threatened by spaces far from its literal and
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symbolic core when separatist movements like that which the Mapuche are conducting,
commence.
Furthermore, because racial narratives have again become so key for nation-state identity,
the precarity of keeping racialized groups on the symbolic peripheries of society create a fear
that these very identities will infiltrate into society and will corrupt the racial majority; there is a
fear, that is, that racialized identities will challenge governing bodies’ dominance and legitimacy
across society, who have again built their power on the fabrication of such unsteady racial
narratives. As Blumer and Solomos (1999) explain, “the symbolic empire” constantly requires a
constant and vigilant guarding of racialized geographies to determine who has a right to partake
in the sacredness of the national identity and who is too polluted to be included (47). The
sacredness of the nation ultimately needs to be guarded against the racialized minority who have
been positioned to be the pollution in an otherwise pure racial society.
In an age of increasing global population flows and migration, however, the question then
emerges as to what is going to happen to space and both the symbolic and physical peripheral
areas of racialized minorities as more people start moving globally, especially in response to the
pressures created by climate change. In a recent article in The New York Times, for instance,
called “The Great Climate Migration Has Begun,” Lustgarten (2020) reveals how climate
change, and the dramatic warming of our earth is going to cause the displacement of millions of
people as soon as 2050129 (Appendix 34). What will happen then, when millions of refugees
from uninhabitable spaces in Latin and Central America (as well as in Africa, India, and the
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Lustgarten (2020) argues that “if governments take modest action to reduce climate emissions, that “about
680,000 climate migrants might move from Central America and Mexico to the United States between now and
2050.” “If emissions continue to be unabated,” Lustgarten (2020) continues to write, “that number jumps to more
than a million people.” He then notes that these figures do not include illegal immigration and if they did, that the
figures could be twice as high.
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Middle East), particularly, are forced to spaces like the United States? How will the United
States respond to these immigrants, who often are darker appearing in skin color? Will the U.S.
act like China and Myanmar and push racialized immigrants farther to both symbolic and
physical peripheries (even denying their entry to the state completely), or will it act like Chile
and incorporate these groups into the physical core of the country, while still deploying racial
narratives that maintain their existence on the symbolic fringes of racial national identity? Or,
possibly, will the United States and other countries to which these immigrants flee defy the
examples set by countries in this study, and instead both physically and symbolically incorporate
these immigrants into its territory and racial nation-state identity.
Such questions remain unknown, but again emphasize what was found throughout the
course of this section: that peripheral spaces, symbolic and physical, and their control and
treatment by governing bodies are extraordinarily important to racial state construction and
maintenance; they are critical to the continued rule of governing bodies, the maintenance of
racial narratives, and the repression of racialized others at the same time that that governing
bodies profit economically. The rest of this study will now look at how, exactly, governing
bodies and their racial nation-states in Chile, China, and Myanmar deploy control of their
physical peripheries and continue to designate their racialized groups as distinct through the
rhetorical propaganda of terrorism and through coercive methods of oppression. For, ultimately,
Zibechi (2012) concludes that spaces are also where “disciplinary control mechanisms and the
biopolitical [(the citizen body and the political mechanisms of state building)]” become
intimately intertwined (193-210); the rest of this study will explore how such disciplinary control
and justifications of violence emerge in Arauncanía, Xinjiang, and the Rakhine state to further
stigmatize and repress the Mapuche, the Uyghurs, and the Rohingya as racialized and highly
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oppressed groups; how government coercion, consequently, further solidifies racial state identity
and government dominance in each of these three countries and their control of metaphorical and
symbolic racialized identities.
Chapter Three

The Global War on Terror: Rhetoric of Terrorism to Legitimize Racial
Narratives and to Justify Government Coercion
Thus far, the conditions which give rise to government coercion have been examined: as
seen in racial narratives and peripheral conceptualizations (both physical and metaphorical)
which create a motivation for repressing racialized groups, the material (capital) and symbolic
(identity formation) incentives for racial nation-state building in Chile, China, and Myanmar
have been considered; the economic profit of repressing whole minority groups, as well as the
symbolic gain of solidifying national identity and governing authority have been analyzed for
why racial narratives emerge in each of these three countries, and then why government coercion
arises to enforce those narratives as to defend the racial state in each of these three countries.
This section will further look at how government coercion arises in these three countries
as to defend racial narratives and the racial state. How, for instance, does government coercion
violently materialize in Chile, China, and Myanmar, and what methods of control emerge in
order to repress racialized populations? In what ways do governing bodies conduct atrocious
actions against racialized groups without losing legitimacy, especially in democracies such as
Chile? This section, focused on terrorism, as well as the next, focused on methods of oppression,
will delve into the material operations and campaigns of justification for such repressive actions
conducted by coercive governmental efforts in Chile, China, and Myanmar.
Although each of these three chosen countries operate along a different form of
government—democracy in Chile, communism in China, and an authoritarian regime in
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Myanmar—and each have distinct histories and contexts in which government coercion is
deployed and executed, this section intends to delve into how the means in which government
coercion and racial narratives are legitimized and justified across each country starkly mirror one
another. Particularly focused on the Global War of Terror that has arisen across the world since
September 11, 2001, this section intends to look at how a global discourse of “terrorism” has
emerged and has been deployed in Chile, China, and Myanmar as to justify the repression of
racialized groups. The Global War of Terror and the label “terrorist”, I argue, has been harnessed
by governing bodies across these three countries to solidify racial narratives and to legitimize
government coercion. In using the label “terrorist” to describe the Uyghurs, the Mapuche, and
the Rohingya, I argue that governing bodies across these three countries have been able to further
position these racialized groups as a dangerous “other” who need to be repressed by nation-state
coercive efforts. This then brings legitimacy to governing bodies who work to suppress the
“dangerous” racialized other because the citizen body, again, has bought into racial narratives as
true and are highly impacted by fearmongering and moral panic creation. The label terrorist, I
conclude, is a highly effective means to further stigmatize the racialized other in each of these
three countries and to further dehumanize them to the point that government coercion applied
against them seems necessary and legit amongst the larger citizen body.
Before delving into this section, it is first important to explore the origins of the War on
Terror and how the label “terrorist” was imported to China, Chile, and Myanmar. Emerging after
the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in the United States, the War on
Terror first materialized under then President George W. Bush who shortly after the acts, passed
the U.S. Patriot Act to “safeguard the American people...values...and our homeland” (“DHS”).
The U.S. Patriot Act created lasting and utterly transformative security measures in the United
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States such as the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and therefore, the
establishment of Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), and Transportation Security Administration (TSA), amongst other new security
operations (“DHS”). Beyond the establishment of these new organizations, however, the Patriot
Act was important in the fact that it also ignited new rhetoric that envisioned a dangerous and
ubiquitous Muslim terrorist threat that the U.S. had the duty to combat. In an address to Congress
a week after the attacks, for instance, Bush stated that “our enemy is a radical network of
terrorists, and every government that supports them” (“Address to a Joint Session of Congress
and the American People”). “Our war on terror,” he continued, “Begins with al Qaeda, but it
does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found,
stopped, and defeated” (“Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People”).
Following this address, Bush directed the DHS to immediately begin implementing antiterrorist efforts. Thousands of people who appeared Middle Eastern were detained in the United
States in months after the attacks, and in one effort, the Absconder Apprehension Initiative,
thousands of Muslim Americans (with no ties to terrorism) were deported from the U.S.
(Brettell, 2007: 61-62).130 All the while, anti-terrorist detentions and deportations were kept
secret and all evidence remained undisclosed to the public (Brettell, 2007: 62). The tradition of
extrajudicial detainment and deportation of specific groups of people based on their skin color or
physical presentation, and justified with rhetoric of terrorism, hence began in earnest.131
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Brettell (2007) reveals that following 9/11, “over 1,200 persons of presumed Middle Eastern origin were
detained without charges or direct links to the terrorist attacks” (62). Another “40,000 male immigrants between the
ages of sixteen and twenty-five from predominantly Muslim nations were required to participate in a ‘special
registration’ program [in the United States]” (62). Overall, the program led to “over 5,400 deportations and between
1,700 and 2,700 detentions, although none were linked to the terrorist attacks” (62).
131
It is important to note that the detainment of racialized minority groups existed prior to 9/11 as well. Brettell
(2007), for instance, recounts how Japanese Americans were detained during WWII and how Cold War refugee
policies led to the detainment of thousands of Cubans, Haitians, and Central Americans seeking asylum in the
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As will be explored in the rest of this section, shortly after the passage of the Patriot Act
and this newly created language of dangerous Muslim terrorists who needed to be suppressed,
countries across the world such as Chile, China, and Myanmar began to adapt the discourse of
the Global War on Terror against its own racial and religious minority populations. Due to an
increasingly global society, Stone and Rizova (2014) explain how Islamophobia arose
throughout the globe, making Muslims the new “axis of evil” or the terrorist enemy that had to
be suppressed in countries globally (125). So too was the rhetoric of terrorism from the Global
War on Terror applied to non-Muslim minority groups. As seen in Chile which will be discussed
shortly, anti-terrorist laws were adopted and used to describe non-Islamic groups such as the
Mapuche to justify their repression by the Chilean government (Richards, 2013). Former
President Bush’s response to the 9/11 attacks and his anti-terrorism crusade ultimately had global
impacts in further stigmatizing a plethora of racialized and minority groups and making them a
“dangerous” other who were necessary of repression across countries, as will be explored soon.
Before delving into each individual country in this study and their War on Terror, it is
important to touch on some theory as to how the label “terrorist” brings legitimacy to
government coercion and extralegal government suppression of minority groups. In her article,
“Defining the ‘New Terrorism’: Reconstruction of the Enemy in the Global Risk Society,” for
instance, Cebeci (2012) explains that the use of the label “terrorist” by nation-states is an
effective way in which governing bodies can create an enemy who is “inhumane,” and therefore
“rightless” (41). Anti-terrorist laws and campaigns, she explains, allow nation-states to engage in
a “special kind of war...[which] involves the use of measures that impair the rules of war,
international law, and multilateralism, and paves the way for the violation of fundamental rights

United States (76). The 9/11 attacks just heightened the detainment and targeting of racial minority groups and
brought this tradition into modern day across the globe.
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and freedoms” (Cebeci, 2012: 43). Those already made a target by the state can effectively be
deemed a danger to the state and can subsequently be repressed in extrajudicial ways, made
legitimate under the label of “terrorist” and under anti-terrorist campaigns.132
Similarly, Brettell (2007) explains that anti-terrorist campaigns allow nation-states to
deny judicial and human rights to those labeled as terrorists in what she calls “undue process”
(60). Undue process, she explains, is when legal protections are suspended and denied to labeled
terrorists by “codif[ying] them as lesser citizens” (60). In denying full legal and human rights
under the label “terrorist,” people already made “other” in a nation-state are further dehumanized
and criminalized as the enemy needing to be suppressed. Meanwhile, governing bodies in nationstates are legitimized in the use of violence and illegal means against “terrorist” labeled groups
as it appears that they are working to combat what they have posited as a “national security
crisis” (Brettell, 2007: 60). The label of “terrorist” again allows the nation-states and their
governing bodies to act illegitimately towards racialized and ostracized portions of their citizen
body, while ironically, simultaneously legitimizing their authority in society. As will be seen in
Chile, China, and Myanmar, anti-terrorist campaigns are ultimately not questioned nor
challenged in many nation-states and thus, governing bodies’ true efforts of creating what
Mythen and Walklate (2021) call a “culture of control” are obscured and camouflaged as a
legitimate response to threat (379). In democratic countries, specifically, Mythen and Walklate
(2021) explain that Wars on Terror allow for authoritarian actions to emerge legitimately (390).
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For instance, she concludes, under anti-terrorism crusades, “new rules” become available to the state by which
the violation of human rights is not deemed illegal, the state avoids the burden of proving guilt or of even presenting
solid evidence, and all other democratic liberties and processes can be legitimately paused in pursuit those labeled
the enemy (Cebeci, 2012: 35). Further, the idea of terrorism creates a feeling of profound insecurity amongst
citizens. It is the perfect mechanism, she argues, for fearmongering which then undergirds a call for the state’s
violent repression of the racialized other, or those labeled “terrorist” in a society (Cebeci, 2012).
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Tied to racial narratives and racialized minorities, terrorist rhetoric is a perfect
mechanism to further posit racialized groups as “other,” as “dangerous,” and as “criminal,” and
to justify the actions of coercive governmental efforts to suppress them (Ditrych, 2021). Ditrych
(2021), for instance, argues that terrorist rhetoric has always been racist. “Discourses around
terrorism,” he writes, “have focused on civilization/barbarism, order/chaos, and
political/criminal,” oppositions in which racial minority groups are always associated with the
later in each of these dichotomies (226). In portraying racial minorities as “barbaric and
uncivilized terrorists” who are victimizing the “innocent” and the powerless, ideas of the innate
inferiority and the danger of racial minority groups are further ingrained into the societal ethos
(Ditrych, 2021: 228-229). As a result, othering through the discourse and policies of terrorism
once more legitimizes harsh governmental coercion and response; rhetoric of terrorism
ultimately serves as a perfect means to justify the existence and actions of coercive governmental
actions and forces, and to legitimize racial narratives in societies across the globe.133 This section
will further explore how China, Chile, and Myanmar have each adopted racist rhetoric of
“terrorism” after the Global War of Terror commenced in 2001 to further stigmatize and
suppress their racialized populations (the Uyghurs, the Mapuche, and the Rohingya), and how
such rhetoric have legitimized government coercion and the repression of the racialized other in
each.
The Chinese Model: The Uyghurs as the Terrorist Enemy
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Lloyd and Mountz (2018), for instance, similarly argues how the application of anti-terrorist efforts and labels of
“criminal,” “alien,” or “terrorist” onto immigrant bodies is a highly racialized crusade. Looking at the
disproportionate incarceration of Latinx immigrants and people of color in the United States, they argue that the
U.S. carceral state as a whole is anti-black or anti-dark (172). As a result, they argue, “particular categories of
people” are designated as permanently illegal and not fully human; the incarceration of specific racialized groups
and their social imagining as terrorist “enemies” leads to the criminalization of their mere existence (195). Darkness
is criminalized, the body detained, and anti-terrorist endeavors and the powerful disguise of the Global War on
Terror legitimize United States government coercion. As will be discussed shortly, the same anti-terrorism crusades
and anti-black motivation behind such crusades can be seen in Chile, China, and Myanmar.
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As just explained, the War on Terror not only profoundly change the United States, but it
also had global ripples in the model it served for countries worldwide to further stigmatize and
repress whole groups of people under the label “terrorist”, while building state legitimacy and
authority. Nowhere is this seen better than in China, where, shortly after Bush passed the Patriot
Act, the CCP adopted the label “terrorist” for the Uyghurs and claimed that they were associated
with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) (Becquelin, 2004). Operating for a brief time
from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, the ETIM, Xu, Beina, et al. (2014) reveal, was an
organization calling for an independent East Turkestan nation that “would cover parts of Turkey,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Xinjiang.” It was founded by
Uyghur Hasan Mahsum who was assassinated in 2003 and shortly after, the ETIM is thought to
have ceased activities, or have transformed into the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), another
Islamic nationalist group thought to have been founded by Uyghurs and also advocating for a
separate East Turkestan nation to “replace Xinjiang” (Xu, Beina, et al., 2014).134 Although very
little information is known about the ETIM and TIP, and Clarke (2015) claims that “there has
been little concrete evidence that ETIM mounted successful attacks in Xinjiang” during the time
of its operations under Mahsum (1997 to 2003), after Bush claimed the War on Terror in 2001,
the CCP claimed that the Uyghurs were ETIM terrorists, and that they were responsible for
several terrorist attacks in the early 2000s (Becquelin, 2004). Rhetoric of “terrorism” then
allowed the CCP to persecute the Uyghurs and to concentrate government coercion efforts on
repressing their existence under a seemingly legitimate cause of national security.
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The TIP today is extremely small in scope and does not compare to separatist groups like the Mapuche in size or
influence (Xu, Beina, et al., 2014).
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For instance, shortly after 9/11, Becquelin (2004) reveals, the CCP implemented a “Strike
Hard campaign,” 135 in which the “three evils: separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism”
were identified as forces needing extensive and extreme crackdown and suppression by Chinese
coercive forces (Becquelin, 2004: 40).136 In three state reports from 2002 to 2003, the “East
Turkistan Terrorist Forces'' were accused of organizing and conducting more than 200 terrorist
efforts in China such as bombing and assassinations that led to “162 deaths and 440 people
injured” (Becquelin, 2004: 39). The other reports specifically identified Xinjiang and the
Uyghurs as key actors in these terrorist acts, claimed that they had ties to Al Qaeda,137 and called
for international cooperation to label the Uyghurs as terrorists and to support the repression of
their activities (Becquelin, 2004: 41-43). For example, in their article, “Counterterrorism
Strategies in China: Domestic and Foreign Differences,” authors Andersen and Jiang (2021)
reveal that after launching its Strike Hard campaign, the CCP successfully pushed the U.S. and
the UN to put the Uyghurs on the international list of terrorist organizations (42). Although no
longer labeled as such by the United States,138 such designations of “terrorist” have allowed
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It is important to note that the CCP implemented its first “Strike Hard” campaign against “splittism and illegal
religious activities” in 1996. After 9/11, however, “terrorist activities” were included in China’s new Strike Hard
campaign which has given the CCP more grounds to repress the Uyghurs legitimacy (Becquelin, 2004). The
importance and impact of 9/11 in China’s anti-terrorism crusades thus cannot be overstated.
136
Hillman and Tuttle (2020) emphasize that China’s fight against these three evils is broadcasted across the
country in state propaganda efforts. For instance, they reveal, posters in Xinjiang University in 2011 announced that
the CCP would crack down on Xinjiang along these three fronts (separatist activities, terrorism, and religious
extremism), and that other posters had quotes such as: “We must cater to new circumstances, research new features,
and keep as a current goal a resolute curbing of the ongoing emergence of violent terrorist cases, a resolute curbing
of large incidents of collective incidents of collective nature that violent terrorism triggers, and keep a high-level
crackdown on terrorist crimes” (Hillman and Tuttle, 2020: 49). It is important to note that the rhetoric of terrorism
and the label of “terrorist” is how the CCP further controls the narrative of racialized and dangerous others like the
Uyghurs who ultimately need to be repressed.
137
For instance, Andersen and Jiang (2021) reveal that after declaring their Strike Hard campaign and their efforts
against terrorism, that “China accused more than forty Uyghur organizations . . . [abroad and domestically] of
having ties to al-Qaeda and its now notorious leader, Osama Bin Laden” (42). Yet, Bovingdon (2010) emphasizes
that this is largely untrue as “there is scant evidence that more than a few hundred Uyghurs, if that many, ever had
ties with al-Qaeda or the Taliban” (3).
138
Although under then President George W. Bush, the ETIM was placed on the United States’ list of terrorist
organizations in 2002 (Xu, Beina, et al., 2014), the United States just recently removed this organization from the
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China to achieve domestic and international legitimacy in their violent and suppressive efforts
against the Uyghurs; such labels of “terrorist” have permitted the CCP to conduct coercive and
suppressive actions against the Uyghurs in the name of security while building their own
authority and while solidifying racial narratives in the nation.
The label of “terrorist” and the designation of the Uyghurs as involved in terrorism under
the ETIM has also allowed China to gain international allies who not only support the
designation of “terrorist” for the Uyghurs, but who also violently aid in their oppression. For
example, founded on June 15, 2001 and implemented two years later in September 2003—
shortly after the 9/11 attacks of 2001--the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) combined
China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in a security and economic
apparatus to enforce stability throughout Central Asia (Laruelle and Sébastien, 2012).139 While
this coalition creates trade benefits and relationships amongst members,140 its main purpose is
security and anti-terrorist control (Laruelle and Sébastien, 2012: 11). Joint military exercises are
conducted on an annual basis as well as simulations of terrorist attacks (Laruelle and Sébastien,

list in face of the genocide currently being conducted against the Uyghurs as will be discussed later (Hua, 2020).
Still, for all of this time, it is important to note that China was able to get the international community to also label
the Uyghurs and the ETIM as “terrorist”, therefore, increasing their international legitimacy in their crackdown of
the Uyghurs.
139
In 2017, the SOC expanded to include India and Pakistan (“Shanghai Cooperation Organization…”). Eight
member states now comprise the organization and a report by the UN explains that the SCO also has “four Observer
States interested in acceding to full membership (Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, and Mongolia) and six ‘Dialogue
Partners’ (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Turkey)” who they also work with (“Shanghai
Cooperation Organization…”). Hence, the SCO is extremely vast and consists of many involved nations across
Central Asia.
140
For instance, this organization aids economic trade between the 8 member nations (China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, and Pakistan), and Laruelle and Sébastien (2012) expose that
China wants to make the SCO a free trade zone (34). As a result of this cooperation, China has been able to further
expand its trade and its economic success. For instance, Laraulle and Sébastien (2012) reveal that “in the 1990s,
China was a modest player in Central Asia, but this transformed greatly in 10 years as China is now key, positioning
itself ‘as one of the top three trading partners for each of the Central Asian states’” (7). Hence, in addition to efforts
to gain international legitimacy and aid in their repression of the Uyghurs, economic incentives also motivate
China’s involvement in and leadership of this organization; the two, anti-terrorist campaigns to repress the Uyghurs
as well as economic and capital drive, are intertwined in the CCP’s racial state building motivations as similarly
discussed in the last section.
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2012: 28). Under China’s guidance and leadership, these terrorist simulations are specifically
aimed at preparing for Uyghur terrorist movements; under the SCO, China has been able to
recruit its Central Asian neighbors to also crackdown on and repress Uyghurs and their “terrorist
activities” across various nation-states (Becquelin, 2004: 41). Neighboring countries such as
Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, for instance, are now
complicit in tracking, arresting, and deporting Uyghurs from Xinjiang back to China who cross
into their territories (Laruelle and Sébastien, 2012: 29). The SCO is also expanding technological
and information sharing between these countries, further aiding in the CCP’s knowledge of
international Uyghurs and thus, aiding in its repression of Uyghur solidarity and Uyghur crossnational activities (Laruelle and Sébastien, 2012: 29). Ultimately, the SCO has allowed the CCP
to gain support and allies in the repression of the Uyghurs, thus increasing its international
legitimacy as other nation-states have ultimately also become invested in the suppression of this
racialized “terrorist” group.
Domestically, too, the label of “terrorist” has provided the CCP with legitimacy in their
stringent control and suppression of the Uyghurs. For instance, Andersen and Jiang (2018)
emphasize that the label “terrorist” was used as justification to expel the Uyghurs from attending
the Olympic Games that took place in Beijing in 2008 (42). Uyghurs were denied hotel rooms,
and ironically, despite the CCP emphasizing national unity in which all ethnic groups or minzu
are incorporated in its national identity (Bovingdon, 2010), the Uyghurs were prevented from
joining this national event due to their racialized and criminalized status as “terrorist” (Andersen
and Jiang, 2018: 42). A year later, in 2009, violent confrontations between the Uyghurs and the
Han majority then broke out in Xinjiang (Hillman and Tuttle, 2020: 226-228). Known today as
the “Urumqi riots,” and largely triggered by what Hillman and Tuttle (2020) explain as the
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Uyghurs’ frustration with their poverty and economic exclusion from Xinjiang, Uyghur protests
in Xinjiang turned violent and “more than 200 civilians [(both Uyghurs and the Han majority)
were] killed in street rioting and targeted interethnic violence” (Hillman and Tuttle, 2020: 226).
Despite the fact that Hillman and Tuttle (2020) emphasize that “these ethnic clashes are not new”
as they count “150 incidents of ethnic protest and violence [that] occurred in Xinjiang between
1949 and 2005,” the CCP responded to these events by labeling the Uyghurs as “terrorists” who
were targeting the Han majority (228). The label of “terrorist” was then used to justify the
implementation of a series of harsh regulation and surveillance of the Uyghurs after 2009
(Hillman and Tuttle, 2020). For instance, after the Urumqi riots, military and security
checkpoints were installed in Xinjiang as well as an increasing number of security cameras, with
the attempt of better controlling, regulating, and suppressing the Uyghurs (Hillman and Tuttle,
2020: 236). Clearly, the label “terrorist” justified increased security and suppression of the
Uyghurs, increasing the CCP’s domestic legitimacy amongst the Han majority in conducting
such efforts.
Then, in 2013, more violent conflict between the Uyghurs and the Han majority erupted
in China after a car, thought to have been driven by Uyghurs from Xinjiang, killed five people in
Tiananmen Square, Beijing, and subsequently, the Uyghurs were again labeled “terrorist” and
their surveillance was increased to an even greater extent (Andersen and Jiang, 2018). For
instance, after this event, the Uyghurs were called a “jihadist threat” (Andersen and Jiang, 2018:
43),141 and security efforts were ramped up significantly (Clarke, 2015). “Ongoing sweeps of
Uyghur neighborhoods and mosques in search of potential militants and their weapons,” Clarke
(2015) explains resulted, as well as “Beijing rapidly increas[ing] Xinjiang’s internal security
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Jihadism has typically been used to describe militant Islamic movements typically portrayed as “dangerous”
(Andersen and Jiang, 2018).
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budget for 2014 to some $1 billion and a new committee named the National Security Council
was created to deal with counterterror strategies in Xinjiang” (132). Like 2009, the Uyghurs in
2013 and 2014 were again uniformly labeled “terrorist” by the CCP, and consequently
suppressed and surveilled to a greater degree in efforts seemingly legitimate to the rest of the
country; anti-terrorist efforts on behalf of the CCP again brought the nation-state domestic
legitimacy in increasing coercive and repressive surveillance actions against the Uyghurs under
the notion of state security.
Finally, in 2015, China’s anti-terrorist crusade against the Uyghurs took the most drastic
form when China passed the Counterterrorism Act of 2015, an act which allowed the CCP to
crackdown on “illegal” religious expressions and cultural practices that are seen as threatening to
the state (Andersen and Jiang, 2018: 42). In practice, this act has allowed the CCP to persecute
racial and religious minorities like the Uyghurs legitimately.142 For instance, this law permits the
CCP to criminally arrest many Uyghurs by labeling their distinct cultural expressions and
practice of Islam as terrorist (Andersen and Jiang, 2018). Today, for instance, Muslim practice
and expressions such as beards, head scarfs, fasting, and public prayers or religious gatherings
are criminalized. Furthermore, all religious texts are required to be approved by the CCP and all
literature and academia contrary to CCP narratives are criminalized as “terrorist” (Reger and
Szadiewski, 2012: 11).143 For instance, in 1998, Uyghur scholar Tohti Tunyaz was sentenced
eleven years in prison for writing a history book on Xinjiang and the East Turkestan Republic
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A United Nation Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 2019 report, for instance, notes
that the majority of racial and religious minority of groups have been arrested and persecuted under this law (Aoláin,
2019). “Notably,” they explain, this law has been applied to “Uyghurs and Tibetans” whose cultural identity is
perceived as most threatening by the CCP (Aoláin, 2019: 2).
143
Even before the passage of this law, Reger and Szadiewski (2012) explain that efforts against counter-CCP ideas
were already so strong that in June 2002, “Kashgar authorities conducted a massive public book burning, during
which ‘tens of thousands’ of Uyghur books were reportedly destroyed” (Reger and Szadiewski, 2012: 13).
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(Becquelin, 2004: 42). Reger and Szadiewski (2012) explain that today, “opinions that diverge
from official views often are considered ‘splittist’ and prosecuted as ‘endangering state
security.’” The Counterterrorism Act of 2015 ultimately allows the CCP to retain control of
racial narratives and histographies in China which ensure the CCP’s dominance and the erasure
of Uyghur distinctiveness under a rhetoric of national harmony.
While it is clear that under the Counterterrorist Act of 2015, the CCP is able to suppress
cultural and religious expression rather than terrorist expression, this anti-terrorist legislation is
again key to building CCP legitimacy as under these crusades, the CCP is portrayed to be
protecting the health and safety of the nation; something that Han majority citizens can support,
especially given that many believe that racial narratives of the Uyghurs as criminal or dangerous
are true, as discussed in the race chapter of this study. Furthermore, and perhaps most
importantly, counterterrorism legislation allows the CCP to arbitrarily arrest and imprison
thousands of Uyghurs, and to deny them many important judicial rights (Becquelin, 2004). For
instance, a United Nation Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 2019
report notes that the Counterterrorism Act of 2015 has led to extended detention of the Uyghurs
and their subsequent “judicially handed down criminal sentence in an ‘education placement’, i.e.,
re-education facilities, instead of being freed, if the individual is believed to constitute a danger
to society” (Aoláin, 2019: 8). As will be discussed in the next section of this study, such
reeducation facilities are really highly repressive and coercive detention facilities where
numerous Uyghurs and other minorities have been suppressed in Xinjiang.144 As will be
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For instance, this report notes that as of 2019, it was alleged that “between 1 million to 1.5 million ethnic
Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang may have been arbitrarily forced into these facilities, where there have
been allegations of deaths in custody, physical and psychological abuse and torture, as well as a lack of access to
medical care” (Aoláin, 2019: 8). They also note that the Counterterrorism Act of 2015 takes away the right to
judicial review and an independent judiciary when appealing their arrest and detention under this law (Aoláin, 2019:
9).
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similarly seen in Chile, the creation of such a powerful anti-terrorism legislation hence results in
the application of extremely subversive and repressive government coercion against religious
and racial minority groups like the Uyghurs, while they are simultaneously denied any rights or
means to contest such discriminatory and oppressive governmental actions. Meanwhile, the CCP
remains in good standing with the Han majority; if it is law, after all, it remains what Jacobson
(2003) calls natural and objective authority in which the majority of the citizen body will not
question such an act’s legitimacy (226-227). The CCP and its oppression of racial and religious
minority groups such as the Uyghurs is again justified under anti-terrorist efforts and legislation.
Yet, the fact remains that the label of terrorist and the application of the 2015
Counterterrorism Act against the Uyghurs is largely inadequate and largely misused. Becquelin
(2004), for instance, notes that “virtually every expression of dissatisfaction with the [Chinese]
government is immediately associated with separatist ideology which is associated in turn with
actions conducted by terrorist forces” (43). Clarke (2015) notes that many of the alleged Uyghur
terrorist attacks identified in the 2002 state reports are questionable in their accuracy (130). And
as discussed at the beginning of this section, throughout time, the East Turkestan Islamic
Movement has been limited in scope, and most Uyghurs are not involved in any terrorist related
conduct (Clarke, 2015: 133). Instead, rhetoric of terrorism has again been utilized as highly
effective means for justifying the larger CCP goals of repressing the Uyghurs for its racial nation
state building efforts of creating a homogenous Han identity in the name of domestic and
international security.
Applied to the CCP’s racial nation state building strategies, then, rhetoric of terrorism
aids the CCP with its discourse of national unity. In distinguishing Uyghur “terrorists”, the CCP
can identify those Uyghurs who serve as the “exception” to China’s nation state harmony.
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Terrorist, after all, often denotes “foreign” and in distinguishing “separatist” activity, the CCP
can solidify a national identity that is formed in opposition to that threat; the national dream of a
shared (racial) identity (zhonghua minzu) is again emphasized and those with a portrayed
backward and dangerous racial, regional and religious identity are rhetorically banished from the
country under the label “terrorist”. The Han in-group identity is once more solidified while the
Uyghurs are further racialized and ostracized in society. Hence, a reality of Uyghur exclusion
emerges, even though inclusion and citizen homogeneity are again the narratives that the CCP
smoothers the country in to maintain legitimacy. Taken together, racial narratives and rhetoric of
terrorism ultimately allow the CCP to deal with the contradictions of discriminating against a
racially and religiously minority group even while it nominally recognizes that group in its
national race and identity, zhonghua minzu; like economic development projects, rhetoric of
terrorism ultimately allow the CCP to explicitly exclude and oppress the Uyghurs while it can
still create a rhetorical veil that promotes a vision of the body politic as consisting of bodies
without such excluded racial difference and while it can still promote itself as a protector of
everybody. The fact that Han homogeneity is being achieved through exclusion, rather than the
actual collectivity of its racial and religious minority groups, is ultimately concealed, and the
CCP again remains in legitimacy, perhaps even more than before, in its anti-terrorist campaigns.
Furthermore, government coercive actions like re-education camps are justified to “fix” or
“help” the “dangerous” and “terrorist” Uyghur as will be discussed in the last chapter of this
study. Thus, and as seen, rhetoric of terrorism has ultimately been extremely influential in
helping the CCP solidify its racial state building and racial narratives of national homogeneity at
the same time that it emphasizes and acts on Uyghur difference in reality.
The Mapuche as Terrorists: Incarcerated and Denied Judicial Rights
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Like China, Chile has also adopted the rhetoric of terrorism in labeling and repressing the
Mapuche; similar to the Uyghurs, the Mapuche have also been labeled terrorists and have been
detained and incarcerated under anti-terrorist legislation created by the Chilean government.
Such legislation works to continue stigmatizing the Mapuche as a racial and indigenous other—
as a dangerous and criminal group—while also allowing for their incarceration and denial of
basic judicial rights. The label “terrorist” applied to the Mapuche in Chile allows for the Chilean
government to ultimately operate legitimately in a highly repressive manner and to garner
Chilean citizen support while criminally detaining and sentencing important Mapuche leaders.
Such rhetoric also helps to continue position the Mapuche as a racially and indigenously distinct
and dangerous population, compounding their stigmatization and further entrenching the belief
across Chile that they are worthy of repression by Chilean government coercion.
As just mentioned, one of the main techniques the Chilean nation-state and its coercive
forces have adopted in repressing the Mapuche has been their widespread arrest and
incarceration. To combat Mapuche advocacy organizations and their protests against
transnational corporations and the Chilean nation-state’s usurpation of their land, the Chilean
government has deployed its main Chilean police force, called the Carabineros, and the carceral
state to detain many Mapuche in jails and prisons across the country (Zibechi, 2012). Mapuche
manifestations have often been criminalized, and as will be discussed later, a police presence is
often a constant force in Mapuche communities (Zibehci, 2012; Richards, 2013). So common is
the arrest and detainment of the Mapuche that in a letter from a Santiago prison, an incarcerated
Mapuche man, Waikilaj Cadim Calfunao stated, “The Chilean State considers me a criminal for
defending my family and lands” (Zibechi, 2012: 109). One of the founders of the Mapuche
organization, CAM, José Huenchunao, similarly stated, “Prison is the place the Chilean State and
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its political and judicial operators use to punish those who struggle on behalf of the Mapuche
people-nation” (Zibechi, 2012: 109).145 Yet another CAM leader, Héctor Llaitul—a leader who
has been arrested and imprisoned many times for his protests against transnational corporations
and their occupation of Mapuche land—stated, “My community has been severely repressed-every member of my family is imprisoned--my mother, father, brother, aunt, etc.” (Zibechi,
2012: 110). The criminalization and incarceration of the Mapuche is hence a very common
experience and is a way in which the Chilean government works to control and repress the
challenges the Mapuche pose to its neoliberal policies and occupation of their land.
Like the Uyghurs in China, the Mapuche are arrested and criminalized to such a large
extent because of the existence of an anti-terrorist law that targets them as a racialized enemy.
Originating with dictator Pinochet, the anti-terrorism law was first introduced in 1984 to target
any groups and individuals who protested his rule (“Chile: Undue Process”, 2004).146 Although
modified briefly in the 2001,147 like the 1980 Constitution, this law still exists in Chile’s presentday democracy and is a means by which the Chilean government can suppress the Mapuche
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It is important to note that Huenchunao stated this after he was sentenced to ten years in prison for allegedly
torching the equipment of a logging company in the Arauncanía (Zibechi, 2012: 109). Long sentences like this are
common for many Mapuche acts of protest or resistance against the Chilean state and transnational companies.
146
Richards (2013) emphasizes that under Pinochet, the “citizen-subject formation” of either “permitido”—people
following state rule and not resisting—and “insurrecto”—the terrorist who is labelled as leading insurrectionaries
and protests—first emerged (124-130). So too did the anti-terrorism law of 1984 to deal with those labelled
“insurrecto.” As will be shortly discussed, this law increases prison sentence times, makes pretrial detention more
common, and takes away basic criminal rights that are present during normal trials such as the necessity for
witnesses to be identified in trial and the necessity of the prosecution to right away share evidence with the defense
(“Chile: Undue Process”). Today, the Mapuche are ultimately still labeled as “insurrecto” or “terrorist” when they
forgo assimilation and instead protest the occupation of their lands by transnational companies and the Chilean
government.
147
Bialostozky (2008), for instance, reveals that the anti-terrorism law was modified in 2001 to become the
Terrorism Act of 2001 and to include the new code of criminal procedure that was passed in 2000 (83). Today, they
emphasize, terrorist crimes that can be punished under this law are: “murder; mutilation; infliction of wounds;
kidnapping; hostage-taking; sending explosive substances; arson; etc.” Specifically important is the “detonation of
explosive or incendiary substances” or arson which the Mapuche have been repeatedly charged with when they have
set transnational corporations’ trucks and land on fire as means of protest (Bialostozky, 2008: 83).
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comprehensively and legitimately (“Chile: Undue Process”, 2004).148 In their report, “Chile:
Undue Process,” for instance, Human Rights Watch (2004) explains that the anti-terrorism law
(now called the Terrorism Act) is “the harshest law in the Chilean statue book.” “It doubles the
normal sentences for some offenses,” they explain, “makes pretrial release more difficult,
enables the prosecution to withhold evidence from the defense for up to six months, and allows
defendants to be convicted on testimony given by anonymous witnesses'' (“Chile: Undue
Process”, 2014). Furthermore, under this law, those convicted of terrorism are not allowed to
hold public office for fifteen years (“Chile: Undue Process”, 2004).149
Important is the fact that this law has been disproportionately applied to the Mapuche.
For instance, a 2013 investigation and report conducted by a “Special Rapporteur” sent to Chile
to investigate the anti-terrorism law and the repression of the Mapuche from July 17th, 2013 to
July 30th, 2013, found that in this time alone, “the anti-terrorism legislation had been invoked by
the local public prosecutors and by the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security in a total of
19 emblematic cases, involving 108 individuals” (Emmerson, 2014: 12). Of these cases, they
continue to reveal, “the statistics demonstrate that Mapuche protests account for the vast majority
of prosecutions under the anti-terrorism legislation” (Emmerson, 2014: 12). The Rapporteur
further noted that between 2008 and 2012, there was a total of 843 anti-terrorist cases brought
against the Mapuche in Arauncanía (Emmerson, 2014: 12). While they note that only seven of
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Notably, although anti-terrorist law in Chile arose from Pinochet’s dictatorship, 9/11 still had a major effect on
increasing the association between Mapuche and terrorists. Richards (2013) notes that after 9/11, a conservative
think tank named Libertad y Desarrollo (LYD) published an essay that associated Mapuche resistance with the 9/11
terrorist attacks. This publication emphasized that the Mapuche were a “risky situation” who needed to be
suppressed in a “new global terrorism context” (106). Rhetoric like this was widespread in Chile following the 9/11
attacks and had a role in making Pinochet’s anti-terrorism law modern.
149
Richards (2013) similarly reveals that the anti-terrorist law allows public prosecutors to conduct criminal
investigations in secret and to invade the defendant’s privacy by monitoring their computers and tapping their
phones to collect information, practices not allowed in any criminal proceeding (104). Longer sentences, longer than
under the normal criminal code, often also result (104).
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these 843 cases resulted in formal sentences, that “these statistics do not include cases where the
anti-terrorism legislation was applied at the earlier investigation stages...the formal charges were
later changed to offences under the ordinary criminal legislation” (Emmerson, 2014). That is,
even if the Mapuche are not charged under the anti-terrorism law, this report found that the
application of this law can be applied in early stages of prosecution and can still be used to detain
and suppress the Mapuche for long periods of time.150
Taken collectively, this report shows the disproportionate application of anti-terrorism
laws against the Mapuche and the effectiveness of applying this law in incarcerating them for
long periods of time, and therefore, incapacitating their ability to protest the Chilean government
and transnational corporations; this report reveals the ability of such legislation to harshly repress
Mapuche protests against the usurpation of their lands and the neoliberal policies of the Chilean
government. Richards (2013) concludes, “Constructing the Mapuche as terrorists obscures their
legitimate rights claims” (105); it allows, once more, for the dehumanization of the Mapuche and
the negation of their legitimate claims to their lands.
Before going any farther, it is vital to note that even if the Mapuche are committing
illegal offenses in their protests against the Chilean government and transnational companies,
that the international community at large does not consider the crimes they are being sentenced
for (under the anti-terrorist law) as acts of terrorism (Bialostozky, 2008). For instance,
Bialostozky (2008) reveals how the majority of crimes that the Mapuche have undoubtedly
committed and been arrested for in their protests are crimes against property, usually involving
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A 2004 Human Rights Watch report similarly emphasizes that beyond the small number of Mapuche who have
been actually sentenced under anti-terrorism legislation, that “many other Mapuche activists and suspects…have
been held in prolonged pretrial detention under the anti-terrorism law, some for more than a year before charges
were dropped.” This reveals the power of such legislation in suppressing the Mapuche, even if they are not
sentenced under the actual legislation.
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arson (104).151 Yet, Biaostozky (2008) goes on to explain, arson does “not meet the requisite
level of gravity to be a terrorist crime based on international definitions of terrorism” as it does
not “endanger life” (91-92).152 Further, he continues to state, “In Chile, arson is also included as
a crime against property in the ordinary criminal code” (92). Hence, if it is included in the
criminal code, why are the Mapuche specifically being charged for this crime under the antiterrorism law? Biaostozky (2008) speculates that the Chilean government has done so to be “able
to control the sociopolitical discourse by supplementing their unequal application of the
institutional judicial framework with the rhetorical use of terrorist language” (92). “This
combination has served to misrepresent arguably legitimate social protests as a threat to national
and international security,” he continues to explain, “and legitimize the government’s use of the
anti-terrorism law” (92). In other words, while arson might not truly be a terrorist act, labeling it
as such for the Mapuche, allows the Chilean nation-state and their coercive forces to squelch any
Mapuche activity protesting the government and the occupation of their lands, while
simultaneously positing the Mapuche as dangerous terrorists who need to be suppressed; through
the application of the label “terrorist,” the Mapuche can be portrayed as “committing actions that
are a threat to democratic values and international peace” (92). This, ultimately, then legitimizes
the Chilean government’s harsh actions against them.153

151

Mapuche leaders and organizations have often targeted the property of transnational timber companies, setting
their trucks, machinery, and crops on fire, but hardly any Mapuche have been accused of crimes that have resulted in
physical violence, injuries, or deaths (“Chile: Undue Process”, 2014).
152
As a caveat, he explains that there is no international consensus on the definition of terrorism but that generally,
definitions of acts of terrorism include “any action that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians
or non-combatants” (Bialostozky, 2008: 93).
153
Biaostozky (2008) concludes that anti-terrorism legislation also reinforces the Mapuche’s stigmatization as other
while also “prevent[ing] them from engaging in the judicial and sociopolitical discourse that a rule of law
framework is meant to enable” (Bialostozky, 2008: 92). That is, this legislation further positions them as a
dangerous, racial other, while preventing their ability to lay claim to basic judicial rights and the ability of a fair
trial.
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For instance, like China, the anti-terrorist law in Chile also results in the legitimacy of
Chilean government coercion and Chilean police, known as the Carabineros. In their book,
Toward a Society Under Law: Citizens and Their Police in Latin America, Tulchin and
Ruthenburg (2006), for example, reveal how a sense of security has always been important to
various groups of citizens throughout Latin America due to the high prevalence of crime in many
Latin American countries and the threat that instability is viewed to pose to newly founded
democracies.154 “Even before 9/11,” they write, “the vast majority of peoples in Latin America
were concerned about security” (319). As a result, they argue that citizens in Latin American are
highly susceptible to fearmongering and that any talk about crime or instability triggers deep
anxiety among various groups (319). This then leads to their adamant support of forces who
work to quash these perceived threats. For instance, while distrust surrounds policing in many
other post-dictator countries in South America, Tulchin and Ruthenburg (2006) note that
“Chile’s Carabineros are, along with Chile’s Investigative Police, one of the few Latin American
police forces that a considerable proportion of citizens ‘trust to a large degree’ (23%) or to a
‘moderate degree’ (35%)” (224). Could the repression of the Mapuche by Chilean police lead, in
part, to this higher degree of legitimacy? Because the Chilean government has created the
narrative of the Mapuche as a dangerous and criminal “terrorist” and because citizens are again
concerned with national security and the high status of their own identities, the Chilean racial
majority could be led to support Chilean policing and government coercion through anti-terrorist
crusades.
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They emphasize that a lot of Latin American citizens’ concern for stability ties back to the fact that many Latin
American countries were recently ruled by dictators and that transition to democracy is relatively new for many
Latin American countries (Tulchin and Ruthenburg, 2006).
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Furthermore, the Chilean racial majority have even called for anti-terrorist legislation and
repressive policing to be deployed against the Mapuche themselves. For instance, Richards
(2013) observes that “a vast majority of local elites in the Arauncanía support state violence
against the Mapuche '' (83). It is the local elites themselves, she explains, who have lobbied for
antiterrorist legislation and stronger state oppression against the Mapuche (83). While perhaps
concerned with security as just mentioned, local elites’ support of antiterrorist legislation applied
to the Mapuche also likely arises from capitalistic interests: state violence and the application of
anti-terrorist laws against the Mapuche suppresses any Mapuche resistance that could potentially
threaten their occupation of Mapuche land, and hence, their profit (Richards, 2013). In this sense,
government coercion “maintain[s] their place at the top of the social hierarchy” (83).155
Ironically, and like the other countries in this study, while it is the Chilean state and transnational
companies seeking to repress the Mapuche--colonizing their land, destroying the earth, and then
denying their rights to live in prosperity-- it is still the Mapuche who are labelled terrorists and
convicted and incarcerated under anti-terrorist legislation.156 All the while, the Chilean nationstate garners greater legitimacy and Chilean governmental coercion like Chilean police (the
Carabineros) are made to seem a necessary part of the state apparatus repressing the Mapuche in
Chilean society.
Refocusing on Chile’s racial project, it is because local elites and ordinary Chileans have
full-heartedly bought into the racial narrative of the Mapuche as “other” that anti-terrorist
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Local elites and corporations are so invested in the oppression of the Mapuche that they have even staged crimes
against themselves to blame on the Mapuche--self-attacks called auto-atentados (Richards, 2013: 95). Although
falsely created, the Mapuche are then tried and charged under anti-terrorist legislation. While capitalistic pursuits
motivate these auto-atentados, Richards (2013) argues that these elites are also largely afraid of “multicultural
outside forces” (154). That is, a racial fear of the Mapcuhe as other also lead to their support of Mapuche repression
and their creation of auto-atentados; these elites have again incorporated racial narratives into their beings.
156
Richards (2013), for instance, interviewed a Mapuche woman who observed that “Mapuche could end up in jail
for fifteen years for defending a small amount of land, while the owners of big business who wreak havoc on
Mapuche lands remain free” (98).
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legislation ultimately leads to larger citizen support of anti-terrorist Chilean government crusades
against the Mapuche. This increased citizen support, in turn, legitimates the narrative that
“others” the Mapuche. Beyond capitalist pursuits, it is because the Chilean state has been so
effective at creating racial narratives of the Mapuche as “uncivilized,” “innately different,” and
“lesser,” that the larger Chilean polity has easily accepted ideas of Mapuche criminality and
Mapuche terrorism in need of suppression (Richards, 2013). As Richards (2013) emphasizes, “A
central aspect of racism, power, and coloniality is who has the power to define what is legal and
legitimate” (99). So too, is the power to define who is illegitimate, illegal, criminal, and terrorist.
In labeling the Mapuche as criminal and in actively enforcing anti-terrorist laws against them,
the Chilean government and its coercive forces further entrench racial narratives of the Mapuche
as a racialized and dangerous “other.” In turn, this once again leads to the further support and
legitimacy of government coercion against the Mapuche. An ever-revolving cycle of
stigmatization for the Mapuche and legitimization of coercive government action is ultimately
created through anti-terrorism legislation and the label of “terrorist” for the Mapuche.
Yet, it is important to conclude this section by emphasizing that as mentioned previously,
most of the Mapuche’s acts of protests against the Chilean state and transnational companies take
the form of arson or property damage and do not target human life (Biaostozky, 2008). Because
of this, Biaostozky (2008) emphasizes that international definitions of terrorism are not adequate
to describe their activities; that the application of the anti-terrorist law is not accurate to punish
their protests. Furthermore, like the Uyghurs and the Rohingya, many of the Mapuche’s acts of
protest also ironically arise from a desperate state of poverty, not always from a desire to
separate from the state. For instance, a Mapuche quoted in Richards’ study (2013), explained that
acts of protest and resistance among his Mapuche community arose because they “could no
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longer endure the scarcity” (105). “We no longer fit in the community,” he stated, “and aside
from that, the timber company dried up all the water” (Richards, 2013: 105). Many acts of
resistance amongst the Mapuche are hence not likely attacks motivated simply by a desire for
independence, but rather, acts of “extreme poverty and dehumanization” (Richards, 2013: 105).
In this sense, in applying anti-terrorist legislation, Chile is ironically creating the exact
conditions they are aiming to eliminate; in so harshly oppressing the Mapuche and incarcerating
them under anti-terrorist legislation, the Chilean state and their coercive forces such as the police
are ironically triggering the same Mapuche resistance they are adamantly attempting to
repress.157 This ultimately puts into question the truth of why the Chilean nation-state is
deploying anti-terrorist legislation against the Mapuche: it appears that the application of such
legislation is not being deployed with the purpose of annihilating an actual threat to the state, but
rather, to sustain racial narratives; to continue to build the image of a criminal “other” while
solidifying racial state identity and legitimacy. For ultimately, it appears that the label “terrorist”
is ultimately a highly effective means to transform the symbolic threat the Mapuche pose to the
country into a physical and seemingly real threat that legitimizes the state and their coercive
actions against the Mapuche through the eyes of the Chilean citizen body.
The Rohingya as the “Foreign” Terrorist in Myanmar
Fear of terrorism has also come to frame conflict in the Rakhine state and has been used
as means to further separate and designate the Rohingya as a racially and religiously distinct and
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The same can be seen in China where Clarke (2015) reveals how cracking down on Uyghur “terrorism” leads to
the very conditions that motivate those with marginalized identities to join terrorist organizations. “Terrorism won’t
go away by striking against it,” Clarke (2015) writes, because “it is born from the ills of society” (133). As the CCP
and Chinese security forces continue to target and repress Uyghur peoples, the Uyghurs will be pushed further to the
periphery of Chinese society, leading more and more Uyghurs to join separatist groups and demand autonomy and
recognition of their rights (Hillman and Tuttle, 2020). In this sense, like the Chilean government, the CCP and their
coercive actions under anti-legislation paradoxically create the exact conditions that prompt the beliefs and
behaviors they are trying to repress; in short, they are creating a self-fulfilling prophecy by labeling the Uyghurs
terrorists.
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dangerous “other.” Violent clashes between the Rohingya and the Rakhine Buddhists (Buddhists
who live alongside the Rohingya in the Rakhine state) starting since 2012 have increasingly been
attributed to a dangerous and foreign “Bengali terrorist” menace (the Rohingya) and rhetoric of
the Rohingya’s threat to the nation has been used to justify their harsh suppression. Such rhetoric
has also been used to motivate Buddhist nationalist groups and large portions of the Buddhist
majority to join in the violent persecution of the Rohingya. As will be discussed shortly, because
the Buddhist polity have incorporated their Buddhist religion and race so fervently into their
identities, the Tatmadaw and government officials during Myanmar’s brief period of democracy
(2015-2021) have been able to use print and social media disseminating the idea of Rohingya
“terrorism” to motivate the creation of Buddhist nationalist groups also working to persecute the
Rohingya and destroy the perceived “threat” they pose for the predominately Buddhist country
(Wade, 2017).158 It is not so much that the Rohingya truly pose a highly dangerous threat to
challenging or overthrowing Buddhist identity (as they are much too repressed and small in
number to do so), but it is more so that their distinctive religious and racial identities are
perceived as an intimate threat to the Buddhist polity who again, have established their group
identity by distinguishing who they are not: Muslim and a racialized other. Through the rhetoric
of terrorism, the Tatmadaw and media has ultimately been able to capitalize on this fear of the
Rohingya destabilizing Buddhist identity to garner legitimacy and support throughout the
country; rhetoric of terrorism ultimately has allowed the Tatmadaw to continue to assert its
dominance in society and to hence, remain the ultimate superpower to which everybody else is
subject.
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Steinberg (2008), for instance, emphasizes that “some 85 percent” of Myanmar’s population (as of 2008) is
Buddhist (53).
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While the narrative of terrorism was initiated soon after 9/11 in the other countries in this
study (or even a little before as in the case of Chile), discourse surrounding the danger of the
Rohingya started a little later in Myanmar. Although the Rohingya have historically been labeled
“Bengali immigrants'' and have been viewed as foreigners to Myanmar, the association of them
with dangerous terrorism did not commence until 2012 (Wade, 2017). During that year, in the
midst of Myanmar becoming a democratic country, the alleged rape and murder of a Rakhine
Buddhist woman in the Rakhine state triggered a series of violent confrontations between the
Rakhine Buddhists and the Rohingya (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 36). For instance, shortly
following the rape and death of the woman, ten Rohingya were beaten and killed by Buddhists in
Maungdaw, a township in the Rakhine state (Wade, 2017: 103). Rohingya then allegedly set fire
to hundreds of Buddhist houses and began throwing rocks at Buddhist shops (Wade, 2017: 103).
Police responded by shooting at the Rohingya and Rakhine Buddhists continued to mobilize
against the Rohingya (Wade, 2017: 103). Each protest led to a violent counter reaction until the
central government at the time (the NLD) finally imposed a state of emergency, a curfew, and
deployed the Tatmadaw throughout the Rakhine state (Ware and Laoutides, 2018).159
As conflict and tensions rose exponentially, the press and other media were vital in
portraying the Rohingya as a dangerous terrorist group who needed repressing; significantly,
they created widespread fearmongering and panic of a dangerous Rohingya presence who was
coordinating attacks throughout the region. One journal run by Rakhine Buddhists in Yangon,
for example, wrote that Rakhine were being killed in protest by “Rohingya terrorist attacks”
(Wade, 2017: 103). They continued to ironically state that “the risk and danger of ethnic
cleansing or genocide was possible” (Wade, 2017: 103). Even though the Tatmadaw was literally
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As will be discussed later, after this conflict, the Tatmadaw also put thousands of Rohingya into refugee and
internally displaced persons’ camps (Wade, 2017: 103).
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conducting a genocide against the Rohingya as they wrote this, the journal was referring to “the
potential for Rohingya to eliminate Rakhine” (Wade, 2017: 103). So began the construction of
the Rohingya as threatening terrorists who needed immediate formal and informal control.160
Social media also played a large role in portraying the Rohingya as a foreign and perilous
terrorist force. For example, when the widespread conflicts in the Rakhine state finally died
down a couple days after they commenced, the director general of the President’s Office and
spokesman of Myanmar’s government at the time (the NLD), Hmuu Zaw, posted on Facebook:
It is heard that Rohingya Terrorists of the so-called Rohingya Solidarity Organization are
crossing the border and getting into the country with the weapons...That is, Rohingya
from other countries are now coming into the country. Since our Military has got the
news in advance, we will eradicate them until the end” (Wade, 2017: 108)!
The patriotic and emotionally charged language of this Facebook post was successful in
instigating moral panic amongst Rakhine Buddhists and in triggering deep-seated feelings that
the Rohingya needed to be dealt with extraordinary measures. Before 2012, Wade (2017)
reveals, there was hardly ever violence between the Rakhine Buddhists and the Rohingya. Yet,
the application of “terrorist,” “illegal,” and “criminally deviant” through social media posts like
these led Rakhine Buddhists and other Buddhists across the country to both support the
Tatmadaw’s violent actions against the Rohingya, and to create their own nationalist groups to
further repress them as will be discussed shortly. Ironically, Myanmar’s transition to democracy
during this time explicitly allowed for these extremist social media posts and anti-Rohingya
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In his study, “The Social Construction of Drug Scares,” Craig Reinarman talks about the power of media in
stirring up “moral panic” or public fear over a certain matter (Adler and Adler, 2016: 159-167). Discussing the use
of illicit drugs in the United States specifically, and the United States’ reoccurring construction of “drug scares” to
create campaigns and legislation against the use of these drugs and ideas of specific groups who use these drugs,
Reinarman reveals how media magnification repeatedly dramatizes problems and creates what he calls the
“routinization of caricature”: “rhetorically recrafting worst cases into typical cases and the episodic into the
epidemic” (163). Media, he ultimately explains, serves as “moral entrepreneurs” who create and define what is seen
as deviant in society, and who or what should be feared amongst the rest of the population of a country. Applied to
Myanmar, clearly the media also engaged in creating moral panic after these events and highly contributed to the
stigmatization of the Rohingya as a terrorist “other.”

150

rhetoric to circulate around the nation. McMullen (2016), for instance, reveals how an “odd flip”
happened between Myanmar’s pre- and post-democracy where “people who were speaking
human rights, democracy, equality, and peace [(Buddhists advocating for democracy)] just years
before were now speaking prejudice and hate” (194). The limited opening up of the press and
social media during democracy (2015-2021), definitely contributed to this shift, as well as the
strengthening of the idea of a Rohingya terrorist enemy.
For instance, because of “the lifting of media restrictions” as Myanmar transitioned to
democracy—and in years directly following the Rakhine state conflict in 2012--McMullen
(2016) emphasizes that Buddhist nationalist groups such the Organization for the Protection of
Race and Religion (more commonly called the Ma Ba Tha) as well as the 969 movement were
able to come to power.161 Less media restriction (193), McMullen (2016) explains, meant that
these groups could organize over media technology and spread extremist ideas around Myanmar
as to the threat of the Rohingya to the Buddhist identity of the whole country (193). Both of
these organizations, for example, warned against the “perils of Islam” and the danger that the
Rohingya pose to the dominance and longevity of Buddhism in the country (Wade, 2017: 166).
Ironically, although Buddhism is typically seen as a pacifist religion, these organizations have
been very violent in their operations (Malalasekera and Jayatilleko, 1958; Wade, 2017).162 These
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Founded in 2013, the Ma Ba Tha and the 969 Movement emerged as Buddhist nationalist organizations headed
by Buddhist monks who believed that they must safeguard their Buddhist religion from Islam, and from “dangerous”
Muslim others such as the Rohingya (Wade, 2017). As will be discussed shortly, these organizations are thought to
have been started by the Tatmadaw and have been vital in instigating violence against the Rohingya in recent years
(Wade, 2017).
162
For instance, Malalasekera and Jayatilleko (1958) explain how unlike Christianity, there “were no crusades in
Buddhism, which never lent itself to imperial expansion” (72). As such, they continue to explain, Buddhism is
mostly seen as pacifist (72). Yet, that does not mean that it isn’t racist. Racial caste, they argue, has historically
affected Buddhism and has consistently been used by diverse Buddhist groups for economic and imperial quests to
dominate over another group (20). “Whenever such a group was led by economic and imperial ambitions to
subjugate another group,” they write, “Racial prejudice seems to have reared its head and left its mark on future
generations” (20). Hence, type of religion isn’t so much a determiner in the use of violence and racial subjugation.
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two groups have conducted numerous attacks on Rohingya in the Rakhine state, and have also
been vital in creating and promoting legislation like the recently passed “Protection of Race and
Religion Laws” (Wade, 2017: 170). As will be discussed later, these laws allow the government
to limit the reproductive rights of minority groups like the Rohingya, restrict marriages between
Buddhists and Muslims, and require people to get permission before they switch religions
(Wade, 2017: 170). The Ma Ba Tha was also influential in its support of the military’s political
party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), during the multiparty elections held
in 1990, 2010, 2015, and 2020 (Wade, 2017: 173).163 Lastly, the Ma Ba Tha has been accredited
to creating Buddhist private schools that propagate a Buddhist identity, and the 969 movement
has also been influential in boycotting Muslim businesses, further driving the Rohingya into
debilitating poverty (Wade, 2017: 188-190; McMullen, 2016). Clearly, the Ma Ba Tha and the
969 movement have been critical to supporting the military, promoting a Buddhist national
identity, and aiding in the symbolic and literal suppression of the Rohingya.
It is important to return to the fact that, because these Buddhist nationalist groups arose
from and operate on a fear of their religious (Buddhist) and racial eradication, that the Tatmadaw
has ultimately been able to capitalize on the label of the Rohingya as “terrorists” and a
“dangerous other” as to generate moral panic among these Buddhist organizations and as to

Rather, a universal quest for domination and power tends to lead groups to conquest territories and groups, and then
justify that domination with racial language.
163
The Tatmadaw has its own political party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), who has run in
Myanmar’s various multiparty elections throughout the past few decades: 1990, 2010, 2015, and 2020 (Wade,
2017). The USDP lost to another political party, the National League of Democracy (NLD) throughout all of these
elections, but as mentioned previously, in 1990, the results were nullified by the military who retained control until
it could establish its own dominance in society as the country transitioned to democracy (through the Constitution
they again created in 2008 which reserved 25% of seats in parliament for the military along with other provisions)
(Wade, 2017). In 2010 and 2015, they ceded to NLD victory, but as just seen in the recent coup taking place earlier
this year (2021), the Tatmadaw has contested the recent NLD victory in the multiparty elections of 2020 and has
violently reasserted its regime in society (Faulder, 2021). Hence, the Ma Ba Tha’s support of the USDP didn’t have
a grand influence in the Tatmadaw’s rule in society (as the Tatmadaw would reassert dominance outside of
multiparty elections and outside of this political party), but during democracy, their support of USDP probably still
had symbolic significance in broadcasting support of the Tatmadaw and their violent actions.
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motivate Buddhist citizen’s own violent persecution of the Rohingya. As mentioned in the race
section of this study, Buddhist nationalist groups, and large segments of the Buddhist polity in
general, have incorporated racial and religious narratives into their sense of who they are—they
have established their identity based on who they are not: Muslim and a racialized “other”—and
it is because of this that Buddhist individuals in Myanmar are extraordinarily susceptible to
social media message of the Rohingya as “terrorist” and to Tatmadaw fearmongering; large
portions of the Buddhist majority are afraid of the Rohingya stripping them of what they take to
be their inherent and natural superiority,164 and as a result, they have consumed rhetoric of the
Rohingyas’ terroristic threat and have come to believe that the Rohingya are truly sinister threats
to their prosperity and their very being. The racial narratives propagated by the Tatmadaw and
the state have thus obscured Buddhist individuals from the Rohingyas’ humanity. And most
importantly, these racial narratives and ideas of Rohingya terrorism have prevented many
Buddhist citizens from recognizing the suffering they share with the Rohingya at the hands of the
military.
Wade (2015), for example, argues that in creating rhetoric of Rohingya terrorism and
racial and religious otherness, the Tatmadaw has been able to distract all citizens “from the
workings of their real nemesis,” the military itself. As will be discussed in greater detail in the
next section, throughout Myanmar’s short stint at democracy (2015-2021), the Tatmadaw’s use
of social media platforms like Facebook to ignite Ma Ba Tha and 969 member’s (and other
Buddhist extremists’) persecution of the Rohingya ultimately undermined the prospect of the
Buddhist majority and the Rohingya uniting on the basis of their common persecution and
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The Buddhist belief in the Rohingyas’ threat to their sovereignty, prosperity, and literal being allows them to
dehumanize the Rohingya, see them as racialized “others,” and, as Wade (2017) reveals, “morally justify” their
harsh actions against them (108); the Buddhist polity has truly bought into the Tatmadaw and central government’s
racial narratives and identities.
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exploitation by the Tatmadaw (Wade, 2015). For instance, in Myanmar’s transition to
democracy, Wade (2017) emphasizes that the military was able to distract the Buddhist majority
when “2012 repression against the Rohingya came at the same time that the reform process for
the 2008 constitution was taking place” (188). The Buddhist majority, he explains, was so
distracted by the Rohingya “terrorist threat” and as a racial and religious “other”, that they
couldn’t see the continued dominance the military was establishing for itself in Myanmar’s
transition to democracy (such as still holding 25% of seats in parliament, maintaining the
sovereign right to veto anything and declare states of emergencies, dominating Myanmar
economically, etc.) (Wade, 2017: 188). The Buddhist majority, that is, was so distracted by the
“danger” of the Rohingya as “terrorists”, and the subsequent believed necessity that they needed
to help persecute them, that they became blind to how they, themselves, became literal tools of
the Tatmadaw; they became akin to another military force who would carry out the Tatmadaw’s
repressive missions and support the Tatmadaw’s continued rule in Myanmar (Wade, 2015).
Consequently, and as seen in the recent success of the military’s coup earlier this year (2021),
“this has been the regime’s crowning achievement,” Wade (2015) writes: obscuring a history of
shared suffering under a veil of local animosities and therefore, ensuring the persistence of the
Tatmadaw’s own dominance throughout society (262).
Ultimately, like Chile and China, rhetoric of terrorism propagated by the Tatmadaw
during Myanmar’s democracy allowed the Tatmadaw to justify its violence and coercion against
the Rohingya and to establish its own legitimacy and necessity in society. For instance, in its
2017 clearance operations against the Rohingya,165 Chaudhury and Samaddar (2018) emphasize
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Once again, the Tatmadaw’s clearance operations were an effort of the military conducted in 2017 to displace
and eradicate the Rohingya from the Rakhine state (The United Nations Human Rights Council, Forty-Second
Session, 2019). These efforts led to the mass murder and exile of the Rohingya as many of their villages were

154

that the Tatmadaw claimed that “it was a lawful counter-insurgency operation, necessary to
defend the country” (3). Because of this rhetoric promoting the protection of the country, and
because the Buddhist majority have again incorporated racial narratives into their beliefs, the
military’s intervention was accepted as legitimate by Buddhist citizens (Chaudhury and
Samaddar, 2018). This clearly shows how anti-terrorist rhetoric helped legitimize the Tatmadaw
during Myanmar’s democracy, and how it helped justify their extremely suppressive actions.
Furthermore, and as just mentioned, by igniting Buddhist nationalist groups and Buddhist
citizens to conduct violence against the Rohingya themselves, the Tatmadaw ultimately created a
whole citizen body who supported its racial ideologies and its persecution of the Rohingya;
through rhetoric of terrorism which served as the perfect fearmongering force, the Tatmadaw
have garnered a whole network of peoples working for the genocide of the Rohingya.
Meanwhile, the Rohingya remain a stateless population with no rights or legal grounds to
denounce such violence or such terrorist label. Furthermore, although the Rohingya are ironically
portrayed as a grave and imminent threat to the nation, they are so suppressed by the military and
by Buddhist citizens, that any large-scale resistance to the state seems unlikely or if conducted,
ineffective (Wade, 2017). Hence, while Buddhist nationalist groups and the Tatmadaw literally
conduct a genocide against the Rohingya, it is still this minority group who are labeled terrorists
(Ibrahim, 2016). And it is the Rohingya, again, who are scapegoated while the Tatmadaw enjoys
its subversive domination over everybody.166 This is the Tatmadaw’s greatest success story.

destroyed and converted into Buddhist townships (The United Nations Human Rights Council, Forty-Seecond
Session, 2019).
166

Wade (2017) further explains how the Tatmadaw hides its domination over everybody when he writes, “When
the hand of higher powers in episodes of violence is hidden by the hordes of people on the ground that deliver it, one
can explain it away as the work of a collection of extremist individuals . . .” (227). That is, the Tatmadaw can blame
Buddhist nationalist groups for the violent persecution of the Rohingya in the Rakhine state, all while its prominent
role in instigating and fueling that very violence remains hidden. Moreover, in initiating this violence, the Tatmadaw
can distract Buddhists from being discontent with the military and convert it to a convenient animosity toward a
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The Rhetoric of Terrorism as Essential for Racial Narratives and Nation-state Coercion:
Concluding Thoughts
As seen across Chile, China, and Myanmar, the label of “terrorist” and the application of
anti-terrorism efforts and legislation have become integral to the racial narratives of the Uyghurs,
Mapuche, and the Rohingya as a distinct and dangerous racialized other and have been vital in
helping the governing bodies of China, Chile, and Myanmar suppress these groups legitimately
and with the support of their citizen bodies. The label “terrorist” is ultimately an easily available,
believable, and highly effective rubric for labeling whole groups of people who are not a part of
the national imaginary identity as dangerous, subversive, and hence, as people who warrant
violent suppression; the label “terrorist” is a highly effective manner in which the racial nationstate can garner the support of its citizen body for government coercion against racial, religious,
and indigenous minority groups, while at the same time, further stigmatizing these groups as a
racialized and ostracized “other.”
Once more, the nation-state’s deployment of the label “terrorist” and their creation of
anti-terrorist campaigns are so effective at achieving these two things (the further stigmatization
of racialized others and the legitimacy of government coercion conducted against racialized
minorities) because citizen bodies have so intricately adopted racial narratives into their entities;
citizens in each of these three counties have internalized racial narratives into their beings, and
are hence, highly susceptible to rhetoric of terrorism which taps into their deep-seated fear of
losing their power or their precarious position of assumed superiority and dominance in society.
As such, the rhetoric of terrorism is a super effective force in reinforcing the citizen body’s belief
in Mapuche, the Uyghurs, and the Rohingya as a racially distinct and inferior group, and to allow

racial minority group (Wade, 2017: 255). The Rohingya are hence made to be the ultimate scapegoat and discontent
is made to play out “horizontally” among citizens, instead of vertically within the state (Wade, 2017: 255).
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them to accept coercive government action as legitimate, as will be discussed more in the next
section. For ultimately, the racial majority populations in each nation-state cannot be formed
without establishing what and who they are not. The racially light, for instance, are not possible
without the racially dark, nor is the law-abiding, patriotic citizen without the foreign and
dangerous terrorist. In this sense, feelings of security cannot be felt without creating feelings of
insecurity. Tulchin and Ruthenburg (2006) write, “democracy and security are complementary-not contradictory--objectives” (321). So too are government coercion and citizens’ perceived
quest for racial security in their identities.
In their book, Toward a Society Under Law: Citizens and Their Police in Latin America,
Tulchin and Ruthenburg (2006) conclude, in a post-9/11 society, “today, security threats at the
national and individual levels merge and are linked” so that a created or real threat to the nation
feels like an intimate danger to the polity (2006: 320). So strong has racial national identity
become, that citizens are ultimately led to believe that the “threat” of these racialized groups
(again created by the governing body in each of these nation-states) are true, and that thus,
government coercion and their campaigns of law and order to combat these racialized others are
absolutely necessary; legitimacy is once again brought to the nation-state and their racial state
building projects through the label “terrorist” and the feeling of instability it provokes in the
citizen body.
While directed at different group relations and emerging from different histories, the
common application of a broad epithet, “terrorist,” itself demonstrates the potency of the label in
ostracizing whole groups with spoiled identities; the label “terrorist” implemented across these
three countries reveal the power of a stigmatizing categorization as criminal, dangerous, and
innately subversive to make whole groups of people come to be perceived as significantly
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different and threatening. In a period where the growing international belief in human equality
threatens, each of these nation-states must also protect their singular exceptions where a whole
group of its citizens are made racially “other”. Nowhere is this truer than in China where the
CCP, as discussed, can maintain its aura of national unity and acceptance of diverse racial,
religious, and regional groups while at the same time, it explicitly excludes a whole group
labeled “dangerous” and inferior in society (the Uyghurs). In this sense, rhetoric of terrorism
allows countries promoting an aura of equality and liberty (like in China) to violently suppress
racialized groups without losing legitimacy.
The rhetoric of terrorism across all three of countries in this study also show the powerful
forces of globalization in today’s global society. The rise of technology and the ease of
disseminating information across different countries in recent years has led to much more crosscultural exchange and awareness, and it has also led to a global security resource that can be
drawn on to oppress racialized others worldwide. China, for instance, was able to label the
Uyghurs as terrorists based on the rhetoric of terrorism that the U.S. created after 9/11. The same
can be said for Chile and Myanmar which likewise adopted this discourse to justify government
repression of the Mapuche and the Rohingya. In this sense, the actions of one coercive
governmental force in each of these countries is not isolated from the others, and a global
campaign of racism is underway; a global effort of again, isolating and othering entire groups of
people merely based on their physical presentation and skin color. Scholars may say that we now
live in a post-colonial society, but nation-states’ conquering of racialized populations continues
globally and is justified across countries with rhetoric of terrorism as means to subjugate whole
populations.
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Hence, it is ultimately through the false campaigns on terrorism in each of these societies
that the subversion and manipulation of government coercion and a nation-state’s racial
narratives can be most acutely be seen. Government coercion--while promoted as protectors of
the polity—and its accompanying fight against “terrorism”—made to emphasize efforts of
combating dangerous groups who threaten the polity--instead prey on the fear and anxiety of
citizens so desperate for stability; discourse of terror ignites and confounds emotionally charged
racial narratives which are so intimately accepted as true by the racial majority and incorporated
into their very beings. Subsequently, nation-states and their coercive efforts against racialized
minorities are brought legitimacy in their “anti-terror” efforts, while citizens in Chile, China, and
Myanmar are prevented from recognizing their common humanity with “terrorist” minority
groups with whom have a much more common experience of state exploitation than they have
been led to believe. Such is the success of the rhetoric of terrorism in legitimizing governing
bodies and their racial narratives and acts of coercion in countries globally.
Chapter Four

Methods of Oppression: Government Coercion for the Enforcement of Racial
Narratives and the Suppression of the Racialized Other
While discourse and narratives of terrorism may be one rhetorical strategy that nationstates and governments in Chile, China, and Myanmar use to justify the repression and
stigmatization of racialized groups, this section will analyze the literal methods of oppression
that governing bodies in these three countries deploy as to enforce racial narratives and suppress
the racialized other. Both motivated by, and further entrenching ideas of an ostracized and
innately dangerous and different racialized group, this section intends to explore how racial
nation-states and their coercive efforts further stigmatize racialized others and physically restrict
and repress their bodies. Returning to what Weber calls the monopoly of legitimate physical
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violence, this section will ultimately delve into how the deployment of force—literal and
symbolic—and government coercion in Chile, China, and Myanmar is legitimately executed in
racial nation-states and brings both the materialization and the authority of racial narratives into
being (Weber, 2004: 33).
When discussing government coercion, it is first vital to bring the level of analysis down
to the individual body. While the three racialized groups in this study—the Mapuche, the
Uyghurs, and the Rohingya—are all repressed socially, economically, and symbolically, so too
are their bodies physically controlled, condemned, and punished by governing bodies and
government coercion Chile, China, and Myanmar. Their bodies are a locus of control in which
governing bodies in each country operationalize its authority and again, further solidify and act
upon racial narratives that are key for its domination and rule. In this sense, by studying how
racialized others are disciplined and suppressed in their physical bodies, an immense amount of
information is revealed about the extent to which governing bodies in Chile, China, and
Myanmar will go to uphold their power and command of society; the individual, repressed and
racialized body reveals an enormity of information about a governing national body and how
they have created racial state national identity.
In his book, Discipline and Punishment, Foucault (1995) further speaks about the
importance of punishing and condemning certain bodies for state dominance and authority. The
body, in his view, is how nations execute social hierarchies and create disciplined, subjected, and
productive peoples who are compliant subjects to state authority (Foucault, 1995: 25-26). He
writes:
In our societies, the systems of punishment are to be situated in a certain ‘political
economy’ of the body: even if they do not make use of violent or bloody punishment,
even when they use ‘lenient’ methods involving confinement or correction, it is always
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the body that is at issue, the body and its forces, their utility and their docility, their
distribution and their submission (Foucault, 1995: 25).
Punishment, that is, is always inflicted onto individual bodies, and it is this inscription which is
key for obedience to state domination. Foucault (1995) then argues that while physical
punishment no longer takes the form of the gallows and scaffolds that were present before the
eighteenth century, that it continues to persist in transformed manners such as “imprisonment,
confinement, forced labour, penal servitude, prohibition from entering certain areas, deportation”
(11). While seemingly less violent than overt methods of public punishment, Foucault (1995)
writes that “the [state’s] hold on the body did not disappear” (15). The regulation and control of
specific bodies for state domination continues into modern time.167
Why has the state’s domination of the body continued throughout time? Why have
carceral spaces such as prisons persisted despite their well-documented failure at their objective
goals of reducing or eliminating crime? These are questions Foucault (1995) continues to address
as he concludes that the condemnation of bodies is positive in its purposes and functioning;
penalty, he writes, is “linked to a whole series of positive and useful effects” (Foucault, 1995:
24). Drawing on Durkheimian ideas, Foucault references the fact that the punishment of bodies-the physical imposition of deviance designations on certain peoples--is functional for society to
create the boundaries that demarcate what lays within and what outside of a nation-state’s
identity (Adler and Adler, 2016: 73-77). Adler and Adler (2016) summarize:
Deviant behavior is not a simple kind of leakage which occurs when the machinery of
society is in poor working order, but may be, in controlled quantities, an important
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As will be discussed shortly, one way in which punishment has transformed in modern times has been the rise of
technology and the use of surveillance strategies to track and control individual bodies. For instance, Ericson (1991)
suggests that recent technological advances have led to the new “production of knowledge about, and the
supervision of, people” (Ericson, 1991). These technological advances, he explains, are often extremely bureaucratic
in function and serve to condemn the targeted group in a more hidden and ubiquitous manner (Ericson, 1991). Overt
punishment has again been transformed in modern times using different techniques for controlling the corporeal
body (Foucault, 1995).
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condition for preserving the stability of social life. Deviant forms of behavior, by
marking the outer edges of group life, give the inner structure its special character and
thus supply the framework within which the people develop an orderly sense of their own
cultural identity (20).
Deviant behavior and the subsequent punishment or sanction of that behavior, that is, is essential
to marking societal boundaries and thus, establishing who does and doesn’t fit into a nationstate’s identity. Applied to the racial nation-state specifically, modern mechanisms of
punishment are meant to continue creating deviant, racialized bodies who, when condemned and
excluded from a racial state’s identity, solidify that very identity: in establishing who they
racially are not, a racial nation-state and its racial majority can again solidify who they are
(Foucault, 1995: 272). Racial nation-state governing authority and legitimacy is once again
established through the condemnation of the individual, racialized body.
As mentioned previously, this section looks at the different methods or means of
oppression that the three nation-states in this study—Chile, China, and Myanmar—use against its
racial minority populations and how they specifically sanction and control racialized bodies who
have been made deviant in society. Looking at incarceration and security checkpoints in Chile,
the use of reeducation camps and surveillance in China, and the straight up genocide in Myanmar
(along with internal displacement camps and security checkpoints), this section intends to
analyze the various ways government coercion in each country attempts to control its racialized
subgroup and with what consequences for the racial minority groups they are repressing.
Specifically, this section looks to analyze how each government’s methods of coercion and
oppression intersects with the type of government present in each country. Why, for instance,
can the Tatmadaw execute such violent means of oppression publicly while their mechanisms
would be completely impermissible in the three other countries? How does this intersect with
their governing structure of being a military regime? And why, especially, do the mechanisms of
162

oppression used by each country in this study--security checkpoints and the detention of
racialized bodies in some sort of carceral spaces --parallel each other, even though they each
represent a different type of governing force: democracy in Chile, communism in China, and an
authoritarian regime in Myanmar?
This section will also delve into an issue of visibility that differs between the three
countries. For instance, although the Tatmadaw conducts its coercive operations mostly publicly
(especially now that Myanmar is no longer a democracy), why does government coercion in
Chile and China need to work with a degree of secrecy? Why, if deployed by the nation-state and
largely known to exist by the citizens of each country, do Chilean and Chinese government
coercion still deploy many sub rosa methods? This section will try to address some of these
questions and to answer the existential question: why does each nation-state in this study and
their government coercion engage in various forms of violence against racialized bodies even
though some of their methods, ironically, would seem to be quite suited to the eliminating of
these racialized populations completely? How do the racial nation-states and their governing
bodies in Chile, China, and Myanmar continue to make deviant and condemnable bodies who,
just by existing, are made to violate nation-state identity? Such questions will be explored while
analyzing the impact of government coercion and racial narratives on the individual bodies of the
Mapuche, Uyghurs, and Rohingya across these three countries.
Chile: The Incarceration of Mapuche Bodies and the Omnipresence of Police Security in
Arauncanía
As mentioned in previous sections, the main way that Chilean government coercion and
Chilean police work to control the Mapuche is through the carceral state and the application of
anti-terrorist laws that facilitate the arrest and detention of Mapuche leaders and followers alike
(Richards, 2013). Because the Mapuche are widely viewed amongst the Chilean citizen body as a
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danger to the Chilean nation-state, and because racial narratives created by the Chilean
government has positioned them this way, detention is an effective way of controlling Mapuche
protest and dissent in a seemingly legitimate manner; the incarceration of Mapuche leaders
appears just and necessary. Furthermore, according to Jacobson (2003), the law and the courts
carry with them an aura of objectivity, naturalness, and authority that prevent the polity from
questioning their practices and rulings (226-227). Consequently, through the carceral state,
Chilean government coercion and the incarceration of the Mapuche through anti-terrorism laws
can quietly and legitimately work to repress their bodies while simultaneously strengthening
racial narratives that they are a threat to the Chilean state.
While the incarceration of the Mapuche under counterterrorism laws appears legitimate,
as discussed in the terrorism chapter, the practice of arresting and sentencing the Mapcuhe under
these laws are in reality, highly subversive and highly discriminatory acts committed by the
Chilean government; as mentioned previously, the fact that arson, the majority of crimes in
which Mapuche protesters are charged with, does not injure human life and hence, does not
constitute a terrorist act under international standards (Bialostozky, 2008), reveals that the
Mapuche are being prosecuted and incarcerated under manipulated laws and standards which
work for their disproportionate imprisonment. The criminal deviance of the Mapuche is again
created by the Chilean government who label and suppress their bodies as dangerous and
terrorist, even when these labels are not reflected in reality. Although the Chilean government
and legislative bodies are critical in maintaining the Counterterrorist Act and its provisions
which allow for the restriction of Mapuche judicial rights and their unequal incarceration,
another key player is also critical in its application: Chilean police, the Carabineros.
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Chile’s police, the Carabineros, are essential to the Chilean government in the fact that
they arrest the Mapuche under anti-terrorism legislation, but importantly, they are also a
presence that has become ubiquitous and constant throughout Arauncanía as to remind the
Mapuche that their bodies are being consistently surveilled and monitored. For instance, and as
will be seen throughout the rest of the countries, security checkpoints and the deployment of
Chilean police at the edges of communities in Arauncanía serve as a symbolic reminder to the
Mapuche that they could be criminalized and suppressed by the Chilean government at any
point. These checkpoints metaphorically represent what they display visually: that Chilean
government coercion are guarding Mapuche territories and are controlling racial narratives that
posit the Mapuche as dangerous, criminal, and inferior throughout the rest of Chilean society.
For example, Richards (2013) reveals that in places such as Malleco, a town in the
Arauncanía, Chilean police frequently stop people coming in and out of the Mapuche community
(Richards, 2013: 105). People’s license plates are recorded, people are questioned about the
reasons for entering and leaving, and cars are often searched (Richards, 2013: 105). These
checkpoints suggest that Chilean police are trying to diligently keep track of Mapuche
community members, and that they are even looking for reasons to incarcerate them (Richards,
2013). While these security checkpoints do not exist in other parts of Chile, in the Arauncanía,
they have become a natural part of the landscape (Richards, 2013). They have been successful in
both entrenching racial narratives of Mapuche criminality while also suppressing Mapuche
brains and bodies.
For instance, such constant police presence on the borders of Arauncanía communities
create fear in the Mapuche that they will be arrested and incarcerated under the Counterterrorism
Act. In what Richards (2013) calls “psychological warfare,” such a constant presence of Chilean
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police in their communities remind the Mapuche of the ease at which their bodies could be
arrested and detained in carceral spaces (Richards, 2013: 126); they remind the Mapuche of the
lack of power they hold in comparison to the carceral state and Chilean government coercion,
and the ability of the Chilean government to easily incarcerate their bodies. As such, widespread
anxiety, fear, and vulnerability dominate Mapuche communities; feelings that are opposite of the
sense of security a police presence is usually thought to create. Richards (2013) explains that
Chilean police in the Arauncanía will even go “into local schools to interrogate young children
about their parent’s activities” (127). From a young age, the Mapuche are hence taught that their
bodies are being constantly monitored and surveilled by a constant Chilean police presence in
their neighborhoods.
Moreover, Chilean police and security checkpoints in Arauncanía entrench racial
narratives that the Mapuche are dangerous and criminal people who need constant surveillance.
They reinforce racial narratives throughout the rest of Chile that the Mapuche are a racially
distinct and threatening group, and that hence, such security and police efforts are absolutely
necessary. If the Mapuche were not a threatening group, after all, these checkpoints and police
presence create the idea that such surveillance would not be necessary; like rhetoric of terrorism
discussed in the last chapter, police presence in Araunanía help fortify the idea that the Mapuche
are a menace to Chilean society who needs controlling. In this sense, such efforts legitimize
Chilean racial narratives and legitimize the stifling suppression these efforts again have on
Mapuche bodies. Through a constant police presence in Mapuche neighborhoods, the Chilean
nation-state and the Chilean government is ultimately able to continue positing the Mapuche as
an illegal and illegitimate other, deserving of government repression and coercive efforts.
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In fact, and as explained throughout this study, the Chilean racial majority have so greatly
boughten into such narratives of Mapuche inferiority, criminality, and racial difference, and
often profit from the Mapuche’s exploitation themselves, that local elites and corporations have
even called for a greater police presence in Arauncanía. For instance, in response to Mapuche
protest against these companies’ exploitation of Arauncanía, transnational companies and
Chilean elites have called on Chilean police to repress Mapuche dissent and to arrest Mapuche
leaders and protesters under anti-terrorist laws. Some transnational companies have even been
accused of staging crimes to blame on the Mapuche--acts that are called auto-atentados, or selfattacks—as to entrench racial narratives of the Mapuche as criminal, as to diminish Mapuche
presence in Arauncanía, and as to hence, ensure the companies’ success in the region.
For example, in 1999, a house on a timber plantation in Collipulli (in the Araucanía) was
set on fire and blamed on the Mapuche (Richards, 2013: 96). Later, it was discovered that guards
on the plantation set the fire themselves “in order to stir up conflict and influence public opinion
against [the Mapuche]” (Richards, 2013: 96).168 Similarly, in 2009, Richards (2013) goes on to
explain, six Chilean police were suspended for stealing timber from the Arauco Timer
Corporation (ARAUCO) which was also attributed to the Mapuche (96). Although conducted by
Chilean police in this case and not the transnational companies themselves, both of these
instances expose the actions of those in power and those in the racial majority—corporations and
Chilean police—conducting harmful and criminal acts against corporations themselves, only so
they can continue entrenching racial narratives of the Mapuche as criminal; only so they can
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Richards (2013) claims that the Mapuche are “actually helpful to farmers as they can claim that they are
being attacked and demand help from the government” (96). Even when big corporations have comprehension
insurance, she argues, if something is burned (even intentionally), the government has to pay to replace it (96). In
this sense, conflict ironically brings more state resources into the region while the Mapuche are increasingly
portrayed as criminals and terrorists. This also brings a greater police presence into the region.

167

bring greater police presence into the region and so they can continue repressing the Mapcuhe as
a racialized other. In combination with the Counterterrorism Law that again, allows the Chilean
government to disproportionately incarcerate the Mapuche, such actions reveal covert and
subversive acts conducted on behalf of Chilean police, the Chilean racial majority, and
transnational companies as to continue condemning Mapuche bodies. Such evidence, again
reveals how the Chilean police and those invested in racial narratives in Chilean society, are
deliberately fabricating the Mapuche as deviant and ostracized peoples in society.
Not only are Mapuche crimes often falsified by transnational corporations and Chilean
police, but Chilean secret police operations have also been essential in inventing false Mapuche
crime and manipulating their arrest and harsh sentencing under anti-terrorist laws. Nowhere is
this clearer than in a secret police operation that occurred in 2017. Known as Operación Huracán
(Operation Hurricane), a unit of Chilean secret police in Temuco (an area of Arauncanía), the
Special Operations Intelligence Unit (Unidad de Inteligencia Operativa Especializada de
Carabineros, UIOE), planted incriminating evidence on eight Mapuche leaders to detain them
illegally (Sepúlveda and González, 2018). To plant the evidence, the Chilean secret police first
raided several Mapuche houses in Temuco, took Mapuche leaders’ cell phones and hard drives,
and then blamed these leaders for allegedly coordinating and conducting attacks on timber
corporations in the region; attacks that were subsequently confirmed based on chats found on the
leaders’ cellphones (Appendix 35) (Sepúlveda and González, 2018). While the Mapuche leaders
were detained for over a month, the validity of the phone evidence (the chats) was eventually
questioned as the case went to trial (Sepúlveda and González, 2018). The fact that the Chilean
secret police unit denied releasing the cellphones to the prosecutor’s office for over a month
(when under law, they are supposed to release evidence immediately), arouse suspicion as to the
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legitimacy of the evidence and as a result, an external investigatory body was hired to investigate
the case (Sepúlveda and González, 2018).
The external investigation found that the special police unit, the UIOE, had indeed
planted false evidence on Mapuche phones and that hence, the Mapuche leaders were arrested
unlawfully (Sepúlveda and González, 2018). The same night that the Chilean secret police took
the leaders’ phones, for instance, the investigation discovered that there was an email sent by an
officer in the secret police unit with the same messages that appeared on one Mapuche leader’s
cell phone, Héctor Llaitul (Sepúlveda and González, 2018). It was clear that the UIOE had
programmed false chats on the phones. As a result, the Mapuche leaders were ordered to be
immediately released from their detention (Appendix 38) (Sepúlveda and González, 2018).169
Important police officers thought to have been involved in this operation like the General
Director of the Carabineros, Bruno Villalobos, and the Director of Intelligence, General Gonzalo
Blu were also subsequently fired (Appendix 39) (Sepúlveda and González, 2018).
Interestingly, the external investigation also found that the UIOE was wiretapping phones
in the area more generally as not only were the Mapuche’s phones found to be wiretapped, but so
too were the phones of prosecutors, judges, and other Chileans in the area (Appendix 36)
(Sepúlveda, 2018). Why would the UIOE in this case be spying on the Chilean polity more
broadly? Why would they also be collecting information on the Chilean racial majority? In order
to achieve the illegal incrimination of the Mapuche, did the secret police in this operation need to
make sure that they could deceive the prosecutors, judges, and others who were a part of the
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It was also found that the secret police had created a false Facebook account in the name a Mapuche man,
Lautaro Caupolican. This was apparently an attempt to get Mapuche leaders to accept the Facebook request and
thus again access to inside information (Appendix 37) (Sepúlveda, 2018). Such activities show how Chilean secret
police use technology and social media to repress the Mapuche.
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racial majority? Does the repression of the Mapuche require surveillance beyond leaders and
members of their group?170
Yet, despite such findings of subversive and illegal activity conducted by the UIOE, its
operations and other secret police operations in Arauncanía continued to persist and suppress the
Mapuche, even killing them as what happened with the case of Mapuche farmer and leader
Camilo Catrillanca. Murdered November 14th, 2018 by secret Chilean police under UIOE and
another secret police operation called “Comando Jungla,” or the Jungle Commando,171 it was
later discovered that the UIOE and the Jungle Commando had been tracking him and surveilling
his movements as he was an important leader for a Mapuche independence organization, the
Alianza Territorial Mapuche (the Mapuche Land Alliance or ATM) (Sepúlveda, Nov. 2018;
OpenDemocracy, 2019). In a UIOE report that was later uncovered by the Chilean Center for
Investigative Journalism and Information (Centro de Investigación Periodistica, CIPER), it was
noted that “what put [Catrillanca] under surveillance was the prominent role that he played for
years in his community, and his defense of Mapuche cultural identity” (Sepúlveda, Nov. 2018).
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Because the Chilean racial majority was also tracked during these operations and was unaware, this reveals that
Chilean police are very subversive or sub rosa in its qualities. The Chilean racial majority know that Chilean police
are working to control the Mapuche in the Arauncanía, but any thought of them spying and gathering information on
them probably remains unthinkable or unexamined. Yet, as seen here, this seems to happen when the positioning of
the Mapuche as criminal and the defense of racial narratives in Chilean society are at stake.
171
The “Comando Jungla,” or the Jungle Commando is another secret Chilean police operation working to suppress
the Mapuche in Arauncanía. Trained by police in the United States and Colombia, the Jungle Commando arose from
an explicit effort to control the Arauncanía and suppress Mapuche violence (“'Jungle Command'…”, 2018). For
instance, in a June 2018 speech when this unit was started, current president of Chile, Sabastián Piñera, stated, “We
created a special force of Carabineros that has been prepared in Chile and abroad to improve the effectiveness of our
police in the fight against terrorism [(the Mapuche)]” (“'Jungle Command'…”, 2018). Yet, four months later, when
Camilo Catrillanca was murdered by this unit, President Piñera in a speech responding to the events, denied that the
Jungle Commando existed at all (CNN Chile, “Presidente Piñera en La Arauncanía…”, 2018). Instead, he stated that
“there are specialized police operations in Arauncanía, but that these exist in all regions of Chile” (CNN Chile,
“Presidente Piñera en La Arauncanía…”, 2018). He then continued to conclude that the role of Chilean police is to
protect the security of the nation as to continue to uphold the Chilean police and Chilean government’s legitimacy
(Appendix 40-41) (CNN Chile, “Presidente Piñera en La Arauncanía…”, 2018).
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That is, just being Mapuche was enough to be put under surveillance by these secret police
operations.
Interestingly, after his murder, a large portion of the Chilean majority gathered in protests
across the country to denounce police violence against the Mapuche and many of these protests
were confronted with the general or non-secretive Chilean police (the Carabineros) using tear gas
and violent methods to suppress these Chilean and Mapuche protestors (Appendix 74) (PC,
2018). Like Operación Huracán, when it came to ensuring Mapuche repression and the
maintenance of their division from Chilean society, the suppression of the Chilean majority again
became necessary when they got in the way of such repression of the Mapuche as different. The
killing of Catrillanca (one of many Mapuche who have been killed by Chilean police) and the
repression of the Chilean majority when they begin to stand in solidarity with the Mapuche
ultimately reveal the extent that the Chilean government is willing to go to preserve its racial
state.
Ultimately, although Chile’s notoriously violent secret police force during Pinochet’s
dictatorship, DINA, was disbanded decades ago,172 violent practices still characterize modern
Chilean policing and the Mapuche remain unable to denounce such unequal applications of antiterrorism legislation and abuse at the hands of Chilean police (Orellana, 2018). For instance, the
application of anti-terrorist laws has resulted in allegations of torture, beatings, electrocution, and
asphyxiation during the interrogations and arrests of Mapuche leaders and Mapuche individuals,
and yet, as a whole, the Mapuche cannot get justice or respite as all alleged abuses by Chilean
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During the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, Chile had a secret police force referred to as the DINA (Dirreción
de Inteligencia Nacional) that was responsible for the disappearance and murder of thousands of individuals who
were viewed as threatening to the state (Orellana, 2018).
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police are tried in military court (Richards, 2013: 127; Uildriks, 2009).173 While the Mapuche
can file formal complaints to report Chilean police brutality, all military court proceedings are
closed to the public and usually result in decisions that treat the Chilean police leniently
(Uildriks, 2009). For instance, in his book Policing Insecurity Police Reform, Security, and
Human Rights in Latin America, author Niels A. Uildriks (2009) writes that between 1990 and
1997, 90% of cases involving police violence and violation of civilian rights were dismissed
“due to lack of evidence” (164). “[Only] 5.6% of cases,” he reveals, “resulted in verdicts, with
only 4.7% of those accused being found guilty” (164). Accordingly, Chilean police are legitimate
state actors whose cruelest actions or violations of the rights of citizens—especially of the
Mapuche--are rarely met with scrutiny or punishment.
Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet once wrote that “in all countries exists a percentage of
disappeared peoples” (Orellana, 2018: 296).174 Today, the equivalent of the disappeared peoples
under Pinochet are the Mapuche. Hidden in prisons across the country, detained in both state
facilities, and living under tight surveillance in their own communities in Arauncanía, the
Mapuche remain a highly persecuted group who Chilean police and the Chilean government
continue to rigorously track, incarcerate, and even kill. While Chile nominally transitioned to a
democracy in 1980, Richards (2013) remains correct in stating that “state violence that is
reminiscent of the dictatorship” continues to be deployed against the Mapuche (127). Like in
Operación Huracán, clandestine and subversive methods define the oppression of these forces,
all while the Mapuche are made to seem deserving of whatever state control is applied to them
because of their alleged criminality and terrorism. Then, they are even killed by Chilean police
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This is a legacy of Pinochet’s 1980 Constitution that the construction of a new constitution in future years will
possibly change.
174
This is a translated version of what he actually said: he stated, “En todos los países existe un porcentaje de
desaparecidos” (Orellana, 2018: 296).
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like what happened to Catrillanca in 2018 and are left with no ability to challenge such police
brutality because of the impunity military court brings for these very police. Such extreme
methods of oppression and government coercion—such condemnation and oppression of the
Mapuche body—ultimately reveal the extent of force that the maintenance of the Chilean racial
nation-state, the continuation of racial narratives for Chilean government dominance, result in.
These are the consequences, that is, of sustaining the Chilean racial nation-state whose governing
body seems to require such harmful, false, and acted upon racial divisions across Chilean
society.
China: Detention for “Reeducation”, Propaganda, and Eugenic Pursuits for
Assimilation or for Eradication Completely?
Returning to the before referenced book, Discipline and Punishment, Foucault (1995)
argues that beyond the goal of detention for incapacitation or isolation, detention is key for the
opportunity it provides for “correctional training” (170). He explains that prisons have the
potential to literally “make” individuals: “to act on those it shelters, to provide a hold on their
conduct, to carry the effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter
them” (172). Whether to spread an ideology or worldview, to generate a surplus workforce, or to
change behavior, prisons and detention generally, in Foucault’s view, are effective at achieving
state goals via coercion (Foucault, 1995). Nowhere is this truer than in China’s “vocational” or
“re-education” camps.
Created in 2014, China’s detention camps are located throughout Xinjiang (Appendices
43-49) (Wen and Auyezov, 2018). The CCP first denied that such facilities existed (Testimony of
Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby...2018), but now that there are more than 380 suspected
detention camps across Xinjiang, the government claims that they are “vocational training
centers'' (Ruser, 2020). These “re-education centers” are estimated to have housed over a million
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Uyghurs since 2017 (Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby...2018) and are
proclaimed to be “designed to help young, unemployed people in Xinjiang learn job skills and
the Chinese language” (Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby...2018). This
rhetoric is largely deployed to cover up what the detention centers truly are: forced labor camps
whose goal is to not only to produce surplus labor, but to function as the means to detain, isolate,
and remove the Uyghurs from the rest of China. These centers force detained Uyghurs to
assimilate into the culture of the Han Chinese majority (in their language, dress, religion,
ideologies, etc.), at the same time that they, ironically, isolate the Uyghurs and thus inhibit the
possibility of any voluntary assimilation. As one state official from Kashgar, Xinjiang stated
while summarizing the camps’ goals, “You can’t uproot all the weeds hidden among the crops in
the field one by one – you need to spray chemicals to kill them all; re-educating these people is
like spraying chemicals on the crops… that is why it is a general re-education, not limited to a
few people” (Robert, 2018: 251). In this sense, detention camps, while also existing as forced
labor camps, ultimately work towards the CCP’s true goal: eliminating the Uyghurs completely
as Uyghurs, like weeds in the CCP’s Han majority and “racially homogenous” field.175
On the one hand, detention camps in Xinjiang serve as means for the CCP to exploit
Uyghur labor and to increase the capital wealth of the state. As mentioned previously, China’s
“re-education camps” are extremely effective in creating a surplus labor force of Uyghurs who
can contribute to the profit of the CCP and the prosperity of state-owned companies and factories
(“Against Their Will: The Situation in Xinjiang”). A 2020 Australian Strategic Policy Institute
(ASPI) report, for instance, reveals that after “graduating” these camps, that Uyghurs are often
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In the CCP’s racial nation-state building, the Uyghurs can exist within the nation, but only as assimilated, Han
majority citizens who don’t have a distinct racial and religious minority identity. Such assimilation, however, seems
impossible, and hence, many Uyghurs also seem to be being eliminated from China completely.
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transported to factories across the country where they are similarly surveilled,176 kept in
dormitories, prevented from practicing Islam, paid very little (or not at all), and are subjected to
CCP assimilation strategies like forced Mandarin classes (Xu, et al., 2020). “Aside from political
incentives [(these assimilation strategies)],” this report states, “The business of ‘buying’ and
‘selling’ Uyghur labour can be quite lucrative” (Xu, et al., 2020).
For example, a New York Times article from earlier this year (2021) notes that largely as
a result of Uyghur labor, Xinjiang sources “85 percent of Chinese cotton” (Appendix 54)
(Goodman, et al., 2021). They continue to explain that while the CCP rejects “claims of worker
abuse in part by claiming that much of Xinjiang’s cotton harvest is now automated,” that
“manual picking remains common in the south of the region [(Xinjiang)], where most Uyghurs
live” and where “nearly two-thirds of cotton is handpicked” (Goodman, et al., 2021).
Complicated is the fact that “China remains the world’s central hub for making clothes” and that
“China exports unprocessed cotton to 14 countries…and yarn to 190 countries” (Goodman, et al.,
2021). Many global and highly influential companies are reliant on China’s cotton and products
made from Uyghur forced labor which increases CCP wealth and makes the international
company, by proxy, complicit in this oppression of the Uyghurs (Goodman, et al., 2021).177 The
economic benefit of Uyghur labor sourced from re-education camps ultimately is a strong force
leading to their detention across Xinjiang and their transfer to factories around the country.
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For instance, this report notes that in factories across China where the Uyghurs are forced to work, “every 50
Uyghur workers are assigned one government minder and are monitored by dedicated security personnel” (Xu, et
al., 2020).
177
Many international companies like H&M, this article notes, are now conflicted if they should stop buying the
cotton from the region and risk “alienating a country of 1.4 billion people” as, they explain, “the Chinese
government has weaponized China’s consumer market” which has led to Chinese consumers denouncing these
foreign companies contemplating the end of buying cotton from the region. Or, they must decide if they should
continue to buy the cotton and ignore the genocide of the Uyghurs (Goodman, et. al., 2021).
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However, while economic drive is important in the creation and maintenance of these
camps, arguably more important is their purpose of sinicizing the Uyghurs and indoctrinating
them with CCP ideology. In accounts from former detained Uyghurs, for instance, it has been
reported that officers in detention camps run mandatory classes to teach Uyghurs Mandarin
Chinese and force them to “recite Communist slogans and sing songs praising the Chinese
Communist Party” (Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby...2018). Especially
important, formerly detained Uyghurs report, is the effort of the detention facilities to eliminate
the Uyghurs’ Muslim religion: former detainees report that they were forced to “renounce Islam”
and were forbidden to pray, to gather, and to engage in Muslim practices or traditions in the
camps (Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby...2018). Some detainees even
recount being forced to eat pork and drink alcohol in these camps which are clear violations of
Muslim tradition and practices (Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby...2018).
Allegations that Uyghur hair has been cut and sold in these camps have also arisen in recent
years (Appendix 50) (“CBP Detains Chinese Shipment of Suspected Forced Labor...”, 2021).
Such efforts arise from attempts to make the Uyghurs more like the Chinese Han majority; to use
detention to achieve what Foucault (1995) explained was “correctional training” to force them to
assimilate to the Han majority identity (170).
Yet, while trying to force the sinicization of the Uyghurs, these detention facilities are
also making the Uyghurs’ adoption of a Han Chinese identity nearly impossible by the fact that
detained Uyghurs are completely segregated and isolated from the rest of China. How can the
Uyghurs truly assimilate to the Han Chinese culture, and feel a part of the Chinese nation-state, if
they are being physically separated from the group into which they are supposed to assimilate?
While some Uyghurs are released back into society after they “graduate” from the re-education
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facilities, a lack of information about the camps prevents knowledge as to how long Uyghurs are
on average detained and when their release into CCP society becomes warranted (if it becomes
warranted at all) (Martina, 2019).178 Meanwhile, the CCP promotes the idea that they are
releasing all Uyghurs back into society after their time in the camps (Martina, 2019). For
instance, a 2019 Reuters report reveals that in 2019, Xinjiang’s vice chairman, Alken Tuniaz,
stated that “currently, most people who have received training have already returned to society,
returned home” (Martina, 2019). A lack of information about the camps ultimately leaves these
claims unprovable, but Amnesty International’s Asia regional director, Nicholas Becquelin,
stated that these claims were “deceptive” (“'Most People' Detained in Xinjiang Camps…”,
2019). How long is training after all? Furthermore, returning to ASPI’s report, even Uyghurs
who are released may just end up in another form of detention: forced labor in factories across
the country (Xu, et al., 2020). Or, drawing back to the peripheries chapter, the Uyghurs may end
up in segregated neighborhoods, far from the Han majority. This suggests that the Uyghurs’
segregation from Chinese society is perpetuated even after release from re-education camps; that
the Uyghurs’ true assimilation is again hindered despite CCP proclaimed efforts to the contrary.
For instance, although outside of the detention camps, state propaganda like the use of
billboards, social media, pamphlets, and cultural events promote CCP ideologies, 179 a massive
security operation and government police effort is currently taking place to keep the Uyghurs
confined to their residentially segregated neighborhoods and to surveil and track their
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The CCP has been extraordinarily secretive in regard to these camps and has prevented any journalists,
government officials, human rights organizations, or investigatory bodies into the camps (Martina, 2019). Today,
large amounts of information the international community knows about the camps are obtained from released
Uyghurs (Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby...2018).
179
The CCP is even going as far to promote national unity and harmony by creating a musical. A New York Times
article earlier this year (2021) reveals that now playing in cinemas across China, the CCP helped create a musical
called “The Wings of Songs” that portrays “the Uyghurs and other minorities…singing and dancing happily in
colorful dress” (Qin, 2021). Such efforts are part of the CCP’s propaganda crusade and are an effort to promote an
idea of a happy and harmonious Xinjiang, void of genocide (Qin, 2021).
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movements, just like in the re-education camps (Hillman and Tuttle, 2020). A report from United
States Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in Bureau of Democracy, Scott Busby, for instance,
states that while non-detained Uyghurs do not have physical cells or watchtowers dictating their
movement like they do in the detention centers, that they still live in an “open-air prison”
because of CCP surveillance (Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby...2018). This
can especially be seen in the “grid-style policing” operations that have been implemented in
Xinjiang in recent years to monitor and limit the mobility of the Uyghurs:
Adopted in an effort to better surveil and keep track of citizens, the CCP’s “grid-style
social management” or “grid-style policing” is a security project that developed across China in
the early 2000s, 180 and was then expanded to Xinjiang and other ethnic minority regions in 2014
to better control ethnic minority groups like the Uyghurs (Zenz and Leibold, 2020). The policing
style subdivides regions into zones that are monitored by security officers who then report back
to the CCP (Zenz and Leibold, 2020: 334). In Xinjiang, “convenience police stations” are a key
part of this strategy and are where police checkpoints reside across the region to stop Uyghur
pedestrians and drivers to check their phones and IDs (Appendices 57-59) (334).181 Zenz and
Leibold (2020) reveal that these police stations are located “every 300 to 500 metres” from each
other in Xinjiang which makes Uyghur travel to urban centers extremely difficult (334). As of
2017, they note that an estimated 7,300 of these stations exist across Xinjiang, a number that has
likely only expanded in recent years (Zenz and Leibold, 2020: 334). To fill such massive
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Zenz and Leibold (2020) explain that first “piloted in Beijing and Shanghai during the early 2000s,” that gridstyle policing was adopted to Xinjiang and Tibet after the 2008-2009 unrest and conflict broke out in these regions
(333). In 2014, they continue to explain, grid-style policing was then significantly expanded in these regions and
throughout the rest of China (Zenz and Leibold, 2020: 333).
181
According to a New York Times article, checkpoints only work to stop and surveil the Uyghurs (Buckley and
Mozur, 2019). Han Chinese, Uyghur officials, and foreigners can usually pass through the checkpoints without a
problem, the report states (Appendix 56) (Buckley and Mozur, 2019).

178

numbers of police stations and checkpoints, assistant police officers and sub-station police
surveillance staff have been recruited in masses and interestingly, because of a lack of
employment in other sectors of the region, some Uyghurs themselves have been hired in these
positions (Appendices 57-59) (Zenz and Leibold, 2020: 343).182 “Consequently,” Zenz and
Leibold (2020) conclude, “this massive informal police recruitment drive kills two birds with one
stone for the party-state. Not only do they flexibly enlarge the state’s surveillance apparatus but
they also…[get] ethnic groups to police their own people” (Zenz and Leibold, 2020: 343). These
positions, that is, ironically help some Uyghurs to assimilate to CCP society while having those
very Uyghurs hinder assimilation for other Uyghurs. In this light, the CCP seems to be very
selective in allowing what Uyghurs to assimilate and in what capacity.
Along with convenience police stations which physically stop and track Uyghurs, the
CCP has also implemented a highly developed technological apparatus to collect data and
information on the Uyghurs (Zenz and Leibold, 2020). For instance, after the regional party
secretary, Chen Quanguo, took leadership in Xinjiang in 2016, “in Urumqi alone, the capital of
Xinjiang, “over 160,000 security cameras were installed” that first year (Zenz and Leibold, 2020:
333).183 As a result, “6,000 new lower-tiered” police officers were hired to review all of this
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For instance, “a nonrepresentative sample of three assistant police recruitment drives in Kashgar prefecture in
2015 and 2016,” they explain, “shows that 83.2 per cent of those hired were Uyghurs” (Zenz and Leibold, 2020:
343). Uyghurs are attracted to these police positions, Zenz and Leibold (2020) explain, because they are usually
high-wage and require little education (Zenz and Leibold, 2020: 343). Further, they go on to reveal, many Uyghurs
take these jobs out of hopes that they would “protect them from future persecution” (Zenz and Leibold, 2020: 343).
It is also a way to escape residential segregation and to go live and work in urban centers where many Uyghurs are
often restricted to going (Zenz and Leibold, 2020: 343). Despite these benefits, however, Zenz and Leibold (2020)
ultimately reveal that many Uyghurs who have taken these positions reveal that they have been unable to freely
resign from the police stations and that those who have tried have been threatened to be placed in re-education
camps (344). In this sense, recruiting Uyghurs to fill these police positions further represses them and further puts
them under the control of the CCP.
183
Zenz and Leibold (2020) further reveal that “during Chen’s first 12 months in office, the XUAR advertised
100,680 security-related positions, representing a 13-fold increase over the average number of advertisements in the
years 2009 to 2015” (334).
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video surveillance (333). Electronic ID and face scanners are now present in shopping malls,
mosques,184 and other public places around Xinjiang (Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary
Scott Busby...2018), 185 and the CCP has allegedly preprogrammed cell phones with applications
that scan these sites and have been accused of placing GPS trackers in cars in Xinjiang (Shih,
2017). 186 A report from The New York Times explains that these surveillance methods ultimately
have roots in “the military research labs that helped build China’s first nuclear bomb, satellite
and guided missiles,” and that “[these labs] soon expanded into civilian security matters”
(Appendix 60) (Buckley and Mozur, 2019). Because of extensive surveillance efforts, the CCP
spends an absurd amount on technological surveillance a year; in Xinjiang alone, for instance,
spending on internal security was $8.4 billion in 2017 (Buckley and Mozur, 2019). All efforts are
again, to control and monitor the Uyghurs.
Furthermore, the CCP is also engaging in what appears to be a eugenics-based effort to
limit the reproductive capacity of Uyghur women and thus build a “racially pure” nation-state.
For instance, there have been allegations of Uyghur women being forced to get sterilized in
detention camps across Xinjiang or being pressured to go on some type of birth control (“China
Cuts Uighur Births with IUDs, Abortion, Sterilization,” 2020). Some Uyghur and ethnic minority
women have been fined for having a third child, even though China’s one child policy ended
over six years ago (Appendices 62-63) (“China Cuts Uighur Births with IUDs, Abortion,
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That is, in the mosques that haven’t been destroyed or “converted into Communist propaganda centers” in
Xinjiang (Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby...2018).
185
A report by the New York Times states that China has facial recognition records and ID scans for about 2.5
million people (Buckley and Mozur, 2019). Most of this data, they explain, comes from Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital
city (Buckley and Mozur, 2019). Furthermore, according to reports from the Chicago Tribune and the New York
Times, a Chinese state-owned defense contractor, China Electronics Technology Group (CETC) has created facial
scanners which low level security officers review along with material from surveillance cameras themselves
(Appendix 60) (Shih, 2017; Buckley and Mozur, 2019). All are efforts to surveill and monitor the Uyghurs.
186
In the same report, it is alleged that every car in Xinjiang is now required to install GPS trackers (Shih, 2017).
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Sterilization,” 2020). Due to governmental pressure and CCP coercion, Xinjiang’s sterilization
rates and IUD birth control placements are both soaring as compared to the rest of China
(Appendix 61 and 64) (Watson, et al., 2020). Uyghur birth rates are subsequently plummeting,
and Uyghur women’s bodies are now being controlled as a means of reducing the population of
the Uyghurs as a percentage of the national population (Appendix 61) (“China Cuts Uighur
Births with IUDs, Abortion, Sterilization,” 2020). Such efforts create speculation that the CCP is
seeking to eliminate Uyghurs, rather than assimilate them, to achieve its homogenous Han
national identity.
Furthermore, CCP officials are currently collecting DNA samples to create a nationwide
database of human portfolios (Shih, 2017; Richardson, 2020). Mandatory health checks have
become required in recent years (Shih, 2017) and, according to a 2017 Human Rights Watch
report, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security is working to create a “searchable, national DNA
database called the ‘Forensic Science DNA Database System’” (Richardson, 2020). These efforts
have been directed especially at Xinjiang and at the Uyghurs. The same Human Rights Watch
report, for instance, states that since 2016, police have required passport applicants in Xinjiang to
supply DNA samples, even though in the rest of China the police are only supposed to obtain
DNA samples from convicted criminals (Richardson, 2020). An Atlantic article also notes that
Xinjiang police officers are often the ones who perform “health checks” and who measure
height, weight, and other characteristics of the Uyghurs at checkpoints while also taking swabs
of DNA (Appendix 56) (Andersen, 2020). The goal of such efforts appears to be a further
attempt to keep a corporeal tab on the Uyghurs while deducing who is “dangerous” enough to
warrant detention in re-education camps. For instance, a 2018 Human Rights Watch reports that
DNA platforms and surveillance operations facilitate the creation of lists of those who should be
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detained by security and CCP officials. In a platform called the “Integrated Joint Operations
Platform,” Chinese police are said to use “predictive policing” to determine who is going to
break the law or who is a threat to the state and should be arrested (Human Right Watch, 2018).
Surveillance, sterilization, and policing ultimately work together to ensure that those Uyghurs
not assimilating or who remain seen as a threat are sent to indoctrination camps throughout
Xinjiang.
Ultimately, conflicting mechanisms to promote Uyghur integration with the country, and
to simultaneously prevent that integration from happening are thus being enforced by the CCP
and its surveillance and police operations across Xinjiang. At once, the Uyghurs are being fed
propaganda to assimilate and to be more like the Han majority, while at the same time, police
checkpoints enforce residential segregation and still help the CCP surveil the Uyghurs as a
different and dangerous “other”; at once, the Uyghurs are being indoctrinated by CCP ideology
in “paternal” detention camps in Xinjiang, while they are also detained in these camps for
unknown amounts of time and then are often transferred to factories across the country that
similarly segregate their bodies (Xu, et al., 2020); and at once, the Uyghurs are being fed rhetoric
of the plurality of difference (the plurality of religion, ethnicities, and races) in one united,
Chinese nation, and yet, their very difference—their very reproduction—is still being controlled
in an effort of what appears to be a eugenic movement for their elimination completely. What
accounts for these contradicting strategies? Is the CCP actually seeking to integrate the Uyghurs
with the nation, or are they working to eradicate this racialized minority population and its
culture entirely?
The contradicting strategies of promoted assimilation at the same time that the CCP
enforces Uyghur segregation and surveillance, ultimately suggests the former. Drawing back to
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the CCP’s racial state building strategies that are also ladened with dichotomies, the CCP wants
to promote the idea of one united nation--zhonghua minzu—recognizing racial, religious, and
ethnic diverse groups who exist in national harmony, while at the same time, they explicitly
work to exclude these groups as to create a Han dominated Chinese identity (Bovingdon, 2010:
16). It is not so much a united nation of diversity that the CCP seems to be seeking to achieve,
but a homogeneous, Han identity in which groups like the Uyghurs are not present entirely.
As seen in the Uyghurs who have become convenience police station officers who track
the movement of other Uyghurs, it seems that some Uyghurs in China can assimilate and be
incorporated into the nation, but only for those who have truly assimilated to Han centered
identity and for those who work in a specific capacity to promote CCP racial state ideologies. All
others who are still designated as a danger to the state—who still possess Uyghur master status,
meaning that their designation as Uyghur, as racially and religiously different, dominates all
other identities and qualities--it appears, need to be maintained in physically segregated spaces
(re-education camps and segregated residential areas) that prevent their infiltration with the rest
of the country. In this sense, it seems that only those Uyghurs who leave their Uyghur identity
completely behind, or have truly achieved some CCP benchmark of loyalty, have been permitted
real integration with the country. The rest, it again seems, are being exiled from the country
completely. Despite these contradictions, what remains steady is the CCP’s goal of eradicating
Uyghur identity completely; of again achieving a homogeneous Han identity whether that be
through assimilation or elimination of Uyghur identity. All the while, and as consistent with the
CCP’s racial state building efforts, the CCP is continued to be positioned as a benevolent figure
helping the Uyghurs through efforts like re-education camps and the Great Western
Development project as mentioned before where the CCP can pretend that it is “helping” the
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Uyghurs. Ultimately, despite these highly subversive and coercive actions, the CCP is continued
to be positioned in legitimacy while the genocide of Uyghur culture continues, both publicly and
subversively.
Myanmar: Genocide, Internal Displacement Camps, and Facebook as Diverse Means to
Repress the Rohingya
Since 2012, and especially increasing in severity under the 2017 clearance operations, the
Tatmadaw have been burning Rohingya villages, instigating interethnic violence, and engaging
in what can only been seen as genocidal actions against the Rohingya (Wade, 2017). Using
sexual assault, torture, extreme violence, forced labor, and other human rights violations, the
Tatmadaw’s methods of oppression include some of the most violent and overt efforts instigated
by a governing force documented in this study (Wade, 2017). While the Chilean government and
the CCP both are limited in the degree in which they repress their racialized others because of
their respective democratic and communist governing structures, being a military regime, the
Tatmadaw has no such limit. Their authoritarian command stems from and begets violence,
making their genocide of the Rohingya largely unsurprising. Furthermore, their regime makes
genocide and violent action unsanctioned as there are no regulating government bodies who can
denounce and punish such violent actions. For instance, unlike Chile and China where there are
government checks and balances and control on executive power (i.e., in Chile, there are three
branches of government—the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the judicial branch—
to ensure that no party takes too much control (“Chile - Politics, Government, and Taxation”),
while in China, the National’s People of Congress (NPC), the nearly three thousand member
parliament that makes and reviews legislation, oversees the constitution, and elects judicial and
executive posts, serves as this regulating force (“National People's Congress”, 2021)), no such
regulations exist for the Tatmadaw. Instead, the military remains free to commit what atrocities
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serve its interests, without an independent branch or body taking away power or sanctioning its
actions.
Moreover, because of the longevity and militaristic nature of the Tatmadaw’s regime, a
different set of cultural expectations and values have arisen in Myanmar as to what can be
anticipated under military leadership: unlike Chile where equality and liberty are at least the
formal, aspirational bedrock for policies and governance, and unlike China where Communist
rule at least advances an ideology that professes a commitment to unity and equity, the
Tatmadaw have never needed either to suggest that there were taken-for-granted limits to their
dominance or to promote false notions of equality or respect for civilian liberties. The military’s
authoritarian rule in itself justifies extreme actions, and such actions are almost expected from
them as they seek to maintain their authority. Words that are regularly used in reference to the
Tatmadaw, such as “regime”, “dictatorship”, “authoritarian”, and “coup d’état”, after all, denote
unequal power structures, control, and violent means to gain and sustain rule. As such, the
Tatmadaw’s brutal violence against the Rohingya is not extraordinary nor does it produce the
type of alarm it would in a democratic country. This is not to say that the actions of the
Tatmadaw are not sometimes met with resistance, but rather to argue that, because of Myanmar’s
long history of military repression, such drastic and extreme measures are expected as a natural
consequence of authoritarian rule. This gives the Tatmadaw both rhetorical and political space to
deploy much more violent means against unwanted racial/religious minorities than the
government of Chile and even China. In other words, the Tatmadaw doesn’t need to operate
subversively and instead, they can deploy violence overtly. In fact, it is the visible display of this
violence--the instilling of the ever-present threat of violence peppered with occasional and

185

sometimes sustained displays of brutal and indiscriminate force--that is in itself key to its
dominance.
While the Tatmadaw can receive sanctions from other nation-states or international
organizations dedicated to human rights, such sanctions have proven to be largely ineffective at
stopping its genocide against the Rohingya (Chaudhury and Samāddāra, 2018). For instance, and
as mentioned before, in 2019, a case was brought against Myanmar in the UN’s International
Court of Justice (ICJ) for the genocide of the Rohingya (Simons and Beech, 2019). Because this
trial took place while Myanmar was still in democracy (2015-2021), State Chancellor Aung San
Suu Kyi testified on behalf of Myanmar, and largely denied that such genocide was taking place
(Simons and Beech, 2019). Although the trial was effective in bringing international awareness
to the genocide of the Rohingya, and in publicly condemning the violence being conducted
against them, Simons and Beech (2019) emphasize that it ultimately led to no new material
changes or protections for the Rohingya, nor did it materially sanction the NLD nor the
Tatmadaw for their role in massacring and persecuting the Rohingya. Instead, following the trial,
the NLD was solely required to “take all measures within its power” to protect the Rohingya and
to regularly report back to the ICJ (Brody, 2020). Yet, such check-ins didn’t require the
Tatmadaw to change its violent mechanisms against the Rohingya, nor did it lead to lasting and
material changes in Myanmar that would prevent the military’s violent behavior against them
from continuing.
While this case again took place during Myanmar’s brief stint at democracy, Chaudhury
and Samāddāra (2018) conclude that the international community is not responding with the
gravity required to confront such atrocities. Today, for instance, the United States, New Zealand,
and the European Union have put economic and other sanctions on the Tatmadaw after it threw
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its coup earlier this year (2021) (McDonald, 2021). 187 However, at this time of writing, no Asian
country has sanctioned Myanmar (McDonald, 2021).188 Because the Tatmadaw trades
extensively with Asian countries, this sanctioning would be required to truly force the military to
concede power (Head, 2021). Further, such economic sanctions from the West have often hurt
the citizens of Myanmar themselves more than the military as the Tatmadaw again holds its own
assets, banks, and economic organizations that allow for its economic independence and
economic monopoly in Myanmar society (McDonald, 2021). Any international punishment
(financial or rhetorical) ultimately hasn’t been enough for the Tatmadaw to stop its violent
practices against the Rohingya and its reign in Myanmar. Thus, it continues to execute highly
brutal actions that the other two countries in this study, Chile and China, again are limited from
committing.
While an authoritarian form of government is a key difference in the Tatmadaw’s ability
to use more violent means of oppression as compared to other countries in this study, its overtly
violent mechanisms of maintaining power were (temporarily) curbed when Myanmar
transitioned to a democracy in 2015. After multi-party elections were held in 2015 and the
National League of Democracy (NLD) headed by Aung San Suu Kyi came out victorious (Wade,
2017), the military ceded power and Myanmar faced unprecedented change: as mentioned in the
terrorism chapter, unlike never before, social media became available and internet expanded
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For instance, following the coup in February, President Joe Biden in the United States issued an executive
summary which ordered sanctions against the Myanmar military such as an order that “froze US$1 billion…in
reserves Myanmar’s government was holding at the New York Fed, which the junta had attempted to withdraw after
seizing power” (“Myanmar Coup…”, 2021). The European Union also imposed sanctions and travel bans and
banned EU investors and banks from doing business with the Tatmadaw’s two economic organizations, MEHL and
MEC (“Myanmar Coup…”, 2021).
188
Important, an article from BBC explains, is the fact that ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, an
important economic union in Asia including 10 nations in Southeast Asia such as Thailand, the Philippines, and
Indonesia, has refused to put sanctions on Myanmar (McDonald, 2021). While individual countries in this union
wish to place sanctions on Myanmar, like Indonesia, other countries like Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia—
countries that are vital for the Tatmadaw’s trade--have “refused to criticize the coup” (Head, 2021).
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greatly, new political parties could now register and run in elections, and workers could join
trade unions, amongst other new liberties (“Myanmar: Freedom in the World 2020 Country
Report”). Yet, important rights were still restricted across the country like the right to protest,
and State Chancellor Aung Sang Suu Kyi was prevented from making any real or lasting change
as the military’s 2008 Constitution still reigned and the military still held 25% of seats in
parliament (“Myanmar: Freedom in the World 2020 Country Report”).189 The military was
arguably still the most powerful force in society and although from 2015-2021, Myanmar was
nominally a democratic country, democratic qualities were largely absent from its reality;
Myanmar continued to exist in what Wade (2017) names “quasi democracy” (16).
As mentioned briefly in the terrorism chapter, it was ironically through the continued
persecution of the Rohingya that the Tatmadaw could maintain its legitimacy and authority
during Myanmar’s democracy. By drawing on Buddhist citizen fear of losing their position of
superiority in the country, and by igniting moral panic that a dangerous and “terrorist” Rohingya
“other” was challenging their very power and identity, the Tatmadaw could motivate Buddhist
citizens to support its persecution of the Rohingya, and to even conduct violence against the
Rohingya themselves (Wade, 2017). So invested were large portions of the Buddhist citizen
body with racial narratives designating their own supremacy, that many felt like it was their duty
to aid in the genocide of the Rohingya and to support the military’s efforts of massacre (Wade,
2017). Furthermore, because Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD were concerned for their own
reelection—because they needed the votes of the Buddhist polity who were so invested in racial
narratives of Buddhist supremacy—they never spoke out against the genocide of the Rohingya.
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In 2020, Aung San Suu Kyi tried to make a series of constitutional amendments that would revoke or limit the
powers of the military, but it was vetoed by the Tatmadaw in parliament because the military again held 25% of
seats in parliament under the 2008 Constitution (Bauchner, 2020).
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The extermination of the Rohingya continued and possibly became more intense, under a
democratic form of government, revealing the lack of true democracy Myanmar had achieved.
As discussed during the terrorism section, the rise of social media during democracy
especially gave the Tatmadaw a new means to ignite Buddhist extremists and Buddhist monks to
support their persecution of the Rohingya and to then persecute the Rohingya on their own
(Wade, 2017). While the Tatmadaw still motivated powerful social actors, and while genocide of
the Rohingya persisted, the military now had the ability to exercise their control clandestinely.
For instance, Ware and Laoutides (2018) reveal that by igniting Buddhist nationalist groups,
inter-ethnic violence in the Rakhine state would result, often leading to the necessity of calling
on Tatmadaw to bring order (Ware and Laoutides, 2018: 57). This instigation of Buddhist
nationalist groups, they explain, hence “actually improved the prestige and popular perception of
the Tatmadaw, helping re-legitimize them within the Myanmar polity” (Ware and Laoutides,
2018: 57). The Tatmadaw’s manipulation of the Buddhist citizens became hidden as they
garnered greater legitimacy in society as a keeper of social order. Thus, like Chile and China,
their methods of oppression, or their coercion, became more secret and subversive which
probably attributes to why neither the Buddhist citizen body, nor the NLD, could see that the
persecution of the Rohingya was leading to the Tatmadaw’s greater power in society.
For instance, and as previously described, in 2013, the Buddhist nationalist group, Ma Ba
Tha, otherwise called the Organization for the Protection of Race and Religion, is thought to
have been founded by the Tatmadaw (Wade, 2017). This group is mostly composed of Buddhist
monks and has been a key player in carrying out attacks against the Rohingya in the Rakhine
state (Wade, 2017). Facebook is a key propaganda mechanism used by this organization, and it is
through extremist posts that they can spread Buddhist nationalist sentiment and widespread fear
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that the superior status of Buddhists is being threatened by the Rohingya and other Muslims
(Wade, 2017). Facebook has also been a key mechanism for them to infiltrate and spy on the
Rohingya and other Muslims and to then use their Facebook posts to justify their arrests (Wade,
2017).
For example, in his book, Myanmar’s Enemy Within, Wade (2017) describes the case of
one Muslim civilian, Zaw Zaw Latt, who was stalked on Facebook by the Ma Ba Tha and who
was subsequently arrested for a photo found on his page of him holding a rifle (184). Though
these photos were from two years earlier and had nothing to do with challenging Buddhist rule,
Wade (2017) explains that Zaw Zaw Latt was detained for “unlawful association” and was
sentenced to four years in prison (Wade, 2017). At the same time, eleven images from his
Facebook account were posted in one of the Ma Ba Tha’s magazines with the headline: “Photo
evidence of threat to Buddhism” (Wade, 2017: 185). This case reveals that at the same time that
the Ma Ba Tha (and the Tatmadaw) could use Facebook photos as evidence against a Muslim
man who supposedly “threatened” Buddhist dominance, that they could also use social media to
help garner support for their nationalist sentiments and efforts; through the use of social media,
the Ma Ba Tha and the Tatmadaw could create a sense that the Buddhist religion, identity, and
what Wade (2017) also calls race was under threat and had to be defended (Wade, 2017).190 This
would become essential for motivating the Buddhist polity to persecute the Rohingya
themselves, and, at the very least, to believe that such persecution was deserved.
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In another case, Wade (2017) describes that in 2014, an officer of the NLD, Htin Lin Oo, gave a speech where he
denounced Buddhist nationalism (185). This video was subsequently circulated on social media by the Ma Ba Tha
and two months later, Htin Lin Oo was arrested for “outraging religious feelings” (185). During his seven-month
trial which subsequently took place, the Ma Ba Tha and Buddhist monks went to the courthouse to pressure judges
to give Htin Lin Oo the harshest sentence possible (185). Htin Lin Oo was eventually sentenced to two years in
prison and was fired from his post in the NLD (186). This arrest and sentence again resulted because of the power of
social media and the influence of Buddhist nationalist groups in spreading Buddhist nationalist sentiment.
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Through the use of Facebook and social media, the Tatmadaw was also able to trigger
anti-Rohingya sentiment more generally (Mozur, 2018). A 2018 New York Times report reveals,
for example, that the Tatmadaw sent out extremist posts from its headquarters191 to encourage
the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya (Mozur, 2018). Such efforts were not tracked or removed
by Facebook and as such, these efforts became a perfect source of fearmongering; they became
the perfect mechanisms for what Mozur (2018) terms “psychological warfare” where the
Buddhist polity could again be motivated en masse to carry out a massacre of the Rohingya
while, for the first time in history, the role of Tatmadaw in motivating this behavior could be
cloaked in invisibility. Wade (2017) further notes that through the use of social media, the
Tatmadaw could also establish its legitimacy because, as and as explained earlier, when the
violence the Buddhist nationalists provoked in the Rakhine state seemed to get out of control, the
Tatmadaw could intervene as an apparently neutral peacekeeper. At “the end of the day,” he
explains, “who has won above everyone else has been the military...it deflects attention away
from its own maneuverings and sows the potential for unrest that it can profit from well into the
future” (Wade, 2017: 162). Social media, generally, and Facebook, in particular, during
Myanmar’s brief stint as a democracy, allowed the Tatmadaw to act like more secretive
government forces described in this study: here the Tatmadaw was subversive when it had to be
in order to maintain its own authority.192
Do means of oppression hence follow from the type of government in a country? Does
democracy necessitate more subversive means of oppression while authoritarianism and military
regimes allow blatant violence? The fact that the Tatmadaw’s means of oppression became more
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They write that “one major source of the Facebook content came from areas outside Naypyidaw, where the
military keeps compounds” (Mozur, 2018).
192
Steinberg (2008) similarly argues, propaganda like Facebook leaves “little mental space within the Buddhist
communities of Rakhine State to consider the Rohingya as anything but menacing” (118).

191

covert during Myanmar’s short phase of democracy lends support to this hypothesis. Yet, even
now, after initiating a coup early this year and reinstating its military regime, the means of
oppression used by the Tatmadaw is very similar to that used in Chile and China; like these two
counties, the Tatmadaw also uses segregated camps, government checkpoints, and reproductive
control of the Rohingya to repress those who haven’t been massacred or displaced already.
While different from Chile and China along key aspects as will be discussed shortly, I
hypothesize that some techniques of oppression converge across forms of government in the
suppression of the racialized other. I predict that when ostracizing and repressing a whole group
based on skin color and perceived physical differences (along with religion, indigenous status,
and ethnic or transnational identity), that certain methods have become universal across countries
such as the segregation of racialized others in some type of stigmatized space, the deprivation of
their basic human rights, and the limitation of their reproductive and survival capacities. Severity
of punishment, I speculate, is the largest source of difference between nation-states in the
repression of the racialized other, as are the specific purposes of repression that align with the
racial narratives and racial nation-state building strategies of each country. To explore such
speculations, the Tatmadaw’s other means of oppressing the Rohingya (beyond genocide) will
first be explored and then, how these methods mirror and differ from the Chilean government’s
and the CCP’s strategies of suppressing their racialized groups:
For example, although the Tatmadaw does not incarcerate its racial minority group like
Chile or place them in “vocational” centers like China, they do run a series of dangerous
internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps where the Rohingya are similarly segregated and
prohibited from leaving (Appendices 66-68) (Ibrahim, 2016). Arising since large scale
interethnic violence erupted in 2012 in the Rakhine State, these internally displaced persons
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camps house thousands of Rohingya who have been displaced from their homes due to
interethnic violence or Tatmadaw persecution (Emerson, 2020).193 These camps lack access to
adequate health care, education, sanitation, and food, and are so impoverished that a former
United Nations Assistant Secretary-General, Ursula Mueller, called them “beyond the dignity of
any people” (Appendices 66-68) (Emerson, 2020). 194 The conditions of these camps are truly
inhumane as shelters in these areas are deteriorating and are becoming increasingly worse with
an accumulation of monsoon seasons and flooding (Emerson, 2020). Further, the Rohingya need
to obtain a governmentally approved permission slip in order to leave the camps which is not
easy to obtain (Emerson, 2020). Security checkpoints outside their communities (run by the
Tatmadaw) further regulate their movement and prevent them from leaving, even making it
difficult for them to go to health care appointments or family funerals (Ibrahim, 2016).
Cumulatively, Ibrahim (2016) concludes that the camps act as “de facto imprisonment” for the
Rohingya and that due to such stringent measures of security and checkpoints, that the Rohingya
are being held “indefinitely” (89-90).
Some Rohingya who have not been forced into internal displacement camps within
Myanmar and have the means, have fled to bordering countries where they do not meet any
better conditions or housing (Appendices 69-71) (Emerson, 2020). Following the 2017 clearance
operations by the Tatmadaw, for instance, a 2020 Human Rights Watch report notes that 700,000
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For instance, after interethnic violence that erupted in 2012 in the Rakhine State, Emerson (2020) notes that
“ethnic Rakhine, local officials, and state security forces ultimately displaced over 140,000 people.” Of these
140,000 people, they note, more than 130,000 of them were Muslims and Rohingya that remain confined in the
displacement camps today (Emerson, 2020). Other violence and persecution in recent years have caused more
Rohingya to be displaced and put in these camps such as the Tatmadaw’s clearance operations in 2017 (Ware and
Laoutides, 2018).
194
It is important to note that conditions in these camps have only become worse in the past year with the start of
the global pandemic and the fact that social distancing and access to adequate sanitation are nearly impossible in
these camps (Emerson, 2020). These camps are ultimately a huge violation of human rights and pose a serious
health concern during the global pandemic.
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Rohingya fled across the Bay of Bengal to seek asylum in Bangladesh (Appendices 69-71)
(Emerson, 2020). This journey, Chaudhury and Samaddar (2018) explain, is very dangerous and
many have died attempting such a feat (2-6).195 Mass graves, they explain, have been created for
the Rohingya who die on this journey. For the Rohingya who don’t die in this journey and who
make it to refugee camps in Bangladesh, India, and other countries, they confront conditions not
much better than the internally displaced persons camps in Myanmar (Chaudhury and Samaddar,
2018: 2-6); the Rohingya often experience more persecution in these other countries and there
are, for example, documented examples of them having been trafficked for their labor, sexually
abused, and again placed in inhumane and overcrowded camps (Chaudhury and Samaddar,
2018). In the midst of a global pandemic, these human rights violations have become especially
acute (Appendices 94-98). Yet, the tragedy is that because of the Tatmadaw’s brutal actions, the
Rohingya have no other option but to flee (Chaudhury and Samaddar, 2018). 196
Despite the fact that a) the Rohingya are being persecuted and killed by the Tatmadaw
and Buddhist nationalist groups like the Ma Ba Tha, and b) that those who have survived have
been placed in internal displacement camps that limit their mobility and even their means
survival, the Tatmadaw is deploying yet another method of oppression to control and repress the
Rohingya: as in China and Chile, the Tatmadaw is limiting the ability of the Rohingya to
reproduce. A series of laws known as the “Race and Religion Protection Laws” (promoted by the
Ma Ba Tha and the Tatmadaw, but passed by the NLD in 2015), gave the government the power
to limit the reproductive rights of minority groups like the Rohingya (Wade, 2017: 170). Under
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They write that in 2016, “an estimated 6,000 Rohingya and Bangladeshi refugees were stranded at sea”
(Chaudhury and Samaddar, 2018: 5).
196
Other authors, Ware and Laoutides (2018) explain that the exodus of the Rohingya from the Rakhine state has
been “one of the fastest refugee exoduses in modern times, representing over 60% of the former Muslim population
of the Rakhine state” (6).
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these laws, Wade (2017) explains, “local governments were...given the power to limit
reproductive rates of women if they considered their particular region to be suffering as a result
of overpopulation” (170). Wade (2017) continues to explain that there is a “popular narrative”
that the Rohingya are “rapacious breeders bent on overwhelming the Rakhine Buddhist
population” (Wade, 2017: 170). Thus, he concludes, “It appear[s] this law might have a
particular community in mind” (Wade, 2017: 170). 197 Some methods of oppression utilized in all
three countries—government checkpoints, segregated spaces, and control of reproduction--are,
then, extraordinarily similar despite existing in different cultural climates and under different
forms of government.
Yet, while mirroring each other in significant ways, the Tatmadaw’s use of segregated
spaces (internally displaced persons camps), government checkpoints, and control of the
Rohingya’s reproduction vary in significant ways from Chile and China. For instance, contrary
to Chile and China where the placement of racialized groups in prisons and re-education camps
(respectively) seems to be a deliberate strategy on behalf of each nation-state to suppress their
racialized minority groups (i.e., in Chile, the Chilean government and their police/carceral state
have intentionally applied anti-terrorism laws to incarcerate the Mapuche in prisons across the
country while in China, the CCP has purposefully created “re-education camps” in an attempt to
assimilate the Uyghurs and force their conversion to Han majority identity), the existence of
internally displaced persons camps in Myanmar seems to be an unintended consequence of
genocide. For instance, these camps only arose from after the Tatmadaw displaced thousands of
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Also included in these laws were the new criminalization of polygamy, the necessity of people who wish to
convert religions to get governmental approval beforehand, and the new requirement that marriages between
Buddhists and non-Buddhists had to be broadcast to the public so as to allow for any objections in what Wade
(2017) deems “a clear attempt to curb interfaith marriages” (171). Such laws clearly appear to be an attempt to
affirm Buddhist superiority and to further persecute the Rohingya and other Muslims.
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Rohingya from their villages starting in 2012 (Emerson, 2020). Genocide came first, that is, and
the IDP camps only emerged second to deal with those Rohingya who weren’t eliminated or
exiled from Myanmar already. This suggests that while in Chile and China, these spaces serve
utmost importance in how the two governments repress racialized others, that in Myanmar, the
camps merely aid the Tatmadaw in its persecution of the Rohingya, but again, are not the main
method of oppression.
Furthermore, the purposes of these segregated spaces across the three countries vary
substantially. For instance, in Chile, the purpose of incarcerating the Mapuche under antiterrorism legislation is to incapacitate Mapuche leaders and followers advocating for Mapuche
autonomy, while also perpetuating an idea of their criminality; their arrest, detainment, and
sentencing to prisons across the country are again key to promoting the idea of the Mapuche as a
“terrorist” and dangerous other, while also keeping Arauncanía under control of the Chilean
government (increasing their social and material wealth). Dissimilarly, in China, detention camps
are made, in part, to assimilate the Uyghurs to Han majority identity and to indoctrinate them
with CCP ideologies. Unlike the purposes of such segregation to perpetuate an idea or label of
difference (criminality) like in Chile, these camps are instead trying to diminish any idea or
existence of Uyghur uniqueness; they are attempting to eliminate Uyghur distinctiveness which
aligns with the CCP’s racial nation-state goals of national harmony. Lastly, in Myanmar, such
segregation of the Rohingya in internally displaced persons camps once again seems to be
without such deliberate purpose, but rather, is the consequence of genocide that leaves some
Rohingya behind; they appear to be an afterthought or a solution to the Tatmadaw’s elimination
efforts that have left some Rohingya without a home, or without economic means to leave the
country. And yet, like Chile and China, these camps are essential in the Tatmadaw’s racial state
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building efforts; as discussed previously, it was partially through the persecution of the Rohingya
that the Tatmadaw could retain legitimacy and authority in Myanmar during democracy, and
drawing back to General Ne Win’s military regime in Myanmar throughout the 20th century, it
has been Tatmadaw tradition to create a national identity centered on Buddhism and the
exclusion of the Rohingya as to get the Buddhist citizen body to believe in racial narratives and
to thus garner authority in society. Hence, methods of segregating the racialized other has
specific racial state building purposes in each country in this study.
Other methods of oppression also appear to be converging between nation-states in this
study like government checkpoints and the control of reproduction, but what remains different
are the purposes of such efforts in relation to the racial nation-state building strategies and racial
narratives of each country. The Tatmadaw’s racial nation-state building efforts of excluding the
Rohingya (and the authoritarian nature of their government), after all, warrant genocide, while
the CCP’s racial nation-state building efforts of including the Uyghurs and eliding their
differences (conversion) brings about assimilationist camps. It is critical to analyze such
differences between the three countries in this study to ultimately see how methods of oppressing
racialized others may converge and mirror one another across nations, but that these coercive
means will take their own hybridity in each country depending on its unique racial narratives and
distinct racial state building strategies.
The severity and visibility of repressing the racialized other also varies between countries
in this study which I believe is largely dependent upon form of government. To reiterate, I
predict that in China and Chile, governments cannot use such overt methods of oppression as the
Tatmadaw because their governmental structures of communism and democracy, respectively,
prevent such blatant violence. Meanwhile, I hypothesize that the Tatmadaw’s authoritarian rule
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gives rise to genocide. For instance, the transformation of the Tatmadaw’s mechanisms of
repressing the Rohingya before, during, and after democracy could lend support to the idea that
democracy requires subversive means of repressing racialized others, while authoritarian regimes
allow for blatant violence; as discussed throughout this section, the Tatmadaw’s forms of
oppressing the Rohingya changed from overt to subversive back to overt forms of oppression as
Myanmar transitioned in and out of democracy. Now that the Tatmadaw threw a coup earlier this
year (2021) and has taken power once again, its overt and violent mechanisms of oppression
have returned, and are now being applied to Buddhist dissenters as well as the Rohingya
(Appendices 79-86); being back in an authoritarian regime, the Tatmadaw is once more
deploying highly visual and blatant acts of violence for all peoples who challenge its rule. The
subversive manipulation of social media to instigate Buddhist nationalists and gain their support
are no longer necessary as Myanmar is no longer in democracy.
For instance, although Facebook was essential for the Tatmadaw’s ability to continue
establishing rule and influence in democratic society, one of the first things that the Tatmadaw
did upon taking control earlier this year was shut down all social media in the country as well as
internet access (Perrigo, 2021). Paradoxically, while explaining why the Tatmadaw shut down
social media after the coup, a military official stated that the reason was because “fake news and
misinformation” could lead to unrest and rioting (Perrigo, 2021). Also ironic is the fact that
Facebook has now banned the Tatmadaw from using its platform, an effort that seems long
overdue (Perrigo, 2021). The military regime, after all, is once more in power and its brutal
mechanisms of oppression will continue, only now in a more public, direct, and unrestrained
way. And now, those who resist like Buddhist dissenters have no access to social media to
organize. However, due to an increasingly global and technological society, videos and photos of
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current protests against the Tatmadaw have circulated across the world, spreading awareness to
the Tatmadaw’s brutal violence and means of retaining power (Appendices 79-86). Will social
media in a global society encourage more countries like the United States to sanction the
Tatmadaw and to help dissenting citizens resist the new regime?
While such questions remain unknown, ultimately, the Tatmadaw’s mass killing of the
Rohingya, now also directed as Buddhist dissenters, reveals the gravity of their rule and their
coercion. Unlike Chile and China, many more Rohingya and Buddhist citizens (in comparison to
the Mapuche and Uyghurs) have now died at the hands of the Tatmadaw and more than these
two countries, the most extreme humanitarian violations are being committed by the Tatmadaw:
the taking of life itself. The Tatmadaw serves as both a warning and a danger for what racial
nation-states can become without limits or regulations like those present in Chile and China;
although the Chilean government and the CCP are committing their own atrocities against their
racialized minority populations—while all three of these countries represent humanitarian
crises—the Tatmadaw reveals the ultimate extent that governing bodies will go to repress
racialized others, uphold racial narratives in society, and therefore maintain their own dominance
in society. The return to blatant violence and overt coercion under this new regime ultimately
reveals the gravity of such racial state defense in some countries, and the consequences that can
result from defending such precarious racial narratives and constructions of authority.
Conclusion: Looking Forward: How Methods of Oppression Transform to Continue to
Achieve Racial State Building
In his book, A Theory of Social Control, author Richard T. LaPiere (1954) wrote that
“perhaps war...is psychologically less costly to men than the alternative abnormal social
condition in which they are divested of the social status that they seem to value more than life
itself” (552). This is true across all coercive government forces in this study and the racial
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nation-states they are defending: whether it be through cultural conquest like the campaign of
assimilation which China is currently wagging, or through physical conquest such as the literal
murder of the Rohingya in Myanmar, governments and their coercive forces in each country in
this study are conducting wars against their racial and religious minority populations. These wars
are key to defending the authority of the government and are how each governing force in Chile,
China, and Myanmar continue to gain support from their racial majority citizens: fearful of a loss
of status, and also invested in their own economic and social prosperity, racial majority citizens
in all of these nations see the coercive forces of the state as legitimate as they help to maintain
their own cultural domination. The alternative, racial and religious equity and power-sharing and
thus a demise in their status is to be resisted by every means possible.
Once again, the importance of power and force to build and sustain a racial state cannot
be overstressed. Returning to discussions in this work of the thought of Foucault, I would argue
that it is through wielding of power that the state is able to gain legitimacy; power and a display
of force helps governing bodies defend racial hierarchies and work to maintain their authority
and position on top of society. Were governments not to use coercive forces and efforts such as
police in Chile or re-education camps in China, I predict that racial hierarchies would not be so
adequately enforced through nations, and subsequently, there would be greater recognition
among the polity of their shared exploitation; there would be greater recognition amongst the
citizen body of their own suffering under state actions and policies, and thus, less government
legitimacy. For instance, what would have happened if the Buddhist polity recognized the
continued dominance of the Tatmadaw during the past six years of democracy, deriving, in large
part, from the persecution of the Rohingya? Would the Buddhist citizen body have stopped
scapegoating the Rohingya to ensure their own status and instead challenged the Tatmadaw’s
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tyranny collectively? And what if the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi challenged racial and
religious narratives of Buddhist superiority and stood up for the Rohingya during democracy?
Would she have lost votes and would the Tatmadaw still have ended up in power, or would
challenging the genocide of the Rohingya been an avenue to confront and then diminish the
Tatmadaw’s continued rule in society? While it is unlikely that Buddhist citizens and the NLD
would have challenged the persecution of the Rohingya and racial narratives in Myanmar during
the past six years of democracy (2015-2021), I again speculate that it was partially in not
recognizing their common subjugation and manipulation by the Tatmadaw during democracy—
their common humanity with the Rohingya--that the Tatmadaw was able to have success in its
most recent coup. Racial narratives and the violent acting on those narratives, I predict, are again
key for those in power to gain and maintain authority, legitimacy, and dominance in society
because the racial majority in nations globally has come to believe so greatly in such narratives.
Yet, it is vital to note that due to an increasingly technological and global society, as well
as the fact that racial narratives in countries are constantly changing to stay potent and to
maintain the racial majority’s position of superiority in societies (Kendi, 2019), that the power of
racial nation-states and their coercive forces are constantly transforming as well. Returning to
Foucault (1995), in modern times, physical punishment has been replaced by other ways of
controlling the body (11). “Punishment of a less immediately physical kind,” he explains, has
given rise to detention, segregation, forced labor, etc. (Foucault, 1995: 8). This can be seen
across Chile and China where fairly nonviolent mechanisms of punishment such as the
detainment of individuals, the use of checkpoints and security, etc. are the main methods of
oppression being deployed against their racialized minority populations; the Tatmadaw is the
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only governing or coercive group in this study predominantly using overt force and lethal actions
like the massacre to suppress their racialized others.
However, just because China and Chile are not murdering their racialized others on a
large, visible scale like the Tatmadaw (for instance, in Chile, only a few Mapuche have been
killed by Chilean police like Camilo Catrillanca and in China, allegations of abuse in reeducation camps remain hidden from the public’s eye), this doesn’t make the consequences of
their non-violent mechanisms of repression any less potent: returning to Pierre Bourdieu
mentioned in the introduction, for instance, and his concept of “symbolic violence,” some force
manifests itself through non-violent mechanisms such as norms or institutionalized way of
behaving that are also effective means of repressing stigmatized groups that are perceived as a
threat (Murphy and Choi, 1997). In fact, this violence can even be more severe as it is “exercised
in formal terms,” meaning that “the force of the universal” is linked to the “force of the official”
(Murphy and Choi, 1997: 103). That is, the symbolic violence the state uses to impose racial and
social hierarchies seems neutral in its application and is thus hidden.198 As a result, racial
hierarchies and state hegemony is left unquestioned and the polity is prevented from recognizing
their shared oppression with racial minority populations. The coercive forces employed by racial
nation-states like Chile and China thus operates via what Murphy and Choi (1997) call “stealth
control” where governments’ condemnation of certain bodies is left unexamined; non-violent
mechanisms of oppression and racial narratives continue and with grave consequences in Chile
and China, even if genocide isn’t being conducted like in Myanmar.
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Ware and Laoutides (2018) similarly argue that conflict “encompasses much more than just physical violence”
(32). “Violence, they argue, “is [also] often structural and psychological” (32). In this sense, symbolic violence is
taking form in the structural, racial hierarchies that are being established in Chile and China.
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In an age of technological advancements and an increasingly global society (Stone and
Rizova, 2014), it is ultimately certain that the methods of repressing racialized others—the
coercive actions of the racial state--will continue to evolve in both symbolically violent and
overtly violent forms. Clearly, coercive methods of oppression will become more sophisticated,
more complex, and likely, more subversive as more countries adopt a democratic form of
government. Further, because racial narratives are also constantly shifting with demographic
changes and the massive population movements that have begun in response to climate change,
mechanisms of coercion will likewise continue to evolve to try to maintain racial state
domination (Appendix 34) (Goldberg, 2002). The two, racial narratives and the use of force to
maintain such hierarchies, will ultimately have to continue to mutate and modernize jointly in
order to continue to uphold state authority, or perhaps a governing body’s authority will collapse
completely. As seen in the case of the Tatmadaw, mechanisms of oppression can change in short
periods of time due to changes in the political, social, or economic circumstances of a country. I
would argue that all of the mechanisms of state coercion analyzed in this study will similarly
evolve to ensure that their racial minority populations remain oppressed; I speculate that
government coercion and racial narratives in these three countries will continue to evolve and
transmute in order to maintain governing bodies’ racial nation-states and their authority in
society entirely.
…
Conclusion

Implications of the Racial Nation-state for Chile, China, and Myanmar, and the
Prediction of a Globally Racist Society
In this study, the racial nation-states of Chile, China, and Myanmar have been analyzed
and how governing bodies (or regimes such as Myanmar’s case) use racial narratives and
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government coercion to ostracize whole groups based on skin color and what has been deemed
innate differences to gain government legitimacy. First looking at the unique histories of these
three countries and how they each came to build racial narratives of their ethnic, indigenous, and
religious minority groups as racially different, inferior, and dangerous, this thesis has argued that
race serves as the most stigmatizing force to oppress population segments of a country and to
gain the political support of the racial majority in each country. Drawing back to author Isabel
Wilkerson’s book, Caste: The Origins of Our Discontents, the creation of racialized groups can
easily serve as racial scapegoats who are disempowered and easily blamed for their own
situations, for the problems of a country, and who are portrayed as a threat to the dominant racial
majority. In her chapter “A Scapegoat to Bear the Sins of the World,” Wilkerson (2020)
summarizes:
In a caste system, whether in the United States or in India or in World War II Germany,
the lowest caste performed the unwitting role of diverting society’s attention from its
structural ills and taking the blame for collective misfortune...the scapegoat unwittingly
helps unify the favored castes to be seen as free of blemish as long as there is a visible
disfavored group to absorb their sins…[they] become necessary for the collective
wellbeing of the castes above it and the smooth functioning of the caste system (191).
Racial scapegoats distract dominant racial groups from recognizing that they have much more in
common with racialized groups than they have been led to believe; racial scapegoats and racial
narratives divert their attention from the fact that they share a common humanity with those
labeled “terrorists” or “enemies” in societies and that they too are being exploited and
manipulated by governing bodies who have used racial narratives to garner their own authority
and legitimacy in society.
Kendi (2019) similarly argues that racial narratives also distract the polity from the real
source of their discontent: the state and its policies. He writes:
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The history of racist ideas is the history of powerful policymakers erecting racist policies
out of self-interest, then producing racist ideas to defend and rationalize the inequitable
effects of their policies, while everyday people consume those racist ideas, which in turn
sparks ignorance and hate (Kendi, 2019: 230).
The root of racist ideas that is, lie in governing bodies who are interested in maintaining their
own success and superiority at the expense of everybody. Seen in the Chilean government who is
upholding neoliberal policies that work to exploit Arauncanía at the expense of the Mapuche;
seen in the CCP who advocates for national harmony, but in reality, is trying to build a Han
centered national identity where all expressions of Uyghur identity are eliminated completely;
and as seen in Myanmar where the Tatmadaw used racial narratives to first establish Buddhist
national identity following the end of British colonial rule in 1948 and who continued to prey on
such narratives to continue to establish dominance throughout Myanmar’s recent phase of
democracy (2015-2021), all governing bodies in this study have profited immensely from racial
narratives that garner the support of the racial majority citizen body.
Furthermore, and as just mentioned, not only do racial narratives help governments gain
legitimacy in society, but they also simultaneously divide large sections of the polity who could
serve as allies. Racist ideas and the racial narratives of all three of these countries, positing the
Rohingya, the Uyghurs, and the Mapuche as different, ultimately obscure the shared humanity
present across all population segments of the country and thus hinder the possibility of collective
demand for greater citizen prosperity. Racist ideas and narratives are ultimately extremely
effective in hiding the manipulation of those seeking power and success in society under a veil of
local animosities.
For example, beyond the obvious--the literal dehumanization and repression of racial
minority groups in each country--such maintenance of racial hierarchies in each country in this
study has profound consequences for all citizens in these societies. As mentioned previously,
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because of the robust racial narratives in Myanmar, the Buddhist polity couldn’t see their shared
exploitation with the Rohingya which allowed, in part, for the Tatmadaw to continue
manipulating them during democracy; in Chile, racial narratives prevent the Chilean majority
from recognizing their common suffering with the Mapuche under neoliberal policies that favor
corporations and the privatization of basic services which has led to Chile being the most
economically unequal society in South America (Zibechi and Ryan, 2012: 117) 199; and in China,
the Han Chinese polity fails to recognize the dangerous control and surveillance the CCP is
increasingly having on society; control that is ultimately leading to their own limited liberties
and freedom of speech in Chinese society. Each polity of the three countries are once more being
exploited by their country’s governing body, and yet, racial narratives prevent these very peoples
from recognizing their common humanity.200 All the while, racial minority individuals are being
detained, killed, and denied prosperous living. It is ultimately collective suffering where the
racial majority has been made to believe that they are benefiting, but in reality, only governing
bodies who are constructing racial hierarchies are profiting.201
Important in this study are not only the racial narratives of each individual country, but
also a global racism—a global rise of racial narratives and the exclusion and repression of certain
groups based on their skin color and proclaimed physical difference--which shapes not only
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Today, Chile is the second most unequal country in South American following Brazil (Zibechi and Ryan, 2012:
117).
200
Racial narratives ultimately have collateral consequences across societies, and yet like many forms of
government coercion, they remain hidden, subversive, and cloaked in legitimacy.
201
Even if it appears like the racial majority of these nations are thriving under racial state policies, as just
described, they are really suffering in the long term as racial narratives prevent them from seeing their own
exploitation and manipulation by the state. To return to a quote from Lyndon B. Johnson used at the beginning of
this study, “If you can convince the lowest white boy that he is better than the best colored man, he won’t notice
you’re picking his pockets” (Bottoms, 2019: 16). The racial majority, under racial narratives, are prevented from
recognizing the ways in which governing forces are picking their own pockets and are depriving them of prosperity.
Plus, the racial majority becomes blind to how governing forces have manipulated them into dehumanizing and
denouncing whole segments of a population that could serve as community.
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individual nation-states like Chile, China, and Myanmar, but also the web of international
cooperation and competition that characterizes our world. As the world becomes increasingly
connected with technology, easier means of travel, and a rise of material trade and cultural
exchange, I speculate that global racial narratives are starting to impact nation-states across the
world and how governing forces gain authority and legitimacy; I predict that a common anti-dark
persecution of individuals globally is influencing national manifestations of state building and
local expressions of discrimination and hate across the world. Increasing connectivity, I further
hypothesize, is leading to the greater convergence and universality of the methods of oppression
or coercion that governing bodies in racial nation-states globally are using to enforce racial
narratives in their individual countries. I predict that as a part of methods of oppression
transforming in modern society, that more and more racial nation-states are going to partner with
one another to enforce global racial narratives. For, as Goldberg (2020) states, “Racial states are
elaborated, reproduced, extended, and sustained...in virtue of their relative positioning in the
establishment of a complex global arrangement” (132). He continues to state, “Racial states
anywhere are shored up in larger or smaller ways, more or less directly, by their connectedness
to racial states everywhere” (Goldberg, 2020: 133). I hence predict we are moving to a racially
repressive world where racial ideologies and government coercion to enforce those ideologies
are converging, being adapted and being exported across societies for those in power to further
solidify or gain dominance and to enforce racial hierarchy.
For instance, in their book Boats, Borders, and Bases, authors Jenna M. Loyd and Alison
Mountz (2018) discuss the fact that today’s policing has become “transnational” in its deterrence,
detention, and deportation regimes (224). They explain: “Anti-Black racism and practices of
criminalization and exclusion ricochet transnationally across regions and national borders,
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manifesting in tougher asylum procedures and increasingly fortified borderlands” (Loyd and
Mountz, 2018: 224). Succinctly, they call this interrelation a “global apartheid” against
individuals with a darker skin color which is being headed by collective bodies of governmental
coercive forces like police across countries (Loyd and Mountz, 2018).
One way that global apartheid and the increasing interconnectivity of coercive
government forces like police can be seen is in U.S. police operations to train and influence other
police units in Central and South America and the Caribbean (Loyd and Mountz, 2018: 225).
U.S. Customs and Border Patrol’s special forces unit, Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC),
for example, has recently trained border guards in Guatemala and Honduras to repress
immigrants trying to come to the United States (Appendices 99-101) (Loyd and Mountz, 2018:
225). Another U.S. led initiative created in 2007, known as the Mérida Initiative focused on
building a “21st century border” across Mexico, Central America, Haiti, the Dominican
Republic, and the United States (Loyd and Mountz, 2018: 228). Funded by “U.S. congressional
appropriations of $2.5 billion between fiscal years 2008 and 2015,” this initiative worked on
training police forces in foreign areas to repress Central American immigrants from coming to or
leaving their countries to get to the United States (Loyd and Mountz, 2018: 228-229). 202
Professional and technological surveillance equipment were allocated to foreign countries under
this initiative and as a result, new transnational cooperation of repressing racialized others was
established (Loyd and Mountz, 2018: 228-229).

202

For those immigrants who do reach the United States, they reveal, they are often deported by United States
immigration forces themselves who force these immigrants to return to the highly dangerous conditions that they
often flee from. From 2004 to 2012, for instance, they reveal that at least eighty-three people whom the United
States deported were killed upon their return to El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras (222). “These figures,” a
referenced geographer, Elizabeth Kennedy, states, “Tell us that the US is returning people to their deaths in violation
of national and international law. Most of the individuals reported to have been murdered lived in some of the most
violent towns in some of the most violent countries in the world--suggesting strongly that is why they fled” (Loyd
and Mountz, 2018: 222).
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For example, these transnational policing efforts Loyd and Mountz (2018) explain were
established so that the United States could more extensively prevent people who would be
labeled as “dark” or “black” in the United States from entering the country. If the U.S. could
prevent immigrants from entering Mexico (i.e., immigrants from Haiti, the Dominican Republic,
and Central America), the thought train followed that less Latinx immigrants would be crossing
the southern border and that thus, U.S. racial hierarchies could be preserved. United States
border enforcement continues expanding in an effort to spread and uphold global racism and the
exclusion of the racialized other to protect its own racial narratives and its own, white-centered
government and racial nation state. Loyd and Mountz (2018) summarize: “Wherever we look
around the world, we find the United States involved in global policing...directly influencing the
infrastructural design of global apartheid through the racialized containment of human mobility”
(225-226). Here lies the danger of our global society as government coercive cooperation across
countries like transnational police operations are only likely to strengthen in future years with
racialized groups becoming only more oppressed across the world (Appendices 99-101).
Further, beyond the literal infrastructure and mechanisms of policing that are currently
being spread across the globe, so too are racial narratives and an example of racial exclusion that
each racial nation-state is establishing for each other. For instance, although ladened in rhetoric
of unity and homogeneity, China’s repression of the Uyghurs sets a clear example to the
international community of how to repress a whole group of people who have been made to be a
racially and religiously distinct “other”. The same can be said for the United States. Being two of
the world’s largest superpowers or influencers--the United States and China--it is likely that the
CCP’s and the United States government’s repression of racial minority populations has
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established precedent for other countries as to how they can establish their own racial
hierarchies.
For instance, not only did United States education of the “Chicago Boys”--a group of
Chilean economists who came to the United States to study and then returned to Chile where
they greatly influenced then dictator Augusto Pinochet’s adoption of neoliberal policies—
significantly transform Chile’s economy, but Chile’s rhetoric of multi-culturalism—of Mapuche
and other indigenous group’s inclusion with the nation-state even though in reality, the Chilean
government is largely working for their repression—is likely to also have come from the United
States where immigration and diversity is celebrated despite clear racial discrimination and racial
oppression continuing (Drake and Jaksic, 1995: 57-76). Moreover, and as argued in the terrorism
section, the United States’ racial rhetoric of “terrorist,” has intimately influenced the rhetoric and
racial repression of minorities in other countries in this study. Clearly, racial narratives in one
country cannot be viewed in isolation of another, especially seen between Chile, China, and
Myanmar in this study.
Interestingly, when comparing these three countries, another parallel arises within each
country’s general police forces and their violent repression of civilian uprisings in recent years.
Massive protests have recently arisen in all three countries, and all have been met with a
repressive response from each country’s general police force. In Chile, for example, increases in
subway prices in 2019 triggered thousands of protests across the country (Appendix 91) (Munita,
2020). Chile’s general police force, the Carabineros, were deployed to repress such uprisings and
in turn, they executed extreme brutality (Appendix 92) (Bonnefoy, 2019). Thousands of Chilean
protesters were injured due to their brutality and some even lost an eye (Bonnefoy, 2019).
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Similarly, in China, after massive protests took place in Hong Kong in response to
China’s attempt to retain control over judicial proceedings by bringing accused Hong Kong
civilians to be prosecuted in mainland China, Hong Kong police forces violently responded to
combat civilian demonstrations (Appendix 87) (Rasfan, 2019). Tear gas and rubber bullets were
used to disperse crowds, which were then subsequently praised by mainland China as upholding
“law and order” (Feng, 2019). Meanwhile, as previously mentioned, in Myanmar, the Tatmadaw
has responded to recent protests (arising since its coup) with extreme violence, tear gas, and
other oppressive mechanisms (Appendices 85-86) (Stringer, 2021).
Furthermore, in some countries outside of those in this study, racially diverse groups are
banning together to protest state policy and discriminatory and oppressive government coercion
and are being met with police brutality. As seen in the United States, whites, blacks, Latinx
individuals, and people across all racialized groups have recently banned together earlier this
year to protest police brutality (Black, 2020; Moore, 2020). After the police killing of a black 46year-old man named George Floyd in May 2020, people across the country went to the streets to
support the current Black Lives Matter movement and to protest the U.S. racial hierarchies more
generally (Appendix 88) (Black, 2020). Such protests were met with severe police brutality as
United States general police forces (and the National Guard) used tear gas, batons, and other
violent means to break up protesters (Appendices 89-90) (Blake, 2020; Trinca, 2020). Taken
together with the just mentioned violent police response to protests in Chile, China, and
Myanmar, this deployment of general police and military in the U.S. to suppress these 2020
protests adds to the idea that governing bodies globally are now going to a greater extent to
maintain their authority and racial narratives in society. As citizens begin to organize
collectively, or, as in the case of the United States, begin to ally with their racial minority groups,
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it appears that governing bodies across these countries are now willing to exert violence and
government coercive forces more extensively: on the racial majority, not just the racialized
minority, who are threatening government dominance and racial state building through protest.
Importantly, these protests also suggest that a recognition of collectivity—a connection that
extends beyond racial narratives—is also taking place in some countries like the United States.
Ultimately, it is important to note that this study is limited in its analysis of racial nationstates globally. This study has focused on racial narratives promoted by governing bodies in
Chile, China, and Myanmar, and how these narratives manifest through physical and symbolic
peripheries, rhetoric of terrorism, and government coercion and methods of oppression to enforce
such narratives. Yet, it is clear that a plethora of other consequences result under the racial
nation-state such as education gaps, wealth inequalities, mental health consequences for both
racial minority and racial majority populations, and citizen violence amongst other
consequences. This study is just a start at analyzing the racial nation-state and how racism
impacts entire countries and the ways in which governing bodies attempt to gain legitimacy in
society through the construction of race and through force to materialize those narratives. While
this study is limited in its generalizability as only three nations—Chile, China, and Myanmar—
were analyzed, I ultimately predict that similar conditions can be found in racial nation-states
and their governing bodies in countries across the world. Ultimately, I predict that a globally
racist society will continue and that similar racial nation-states will continue to arise globally,
until the perpetuation of modern colonialism and the domination of racialized bodies is
confronted across societies.
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Appendix
Appendix 1

(Left: Saavedra, César,
2020; Right: T., Roberto
Neira, 2019)

Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco (CAM) and Mapuche leader, Héctor Llaitul (left), and murdered
Mapuche leader Camilo Catrillanca (right). Both appear darker than Chilean political members
seen below, which has been used as a stigmatization of difference and a justification of
oppression by the Chilean government throughout time.

Appendix 2

(“Five Chilean Presidents since 1990”, 2010)

President Sebastián Piñera (middle) with former
presidents Ricardo Lagos (far left), Michelle
Bachelet (second from the left), Patricio Aylwin
(second from the right), and Eduardo Frei RuizTagle (far right) in 2010. All of these past and
former Chilean presidents pass as light or “white.”

Appendix 3
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(Gutiérrez, 2016).

Even dictator Augusto Pinochet (in power from 1974-1990)
passed as white.

Appendix 4

(Left: Lluch, 2008; Right:
“Uno Por Uno, Quiénes
Son…”, 2021)

Current president of Chilean timber and gas company, COPEC (Compañía de Petróleos de
Chile), Roberto Angelini Rossi (left), and current Chief Executive Director of Chilean pulp and
paper company, CMPC (Compañía Manufacturera de Papeles y Cartones), Francisco Ruiz-Tagle
Edwards (right). Like the prominent Chilean politicians displayed above, these Chilean
businessmen also pass as white. These businessmen importantly invest and influence Chilean
politics and are invested in the persecution of the Mapuche for the success of their timber
companies in Arauncanía.
Appendix 5

(Top Left: “Ilham
Tohti”; Top right:
“Uyghurs and Other
Turkic Muslims…”;
Bottom left: Morley,
2020)
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Ilham Tohti, an arrested Uyghur activist and
scholar, is shown in the top left photo. To the
top right, Uyghur citizens hold up images of
disappeared loved ones and to the bottom left,
two Uyghur women walk by Chinese security
guards and police forces in fear of persecution.
In all of these photos, the Uyghurs clearly
present differently than the Han majority seen
below and possess a darker skin tone.

Appendix 6

(Left: “Profile: China's President Xi
Jinping”, 2018; Right: “Chen
Wenqing, Minister …”, 2019)

General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and President of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC), Xi Jinping (left), and Minister of State Security (MSS), Chen
Wenqing (right). Both are Han Chinese, and both pass as lighter than their Uyghur counterparts
seen above.

Appendix 7

(“Chen Quanguo -- Member of Political…”, 2017)

CCP Regional Party Secretary of Xinjiang, Chen Quanguo. Quanguo
brought the creation of “re-education” camps (detention camps) to
Xinjiang when he became the regional party secretary in 2016, and he
also increased security measures in Xinjiang significantly (Zenz and
Leibold, 2020). Like Xi Jinping and Chen Wengqing pictured above,
Chen Quanguo is Han Chinese and also passes as light.
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Appendix 8

(Left: Thu,
2017, Middle:
Faulder, 2021,
Right: Htet,
2015)

State Counsellor of Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi (left), Tatmadaw Commander-in-chief and
recent junta leader, Min Aung Hlaing (middle), and Buddhist monk and member of the
nationalist organization Ma Ba Tha (right). All of these actors have been vital in the oppression
of the Rohingya, and all of these leaders pass as light, especially when compared to the
Rohingya, shown below.
Appendix 9

Rohingya who all appear darker than the Buddhist
monks and Buddhist political figures featured
above.
(Left Top: Hosseini; Left Bottom: “Rohingya People in
Myanmar: What You Need to Know”, 2017; Right Top:
“'Violates International Human Rights Law': UN On
Myanmar's Treatment of Rohingya.”, 2019)

Appendix 10
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(Kuhn, 2012)

State Counsellor and leader of the National League of Democracy
(NLD) (who led Myanmar before the recent military coup d’état),
Aung San Suu Kyi, receiving the Nobel Peace Prize for her protests
against the military in the 1990s (Kuhn, 2012). Although hailed a
human rights champion for her protests against the Tatmadaw and
her efforts bringing Myanmar to a democracy (2015-2021), during
her leadership with the NLD in democracy, she refused to speak
out against the genocide being committed against the Rohingya and
instead supported it (Wade, 2017). In recent years, some people
have advocated to revoke this award from her because of her lack
of protection for the Rohingya (Kuhn, 2012).
Appendix 11
(Top Left: “National Flag of the Republic of
China…”, 2006; Top Right: Arqoi, 2012;
Bottom: “Republic of China Flags”, 2005)

Ideas of five races existing in harmony in
China were depicted in a five-colored
flag (top left) during the Republic of
China. Each colored strip represented
a different race/ethnic group/minzu in
China, red being the Han, yellow
being the Manchus, blue being the
Mongols, white being the Muslims,
and black being the Tibetans. The
physical location of these racial
groups is depicted in the map of China
to the upper right. The lower painting
then portrays the five races existing
and thriving in harmony, with the
message, “Long live the union,”
written across the bottom. Although
these ideas were initially rejected
when CCP leader, Mao Zedong, took
leadership in 1949 and the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) was subsequently established, in recent years, the CCP has readopted
propaganda of racial and ethnic unity to put forth an idea of one homogenous Chinese nation;
this propaganda of ethnic and racial harmony is again key for its racial state building project and
means to gain government authority and legitimacy.
Appendix 12
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(“China: Religious
Affiliation”)

This graph shows how as of 2010, a little over a half of China’s population claimed that they are
non-religious or unaffiliated with a religion. The graph further shows that those who adhere to
Islam make up one of the smallest percentages of China’s population (1.8%). The Uyghurs’
practice of Islam, in part, could account for why the CCP wishes to suppress them and elide their
differences, despite claiming that it is devoted to a united nation.

Appendix 13
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(Cook, 2017)

This map further supports the idea
that the Uyghurs are persecuted
because of their religious practices.
Seen here, Xinjiang, where most of
the Uyghurs live, has a very high rate
of religious persecution along with
Tibet. The areas depicted in light
orange and yellow show where the
majority of the Han Chinese live, and
not coincidentally, where there is the
smallest amount of religious
persecution.
Appendix 14

(“Ethnic Composition: 2010.”)

The Han Chinese majority makes up the majority of China’s population by far and away. As
seen here, nearly 92% of China’s population in 2010 registered as Han Chinese, while minorities
comprised only 8.4% of the population. This 8.4% (the categories “other” and “Zhuang”, another
ethnic minority group, as depicted above) represents China’s 55 ethnic minority groups, or
minzus, including the Uyghurs.

Appendix 15
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(“Ethnic Groups in China”)

A photo of the 55 ethnic groups, or minzus in
China, excluding the Han Chinese majority
(there are 56 ethnic groups including the Han
majority). The 55 groups include: “the Achang,
Bai, Bonan, Bouyei, Blang, Dai, Daur, Deang,
Dong, Dongxiang, Dulong, Ewenki, Gaoshan,
Gelao, Hani, Hezhe, Hui, Jing, Jingpo, Jinuo,
Kazak, Kirgiz, Korean, Lahu, Li, Lisu, Luoba,
Manchu, Maonan, Menba, Miao, Mongolian,
Mulao, Naxi, Nu, Oroqen, Ozbek, Pumi, Qiang,
Russian, Salar, She, Shui, Tajik, Tatar, Tibetan,
Tu, Tujia, Uigur, Wa, Xibe, Yao, Yi, Yugur,
Zhuang” (“Ethnic Groups in China”). It is
important to note that like the Uyghurs (who
are included in this depiction), that most of
these ethnic groups also have darker skin tones.
This gives rise to the question, are these ethnic
groups racialized as well? Are they persecuted
based on race as well as their religious and
cultural differences? Another study would have to explore such inquiries, but these photos again
show how ethnic minority groups like the Uyghurs present as different from the Han Chinese
majority depicted above.

Appendix 16
(“Location of Region Araucanía in Chile”, 2017)

The geographic location of Araucanía region: the Mapuche’s ancestral
lands. While it may look like Arauncanía resides in the middle of the
nation, not the periphery, because Chile is such a long country, it is
largely imagined by the Chilean citizen body and Chilean government
as existing on the physical peripheries of Chile (Richards, 2013).
Furthermore, like the other counties in this study, the Mapuche have
been positioned as a metaphorical peripheral group and are viewed as
a group who needs to be maintained in this symbolically excluded
position (as a racialized other) by the Chilean government and its
coercive forces.
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Appendix 17

(Top: “Rakhine State”, 2020; Bottom: Asrar and
Smith, 2017)

The geographic location of the Rakhine State, where the majority of the Rohingya reside in
Myanmar. As seen in the left photo, the Rakhine state exists on the physical peripheries of
Myanmar, geographically isolated from the center. Then, as seen in the right depiction, the
Rohingya are also separate from the majority ethnic, religious, or racial identity: the Bamar
ethnic group (the Buddhists) who are depicted in light blue.

Appendix 18
(Ware and Laoutides, 2018)

A photo taken from Ware and
Laoutides’ (2018) book, Myanmar’s
Rohingya Conflict, where the
Rohingya’s symbolic position on
Myanmar’s peripheries is depicted
(141). As seen, Ware and Laoutides
(2018) position the Rohingya—
labeled here as “Muslim”—on the
outer rings of this centric diagram
where they are persecuted by the
government (the NLD), the
Tatmadaw (the military), and
Rakhine Buddhist civilians. They
call this the “tripartite nature of the
Rakhine State conflict” where all
three of these actors are actively
invested in the Rohingya’s
oppression (141). This visual also shows that Rakhine Buddhists are not fully incorporated into
Myanmar’s core metaphorical identity (in the fact that they don’t have full self-determination
221

and recognition in society) which could possibly explain why they are invested in repressing the
Rohingya: so that they too do not end up in such a far and isolated metaphorical periphery.
Appendix 19
(“Jingpo People”, 2021)

Interestingly, during General Ne Win’s military regime in the
late 20th century, an effort to get non-Rohingya peoples to
convert to Buddhism and to move to the Rakhine state was
initiated; Wade (2015) reveals that poor Christian children
were given food and access to Na Ta La schools in the
Rakhine state in exchange for converting to Buddhism. It is
likely that Christian peoples were chosen for conversion
because the Muslim-Buddhist divisions in Myanmar had
already been established, but it is also possible that because
Christians were often lighter skinned or Euroasians that they
were chosen for conversion because they could better fit in
with what Wade (2017) calls the “Buddhist race.” Yet, while
favored and converted during this time, today, Christian
minority groups such as the Jingpo people in the Kachin State
are now persecuted by the Tatmadaw, just like the Rohingya (“Myanmar”, 2021). This suggests
the power of religion in motivating government persecution, and how religion often motivates
government suppression beyond or with race.
Appendix 20

(Dapice and Xuan Thanh,
2013)

Myanmar’s economy is primarily resource based, relying on the extraction of resources such as
jade, gas, minerals, and other materials for profit and stability (Dapice and Xuan Thanh, 2013:
5). The Rakhine state is especially rich in natural resources, which encourages the Tatmadaw to
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exploit the region for its own profits; capitalist pursuits actively shape and motivate Tatmadaw’s
violent repression of the Rohingya and their domination of the Rakhine state.
Appendix 21
(Motaher, 2019)

International actors such as China
also have interest in the economic
exploitation of the Rakhine state. For
instance, China has built a pipeline
through the Rakhine state in order to
transport extracted oil from the
Rakhine state and the Middle
East/Africa back to China (Motaher,
2019: 8-12).
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Appendix 22

(The United Nations Human
Rights Council, Forty-Second
Session, 2019: 23).

This figure depicts
Tatmadaw leadership in the
Myanmar Economic
Holdings Limited (MEHL),
one of its main economic
organizations. As can be
seen, the Tatmadaw
occupies the majority of
leadership and executive
positions in this
organization; it is truly an
economic organization run
by and for the Tatmadaw.

Appendix 23
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(Motaher, 2019)

Motaher (2019) shows the number of Rohingya displaced in three areas in the Rakhine state—
Buthidaung, Maungdaw, and Rathedaung--after the Tatmadaw’s “clearance operations” in 2017
and 2018. The Tatmadaw deployed these operations with the intention of completely removing
the Rohingya from the Rakhine state and to do so, they used techniques of burning villages,
demolishing structures, and then completely eliminating towns with bulldozers (Motaher, 2019:
17-18). As seen above, thousands of structures in the Rakhine state were destroyed by such
efforts and nearly half (40%) of all villages in these three areas were affected. Following these
operations, thousands of Rohingya were both displaced to Bangladesh and other foreign areas or
placed in internally displaced person camps in the Rakhine state (Motaher, 2019).
Appendix 24

(Left: “China Convicts Uighurs in Sham
Trials at Xinjiang Camps.”; Right:
“General Ethnic Population of China”,
2012)

Xinjiang, the region where the
majority of Uyghurs reside (see
map to the right where the Uyghurs
are labeled as a “Turkic” ethnic
group in dark pink) is also located
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on China’s geographical periphery. Physically isolated from dominant cities like Beijing and the
Han majority in general (represented in blue in the right map), Chinese coercive forces such as
surveillance and re-education camps have been deployed by the CCP as a means to control this
physically isolated area, and as a means of suppressing the Uyghurs’ religious, ethnic, and
cultural differences; the CCP is again trying to maintain a homogeneous, Han Chinese national
identity by controlling the physical periphery of Xinjiang and by attempting to eliminate the
Uyghurs’ symbolic peripheral location as a distinct racial, religious, and religious group entirely.

Appendix 25
(“Silk Road”)

Historically, Xinjiang
was located along the
Silk Road which
transported goods from
China to the West (“Silk
Road.” Encyclopædia
Britannica). Today, the
CCP is trying to convert
it into a modern Silk
Road, and a key place
for trade with Central
Asia and Europe
(Laurelle and Peyrouse,
2012: 54).
Appendix 26

(“Panoramic View of Kashgar Old City”,
2012)

Kashgar Old City, a historically
important homeland of the Uyghurs,
is represented to the left before the
CCP headed demolition projects in
this region from 2009-2011. The
majority of these houses were
destroyed in these operations and
most were Uyghur homes (Reger
and Szadiewski, 2012).
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Appendix 27
(“Officials from Xinjiang and Shanghai view the
model for a Shanghai-funded commercial
development in Kashgar”, 2012)

As Kashgar Old City was demolished, CCP
officials met in 2010 to develop a “five-year
plan” to develop Xinjiang. As seen in this
photo, commercial development and large
housing complexes were planned to replace
Uyghur homes in Kashgar (Reger and
Szadiewski, 2012). All of these development
strategies were dictated by CCP officials in
the symbolic core of the country (i.e.,
Beijing) who sought to make China a
homogeneously Han Chinese nation.
Appendix 28

(“Image illustrating
the extent of
Kashgar Old City
demolitions”,
2012)

A map
representing the demolition projects of Kashgar Old City. Each color represents the different
times in which each section was demolished (or was being demolished). Although each section
was demolished at different times, all were demolished by 2011 and all represent majority
Uyghur areas (Reger and Szadiewski, 2012).
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Appendix 29

(“Uyghurs walk against a backdrop of new and
old Kashgar”, 2012)

The aftermath of the demolition projects
in Kashgar city. In this photo, two
Uyghurs walk by what was once their
home and city (Reger and Szadiewski,
2012).
Appendix 30

(“A woman sits atop the ruins of a demolished home
in Kashgar Old City”, 2012)

Another image of the demolished homes in
Kashgar Old City. This woman is amongst
the numerous displaced Uyghurs after these
demolition projects conducted by the CCP
(Reger and Szadiewski, 2012).

Appendix 31

(“The demolition in Hotan”, 2012)

One last image of a destructed Xinjiang
city, Hotan, while construction of new
housing and business complexes commence
behind the demolished homes (Reger and
Szadiewski, 2012).

Appendix 32
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(“Xinjiang Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian
and Shanghai Party Secretary Yu Zhengsheng
in photo-op with anju fumin residents in
Kashgar Prefecture”, 2012)

During the CCP demolition projects,
CCP propaganda made it seem like the
Uyghurs were satisfied with the CCP’s
economic development projects (Reger
and Szadiewski, 2012). For instance,
one TV network, Tianshan Net,
showed Uyghur residents of Kargilik
County, Xinjiang giving support for
these projects and the new homes they
had been displaced to. One Uyghur
woman, for instance, was filmed on this network and stated, “Now many of my neighbors who
come to see my house say that it’s really good, and they want to have their own house built in the
same way” (Reger and Szadiewski, 2012). Another Uyghur resident was then featured who
similarly stated, “The house I lived in before was made of mud bricks--I am so thankful, and I
am so happy, that Guangdong helped us build these pretty new houses” (Reger and Szadiewski,
2012: 39-40). Of course, these statements did not represent the feelings the majority of Uyghurs
who lost their houses and many vital aspects of their culture in the demolition projects. Yet, by
promoting these statements, the CCP could continue portraying a false image that they were
helping the Uyghurs; the CCP could continue to hide their real intentions of eliminating Uyghur
expression and Uyghur culture from China completely.
Appendix 33
(“The modification works of Heijiashan
district Urumqi---harmonious and
beautiful home of the whole people of all
nationalities”, 2012)

New development and housing
structures in Urumqi—the capital
of Xinjiang--as a result of the Great
Western Development Project
(GWDP). It is important to note
that new development was initiated
in this area shortly after protests
and unrest occurred here in 2009
when Uyghurs protested their
oppression by the CCP (Reger and
Szadiewski, 2012: 40-41). In this sense, development can be seen as a means to squander Uyghur
resistance and to again, ensure the domination of the CCP.
Appendix 34
229

(Capps, et. al., 2019)

From Capps et al. (2019) report,
From Control to Crisis: Changing
Trends and Policies Reshaping U.S.Mexico Border Enforcement, this
map shows how climate change and
drought are especially impacting
Central American areas such as
Guatemala, Honduras, and El
Salvador. Labeled the “dry corridor”
and represented in dark green in the
map, these areas are becoming so
dried up that many farmers are
unable to use the soil or produce any
crops anymore (15-17). The start of
the drought in 2014 to 2015, Capps
et al. (2019) explain, corresponds to
when huge flows of Central
American immigrants began
immigrating to the United States out of necessity; thousands of Hondurans, El Salvadorans, and
Guatemalans were forced to migrate because of climate change. More immigrants are only likely
to keep migrating and getting displaced from this area as climate change gets worse in the future.
Appendix 35
(“La Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco y Su
Vocero, Héctor Llaitul…”, 2020)

Mapuche leader, Héctor Llaitul,
being arrested under false evidence
planted on his phone during
“Operación Huracán.” During this
operation, a Chilean secret police
operation in Arauncanía,
Specialized Operational
Intelligence Unit (UIOE), arrested
and detained Llaitul and eight other
Mapuche leaders based on incriminating evidence and false messages the police had placed on
their phones themselves. Although Llaitul and other Mapuche leaders were eventually released,
the subversive methods of Chilean secret policing and of Chilean government coercion is starkly
revealed with this operation.

Appendix 36
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(Sepúlveda, Dec. 2018)
The house in Temuco where the Specialized
Operational Intelligence Unit (UIOE) operated
Operación Huracán and their telephone wiretapping in
the area more broadly. Ironically, it was a group of
Chile’s general police, the Carabineros, who
surrounded the house and raided it after suspicion
arose around this unit, in an attempt to find the illegal
hard drives that this operation was storing tapped
telephone information on (Sepúlveda, Dec. 2018). The UIOE, however, took this hard drive with
them when they vacated the house, so the Carabineros did not find much evidence of their illegal
activities (Sepúlveda, Dec. 2018). Interestingly, however, the UIOE was again tapping into a
broad range of people’s phones, not just the Mapuche (Sepúlveda, Dec. 2018). This gives light to
the idea that in some cases, government coercive forces like secret police are starting to surveil
all citizens to ensure racial state domination more generally.

Appendix 37

(Sepúlveda, Dec. 2018)

Photos of the fake Facebook profile that UIOE
made during Operación Huricán. As seen in the
bottom left of the left photo where there is a
Mapuche flag in the post, UIOE pretended to be
a Mapuche man in this profile in order to get
Mapuche leaders to accept the friend request and
to then in an attempt to try to steal their
passwords and get inside information on their movements. Social media is a large way that
government coercive forces gather information across all of these countries.
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Appendix 38

(Sepúlveda, Nov. 2018)

Once suspicion arose as to the legitimacy of the telephone messages in Operación Huracán,
Héctor Llaitul and his son Ernesto (along with the other accused Mapuche) were released from
detention. Even though they were released, they had been in detention for over a month before
evidence was contested (Sepúlveda, 2018). Also, this was not Héctor’s first time being detained
or imprisoned by Chilean secret police forces; he was arrested and detained several times before
under counter terrorism legislation which is commonly applied to Mapuche leaders as means to
incapacitate their movements for autonomy from the Chilean state.
Appendix 39

(Left: Sepúlveda, Nov. 2018; Right: (Sepúlveda and González, 2021)

After the operation, the Director of Intelligence, General Gonzalo Blu (left), was fired, as well as
the General Director of the Carabineros at the time, Bruno Villalobos (right) (Sepúlveda and
González, 2021). Although these two officers were fired, this Specialized Operational
Intelligence Unit (UIOE) and the Chilean general police force, the Carabineros, continue
operating and discriminating against the Mapuche even in the absence of their leadership
(Sepúlveda and González, 2021); Chilean police and their arrest and detention of the Mapuche
continues to be key in the Chilean government’s suppression of the Mapuche.
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Appendix 40
(“'Jungle Command': Piñera…”, 2018)

Although President Sebastián Piñera would
later deny the existence of another special
police operation in Arauncanía, the Jungle
Commando, or Comando Jungla, in June
2018, he gave a speech to the nation where
he introduced the creation and deployment
of this force to Arauncanía. In the speech, he
stated, “We created a special force of
Carabineros that has been prepared in Chile
and abroad to improve the effectiveness of
our police in the fight against terrorism”
(“'Jungle Command': Piñera…”, 2018). A
photo of this speech was then posted on his
Twitter account as seen here. The creation of
the Jungle Commando was to specifically
target the Mapuche who have been
consistently labeled terrorists in recent years.
Appendix 41
(“'Jungle Command': Piñera…”, 2018)

In the same speech, President Piñera then
claimed that this specialized police force,
the Jungle Commando (Comando Jungla),
would be “endowed with ‘the best and most
modern, most innovative, in terms of
technology, with armored vehicles to protect
them better, because a protected police is a
more effective police’” (“'Jungle
Command': Piñera…”, 2018). He further
went on to explain that the Jungle
Commando would have “two Tundra trucks,
two Mowag cars, drones and special uniform to move in forests” as well as “20 thermographic
night viewers, and…[a] ‘GPS Spot’, positioning devices to know the location and displacement
of the police on the basis of geographic coordinates and signal via satellite” (“'Jungle Command':
Piñera…”, 2018). Clearly, this force was highly technological which led many Mapuche to view
Jungle Commando as evidence that President Piñera was “militarizing” or going to war with
Arauncanía. In response and upon implementation of this force to the region, one general of the
force still claimed that “this is not related to the Mapuche people.” Yet, four months later, the
Jungle Commando would go on to kill a Mapuche man, Camilo Catrillanca, and most of its
operations were found to be targeting and surveilling the Mapuche in this region ("El Asesinato
De Camilo Catrillanca y El Movimiento Mapuche En Chile").
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Appendix 42
(PC, Zoe, 2018)

Many Mapuche protested the
Jungle Commando after its
creation, especially after the
murder of Mapuche man, Camilo
Catrillanca, by such forces. This
photo depicts a protest following
Camilo Catrillanca’s murder by
Jungle Commando, and the sign
says, “Jungle Commando,
Bastards, Assassins of the
Chilean State.”

Appendix 43

(Left: “Satellite Imagery of Verified Internment Camps in Xinjiang in February 2020”; Right: Wen and Auyezov,
2018)

Satellite depictions of the various detention camps spread across Xinjiang. As seen, most of the
detention centers in Xinjiang are located in the Taklamakán desert and hence, are very isolated
from the rest of China. The exact number of these facilities is unknown as the CCP does not
release reports on them, nor allow journalists or foreigners to report on them, but a 2020 report
from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) estimates that there are over 380 suspected
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detention facilities present across Xinjiang (Ruser, 2020). Using satellite images, the ASPI and
other journalists have also documented that more high security facilities are being built in recent
years, even as lower security facilities are being taken down (Ruser, 2020).
Appendix 44
(Ruser, 2020)
Satellite image of a new detention facility built in Kashgar, Xinjiang in 2020. According to an
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
report, the facility was built next to a
vocational and technical school in Kashgar
and is “fully surrounded by a 14 metre high
perimeter wall, with 10 metere watchtowers
built on top of the wall at regular intervals”
(Ruser, 2020). The report estimates that this
new facility can accommodate over 10,000
people (Ruser, 2020).
Appendix 45
(Wen and Auyezov, 2018)

Another satellite image of a
detention facility in Korla,
Xinjiang. While hard to
exactly see, this image does
not do justice to the size of this
facility: the upper right square
is the size of an Olympic size
running track.

Appendix 46

(Wen and Auyezov, 2018)

Another detention facility in
Turpan, Xinjiang, at the base
of the Tianshan Mountains.
Although hard to see, the white
line in the middle is a security
wall with guard towers located
behind.
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Appendix 47

(Wen and Auyezov, 2018)

Diagrams from a Reuters 2018 report which
show that the number of detention facilities
in China (what the CCP calls “re-education
centers”) are expanding significantly. Since 2017, there has been a huge spike in the construction
of these facilities and even more construction has occurred in recent years. For instance, an
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) report says that between July 2019 and July 2020, at
least 61 detention sites have seen new construction and expansion—"50% [of which] are higher
security facilities” (Ruser, 2020). Ultimately, the construction of more facilities means the
detention of more bodies.
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Appendix 48

(Wen and Auyezov, 2018)

China’s “re-education” camps or
detention facilities truly mirror high
security prisons. As seen above, guard
towers, barb wire, and huge gates are
common aspects of these detention
facilities.

Appendix 49
(“Detainees in a Political
Education Camp in Lop County,
Hotan Prefecture, Xinjiang”,
2017)

As a part of these “reeducation” or detention
facilities are mandatory
classes or indoctrination
into CCP thinking.
According to a Senate
testimony by Deputy
Assistant Secretary Scott
Busby, former detainees
who have escaped or been
able to leave the camps
have reported on “mandatory classes where detainees are required to recite Communist slogans
and sing songs praising the Chinese Communist Party” (Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary
Scott Busby…, 2018). They further report that failure to comply “leads to beatings and food
deprivations” (Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby…, 2018). The CCP is again
trying to convert the Uyghurs to a Han Chinese identity and is trying to eliminate all signs of
their difference completely through these camps.
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Appendix 50
(“CBP Detains Chinese
Shipment of Suspected
Forced Labor Products
Made with Human Hair”,
2021)

According to a 2021
report by the U.S.
Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), in
July 2020, “U.S.
Customs and Border
Protection (CBP)
officers at the Port of
New York/Newark detained a shipment of products/accessories suspected to be made with
human hair...that originated in Xinjiang, China” (“CBP Detains Chinese Shipment of…”, 2021).
These hair products, they write, composed “almost 13 tons of hair products worth over $800,000
dollars” (“CBP Detains Chinese Shipment of...”, 2021). It is probable, the report goes on to
conclude, that these products were a result of “human right abuses of forced child labor and
imprisonment” (“CBP Detains Chinese Shipment of...”, 2021). That is, all of this hair likely
came from Uyghurs detained in the “vocational” camps in Xinjiang. Such a discovery sheds light
on the atrocities occurring in these facilities, even though the CCP covers up such brutality with
the rhetoric that these camps are merely “re-educating” the Uyghurs.
Appendix 51
(Xu et al., 2020)

In their report, “Uyghurs for Sale,” Xu,
et al. (2020) reveal that after
“graduating” from “re-education
centers” throughout Xinjiang, that
Uyghurs are often transferred to
factories across China to work. By
exploiting the Uyghurs’ forced labor,
the CCP hence economically benefits
from the detention of the Uyghurs along
with the social profit they gain from
these facilities by forcing them to
assimilate to Han Chinese identity and
CCP ideologies.
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Appendix 52
(Xu et al., 2020)

From the same report,
“Uyghurs for Sale,” this
satellite image portrays a
Uyghur detention camp in
Xinjiang called the Jiashi
Vocational School. In this
image, five small
buildings can be seen
under the section labeled
“factory warehouses.” Xu
et al. (2020) emphasize
that these factories are
where detained Uyghurs
are forced to work in this vocational or detention camp, which further reveals how the CCP
profits from the detention of Uyghurs, even at the “re-education” or detention camps themselves.
Appendix 53
(Xu et al., 2020)

The report, “Uyghurs for Sale,”
then shows how the Jiashi
vocational school depicted in the
satellite image above sends
Uyghurs who graduate from its
facilities to the Haoyuanpeng
(HYP) Clothing Company in
Xinjiang which supplies goods
to international companies such
as Adidas, Puma, and Nike as
seen in this graphic. Xu et al.
(2020) further emphasize that
this factory (HYP) is highly
surveilled with “a 3-metre-highfence” surrounding it, guards
located at the entrances, and security posts around the rest of the factory. Further, the president
of the company, Zeng Yifa, told state media that he established the factory in Xinjiang because
of the cheap labor of the Uyghurs. He ultimately stated, “Although the quality of North Korean
workers is good, I’m reluctant to spend money on foreign workers. In the end, I chose Xinjiang.”
Uyghur detention and labor again as capital benefits.
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Appendix 54
(Goodman, Peter S., et al., 2021)

A report from the New York Times earlier this
year (2021) reveals that Uyghur labor is also
essential for China’s cotton industry.
“Xinjiang,” Goodman (2021) writes, referring
to where the majority of Uyghurs in China
again live, “[Is] a rugged expanse more than
twice the size of Texas, [and] holds China’s
largest oil reserves. Its abundant land and
sunshine have made it fertile ground for
cotton.” Uyghur labor is ultimately essential
for the picking of this cotton which further
benefits the profit of the CCP.

Appendix 55

(Goodman, Peter S., et al., 2021)

From the same New York Times article
mentioned above, this photo depicts a textile
factory in Korla, Xinjiang. The CCP again
oppresses the Uyghurs, in part, out of
capitalistic drives to build the material wealth
of the state and to exploit the Uyghurs’ cheap
labor.

Appendix 56

(Wong, 2019)

Images of Chinese security officers and
assistant police officers enforcing border
checkpoints in Hotan, Xinjiang (Wong,
2019). Such methods of oppression are used
to control the Uyghurs who haven’t already
been placed in detention camps.
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Appendix 57
(Zenz and Leibold, 2020: 335)

In their article, “Securitizing
Xinjiang: Police
Recruitment,
Informal Policing and
Ethnic Minority CoOptation,” Zenz and Leibold
(2020) reveal how after
regional party secretary
Chen Quanguo took
leadership in Xinjiang after
2016, that security in
Xinjiang increased
dramatically. Specifically,
Chen Quanguo drastically
increased the number of
convenience police stations
and government checkpoints
in Xinjiang and hired a plethora of assistant police officers to help execute such efforts (as seen
in this diagram in the rise of assistant police jobs advertised in 2017 compared to any year
before). This rise of security was specifically aimed to better surveill the Uyghurs and mirrored
the security measures that Chen Quanguo similarly implemented in Tibet when he was the
regional party secretary there (2011-2016) (Zenz and Leibold, 2020).
Appendix 58
(Zenz and Leibold, 2020: 336)

Zenz and Leibold (2020)
further reveal that the
increase in security and
police during 2017 was
particularly concentrated
in Xinjiang (XUAR) and
rose disproportionately in
this region as compared to
China as a whole. Such
diagram again shows how
surveillance efforts in
China during this time was
specifically focused on
monitoring the Uyghurs.
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Appendix 59

(Zenz and Leibold,
2020: 337)

This chart by Zenz and Leibold (2020) similarly shows how assistant police recruitment was
disproportionately higher in Xinjiang in 2017 than other areas in China such as Guangdong,
Fujian, and Zhejiang. Again, the CCP used methods of surveillance and assistant police officers
as a way to disproportionately monitor the Uyghurs and in an effort to suppress their religious,
ethnic, and racial differences.

Appendix 60
(Mozur, 2018)

Images from presentations that China Electronics
Technology Corporation (C.E.T.C.) have recently
given at industry shows to promote their
technological surveillance (Mozur, 2018). The
CCP uses C.E.T.C.’s security platform to create
massive databases on its civilians and to gather
information on the Uyghurs (Mozur, 2018). The
CCP’s methods of oppression are hence, very
technological and subversive as such efforts occur
without Chinese citizens and the Uyghurs aware
that such information is being collected.
Appendix 61
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(“China Cuts Uighur
Births with IUDs,
Abortion, Sterilization”,
2020)

Detention facilities
are not the only
method of oppression
that the CCP is using
to repress the
Uyghurs. According
to an AP news report,
the CCP is forcing
sterilization onto Muslim women, particularly the Uyghurs (“China Cuts Uighur Births with
IUDs, Abortion, Sterilization”, 2020). The CCP is also pushing for stringent birth control
campaigns to encourage Uyghur women to have less children, and they are distributing fines to
ethnic minority women who have too many children (see below) (“China Cuts Uighur Births
with IUDs, Abortion, Sterilization”, 2020). Despite rhetoric of national unity, the CCP is hence
clearly seeking to remove or limit Uyghur presence in the nation, an effort that detention camps
or “re-education camps” seem to be working for as well.
Appendix 62
(“China Cuts Uighur Births with IUDs, Abortion, Sterilization”,
2020)

A photo of a $2,600 fine (18,400 RMB) given to a
Uyghur woman in Xinjiang for having a third child in
2020. She was detained in a Xinjiang detention camp
for this birth and then was sterilized shortly after her
release (“China Cuts Uighur Births with IUDs,
Abortion, Sterilization”, 2020). With such efforts, the
CCP seems to be working towards a racially or
ethnically pure nation-state where Uyghurs or Uyghur
expression is not present in the nation.
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Appendix 63

(“China Cuts Uighur Births with IUDs, Abortion, Sterilization”, 2020)

Another ethnic minority woman, a Kazakh woman, was also
fined $2685 (17,405 RMB) for having a third child. She reported
that Chinese officials threatened to detain her if she didn’t pay
the fee and that CCP officials made her get an intrauterine
device (IUD) following this child.

Appendix 64
(Watson, et al., 2020)

This diagram shows how
IUD placements are
increasing in Xinjiang in
recent years, while they are
decreasing in the rest of
China (Watson, et al., 2020).
These birth control strategies
(i.e., campaigns encouraging
IUDs and other birth control
devices in Xinjiang) seem to
be a way in which the CCP
can control Uyghur women’s
bodies and prevent their
reproduction--their literal
persistence and regeneration
as a culture--throughout time.
Appendix 65
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(Griffiths, 2021)

Another mechanism of
oppression deployed by the
CCP are widespread
propaganda efforts to
spread Han Chinese and
CCP ideologies throughout
the nation. Here, President
Xi Jinping’s face is
broadcasted on a screen in
Kashgar, Xinjiang.

Appendix 66
(Emerson, 2020)

Myanmar’s
internally displaced
persons camps are
located in the
Rakhine state where
most of the
Rohingya reside.
These camps arose
after interethnic
violence erupted in
2012 when the
Rohingya and the
Rakhine Buddhists
violently clashed in
a series of attacks,
many of which were
triggered by the Tatmadaw (Wade, 2017). After these attacks and the destruction of many
Rohingya villages, thousands of Rohingya were displaced and subsequently fled to Bangladesh
or were segregated in these displacement camps in Myanmar (Emerson, 2020). More Rohingya
were displaced and put in these camps after the Tatmadaw’s 2017 clearance operations (Wade,
2017). Today, these camps are highly controlled and guarded and the Rohingya need to obtain
paperwork to leave the camps. Although not prisons, these camps serve the same purpose of
preventing the Rohingya’s movement and mobility and confining them to a highly surveilled
area.

245

Appendix 67
(Emerson, 2020)

Some satellite images of
Myanmar’s displacement
camps and the villages in which
the Rohingya are confined. A
2020 Human Rights Watch
report from which these images
come from writes that these
camps are not so much for
internally displaced persons
(IDPs), so much, as they are
“open air detention camps”
(Emerson, 2020). In the
Rakhine city of Sittwe (seen
above), for instance, Rohingya
are “surrounded by barbed
wire, checkpoints, and armed police guards under effective lockdown” (Emerson, 2020). Further,
the report discloses that the Rohingya are not given adequate access to food, water, health care,
or sanitation--things that have become especially important during the global pandemic which is
currently occurring (2021).
Appendix 68
(Emerson, 2020)

A photo of one of Myanmar's internally
displaced persons camps which is located in
an area of the Rakhine state called Kyaukpyu.
A 2020 Human Rights Watch report states
that camps and shelters were built here in
2012 and were originally intended to last only
two years. Overtime, they explain, these
camps have “deteriorated over eight monsoon
seasons” (Emerson, 2020). Inadequate
construction of houses and maintenance, they
continue to write, have led to overcrowding,
and a host of human rights violations (Emerson, 2020). In 2018, a UN Assistant Secretary
official described these camps as “beyond the dignity of any people” and again, conditions have
only worsened in recent years as the Rohingya face high rates of malnutrition, waterborne
illnesses, and even death (Emerson, 2020).

Appendix 69
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(Asrar, 2020)

Graphics from a 2020 report from
Al Jazeera and the United Nations
Human Rights Council (UNHCR)
which outlines the extent of the
Rohingya’s displacement since
the 1970s. As seen in this graphic,
hundreds of thousands of
Rohingya have been forcibly
displaced from their homes and
have immigrated to other
neighboring countries since the
1970s. A 2020 Human Rights
Watch report, for instance, notes
that in a Rakhine state city named Sittwe, 75,000 Rohingya resided there in 2012 and now, only
4,000 remain (Emerson, 2020). Forced displacement is again caused by the extensive violence in
the Rakhine state (with violence conducted against the Rohingya by Rakhine Buddhist citizens),
the harsh oppression of the Tatmadaw, and the inhabitable conditions of the displacement camps
and segregated areas where the Rohingya are now forced to live in (Emerson, 2020).
Appendix 70

(Asrar, 2020)

From the same news report, it is
noted that a huge number of the
Rohingya have immigrated to
the Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh
which neighbors the Rakhine
state. Tragically, the Rohingya
who immigrate here often find
themselves in a very similar
situation to the areas they left:
placed in refugee camps that fail
to meet their basic needs (Asrar,
2020).

Appendix 71
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(Asrar, 2020)

A graph from the same report shows that after the Tatmadaw’s clearance operations in 2017,
there are greater numbers of the Rohingya in Bangladesh than there are in Myanmar. A clear
exodus is hence occurring in Myanmar as a result of the Tatamdaw’s violent actions.
Appendix 72

(Saavedra, 2020)

A group of Mapuche protest the Chilean
government and the usurpations of their
lands in 2020.

Appendix 73
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(Torres and France-Presse, 2020)

Meanwhile, trucks and corporations protest
the Mapuche’s attacks and fires which have
targeted their companies in Arauncanía
recently. This photo shows how there are
private actors and transnational companies
invested in the repression of the Mapuche
(as they are protesting for harsher
government response and suppression of
the Mapuche) as well as the Chilean
government.

Appendix 74
(Tym, 2020)

After Mapuche man, Camilo
Cantrillanca, was killed by Jungle
Commando, a secret police force in
Chile, thousands of protests erupted
across the country. Many nonMapuche Chileans joined these
protests, showing Chilean solidarity
with the Mapuche. Today, this
solidarity continues and
Cantrillanca has become a symbol
for the repression of all Chilean
peoples under the state.
Appendix 75
(Hiriart and Colicoy, 2017)

The Mapuche continue to see
themselves and their fate as
separate from the Chilean nationstate. Above, the sign says, “No
somos los indígenas de Chile,
nosotros somos Mapuche,” which
means, “We are not the
indigenous (peoples) of Chile, we
are Mapuche.” As such, Mapuche
are likely to continue fighting for their complete liberation from the Chilean nation-state.
Appendix 76
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(F., Tomás González, 2019)

Mapuche leader Héctor Llaitul (leader of the
Coordinadora de Comunidades en Conflicto
Arauco Malleco-CAM), claims that the
Mapuche have a different path to liberation than
the Chilean nation-state (F., Tomás González,
2019). In an interview with Radio Universidad
de Chile, he stated: “The struggle of the
Mapuche nation has another path, it has a path
of reconstruction of the Mapuche nation, and
within this framework, we consider that the
situation is separate” (F. Tomás González, 2019). This reveals how some Mapuche leaders do
not wish to participate in the process of writing a new constitution because they continue to view
themselves separate from the nation.
Appendix 77

(Karrlsson-Willis, 2014)

Here, the Mapuche are protesting the antiterrorism laws that have been applied
against them by Chilean police and the
Chilean government. Above, the sign says,
“No somos terroristas,” meaning, “We are
not terrorists.” The rest of the sign says,
“Justice and liberty for the Mapuche
prisoners.”

Appendix 78
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(Bartlett, 2020)

Interestingly, even though many Mapuche
leaders and people do not wish to participate
in the new constitution writing process, many
Chileans have been using the Mapuche flag
and symbols in their own protests in recent
years (Bartlett, 2020). Above are Chilean
protesters in 2018, protesting the rise of
subway fares and neoliberal policies in Chile
(Bartlett, 2020). Perhaps the independence
movements of the Mapuche and the Chilean
polity are not so different than the Mapuche
believe--both are fighting against the Chilean
government and the oppressive neoliberal
policies they have in place.
Appendix 79
(Lat, 2021)

Protests have been widespread since the
Tatmadaw threw a coup d’état earlier this
year in Myanmar (2021). The Tatmadaw
has responded to protestors violently and
have killed many people opposing their
rule. It will be interesting to see if the
Buddhist polity finally sees its common
repression with the Rohingya or if they will
continue scapegoating them during this
difficult time.
Appendix 80

(Slotkin, 2021)

Another photo of the protests currently
happening across Myanmar.
Appendix 81
251

(Slotkin, 2021)

Tens of thousands of protesters gathered
in Yangon to again protest the
Tatmadaw’s take over and to order the
release of Aung San Suu Kyi.

Appendix 82
(Handley, 2021)

A group of women in Myanmar wear ball
gowns in what was known as the “princess
protest” in February 2021 to protest the
Tatmdaw’s coup d’état. Clearly, civilians
are finding creative and non-violent ways
to protest the military coup even though
they are being met with a harsh military
response.

Appendix 83
(Handley, 2021)

A man with Aung San Suu Kyi tattooed on his
back protests the military coup. Currently, Aung
San Suu Kyi has become a symbol for
democracy, and yet, it is clear that for Myanmar
to ever truly reach democracy, that more change
will need to take place in Myanmar than that
which she spearheaded these last six years
(2015-2021); it is clear that the Tatmadaw’s
power will need to be debased completely.
Appendix 84
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(Colarossi, 2021)

Health care workers across Myanmar are protesting
the military coup. In the midst of a global pandemic,
some of these health care workers have threatened to
stop working as a form of protest and some have
begun volunteering at charity health clinics after
going on strike (Colarossi, 2021). This three-finger
salute seen in this photo was taken from The Hunger
Games and is being used in protests as a symbol for
freedom from an oppressive state (Colarossi, 2021).
Appendix 85
(Lat, 2021)

Civilians defend themselves against the
Tatmadaw’s violent response to their
protests. The military’s violence is now
being applied against both Rohingya
and Buddhist peoples. The Tatmadaw
must ultimately use violence against
both groups to guard their new military
regime.

Appendix 86
(Stringer, 2021)

Security forces have been deployed
by the Tatmadaw to suppress
protesters in recent months. To the
right in the photo, police can be seen
with huge plastic guards; the same
that were used by the Carabineros, or
Chile’s police force, to violently
repress Chilean protesters these past
two years (see below). Police and
government coercion is starting to
mirror each other across nations in
recent years.
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Appendix 87
(Rasfan, 2019)

Hong Kong police shoot tear gas at Hong Kong
protesters in 2019 as civilians opposed a law
that would have allowed criminal suspects to
be prosecuted in mainland China. The reasons
for protests went beyond this law, however, as
civilians were protesting the CCP’s control and
influence in Hong Kong more generally. The
police’s violent suppression ultimately shows
how CCP government coercion can be applied
beyond the repression of racialized others to
repress citizens challenging state hegemony
more broadly.
Appendix 88
(Moore, 2020)

Latinx protesters join in the Black Lives
Matter protests that erupted this past
summer, 2020, in the United States after a
black man named George Floyd was
murdered by police officers. In this photo,
the sign says: “La policía no me cuida,”
meaning “the police does not take care of
me.” People across all racial groups in the
U.S. are hence finding solidarity with one
another under a common exploitation by
the U.S. government and the United
States’ coercive forces (police).
Appendix 89
(Blake, 2020)

U.S. police responded violently to
the recent protests that broke out
across the nation this past May
2020, after the murder of George
Floyd. Across the nation, police
deployed tear gas, rubber bullets,
and clubs against protestors. This
response mirrors police or military
response to protests in China, Chile,
and Myanmar.
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Appendix 90
(Trinca, 2020)

During the George Floyd protests, former president
Donald Trump deployed federal agents to places such as
Portland, Oregon where widespread demonstrations were
occurring. These federal agents were extremely
subversive and violent in their measures to repress
protesters such as the fact that they drove around in
unmarked vans detaining protesters (Trinca, 2020). In
response, the governor of Oregon, Kate Brown, stated,
“The Trump administration needs to stop playing politics
with people’s lives...we don’t have a secret police in this
country. This is not a dictatorship” (Trinca, 2020).
Appendix 91
(Munita, 2020)

Protests in Chile erupted in 2019 after the Chilean
government raised subway fares by 4% (Holland,
2019). Fed up with the neoliberal policies of the
Chilean state and with the huge levels of income
inequality currently present in the country, more than a
million people gathered in Santiago in the following
days after the increase in fares to protest the Chilean
government (Holland, 2019). Privatization and
deregulation of the economy has ultimately led many
Chilean civilians to be discontent with Chile’s
transition to democracy and continues to make many Chileans, not just the Mapuche, feel like
they are also being exploited by the Chilean government (Richards, 2013).
Appendix 92
(Bonnefoy, 2019)

Chilean police (the Carabineros) responded to protesters
violently and in what often appeared as full military gear
throughout 2019-2020 when Chilean civilians protested
the rise in subway fares and the neoliberal policies of the
state (like the protests seen above). Throughout this
time, the Carabineros were accused of a plethora of
human rights violations such allegations of abuse, eye
injuries, sexual abuse, and torture (Bonnefoy, 2019).
Clearly, Chilean police and the Chilean government also
feel the need to repress not just the Mapuche, but all
civilians threatening state hegemony.
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Appendix 93

(Left:“Uighur Woman
Remains 'Unfree'
despite Release from
Re-Education Camp”;
Right: Tantussi, 2020)

Protests have ensued across the world to denounce the genocide being committed against the
Uyghurs. To the right, two men protest the repression of the Uyghurs in Berlin, Germany, after
China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a visit in 2020. In both photos, the flag of East
Turkestan, an Islamic independent republic that existed in what is now Xinjiang from 19331934, is being used as a current means of protest against Uyghur oppression in China.
Appendix 94
(Alam and Jahan, 2020)

Today, the Rohingya remain extremely
suppressed. To the left are Rohingya refugees in
Cox’s Bazar, a city in Bangladesh, who stand with
masks during the global pandemic which is
currently taking place. One of the first COVID-19
cases was found in a Cox Bazar resettlement camp
last May 15, 2020 and in response, the Bangladesh
government shut down the camp from the rest of
the country, “putting more than 1 million
Rohingya under twenty-four-hour lockdown” (“New Op-Ed: Amid COVID-19, Bangladesh
Turns Its Back on Rohingya”, 2020). While the purpose of such effort was to prevent COVID-19
from spreading, the Rohingya remain extremely vulnerable in these camps as they are often
overcrowded, and social distancing is not likely nor feasible.
Appendix 96
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(“New Op-Ed: Amid COVID-19, Bangladesh Turns Its
Back on Rohingya”, 2020)

Rohingya refugees in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,
social distance as they receive food and goods
from volunteers in April 2020. Many Rohingya
are trying to reach Malaysia from Cox’s Bazar,
Bangladesh because of the harsh conditions they
are facing there. For instance, according to the
United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), “there are almost 40,000
people per square kilometer in Cox’s Bazar,
making it forty times more crowded than the
average population density of Bangladesh”
(“New Op-Ed: Amid COVID-19, Bangladesh Turns Its Back on Rohingya”, 2020). Further, “all
latrines are communal,” and most huts are overcrowded (“New Op-Ed: Amid COVID-19,
Bangladesh Turns Its Back on Rohingya”, 2020). The reality, they state, is that social distancing
is not possible and that during this global pandemic, the Rohingya remain more vulnerable than
ever.
Appendix 97

(Hossain, 2020)

This past December 2020, the Bangladesh
government decided to move some
Rohingya immigrants in Cox’s Bazar to
Bhasan Char island in Chattogram,
Bangladesh. According to a Reuters news
report, about “1,600 Rohingya” were
moved despite “complaints by
refugees...that some were being coerced”
(Hossain, 2020).
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(Alam, 2020)

Another photo of the Rohingya being
transported to Bhasan Char island this past
December 2020 in the midst of a global
pandemic. Human rights activists called for this
transportation to halt.

Appendix 99
(Biba, 2021)

A recent photo taken in Guatemala where
thousands of Hondurans and other Central
American migrants attempted to make their way to
the United States and were met with severe
resistance on behalf of Guatemalan security forces.
This immigrant caravan is reminiscent of the one
that happened in 2018 under then President
Trump’s administration and is similarly triggered
by poverty, violence, and as mentioned above,
struggles due to climate change. Unique to this
caravan, the Central American migrants are also trying to reach the United States because of
suffering made worse by the pandemic and two hurricanes which took place in the region last
year. What is extremely important to note is that these Guatemalan security forces and other
similar forces in Mexico, Honduras, and other Latin American countries, have been trained by
United States police initiatives and United States efforts where the United States government is
attempting to expand its border control outwards, beyond its southern border (Loyd and Mountz,
2018). Clearly, a global coercive apparatus against racial minorities seems to be taking form.
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(Taylor, 2018)

Another photo of the 2018 migrant caravan that was
provoked by drought, poverty, and violence in
Honduras and other Central American countries and
caused thousands of immigrants to attempt to
immigrate to the United States. Under then
President Trump’s leadership, these asylum seekers
were turned away. It is likely that these caravans
will continue to persist as climate change continues
to get worse.
Appendix 101

(Cabrera, 2018)

A Honduran child, a part of the Central American
migrant caravan in 2018, stands in front of
Honduran police officers who may have been
trained by the United States’ police forces to crack
down on immigrants trying to reach the U.S. (Loyd
and Mountz, 2018).

Appendix 102
(Birmingham, 2020)

Enough truly is enough. Without
facing the racial narratives and
racial hierarchies promoted by
governments in each of these
countries, stark inequities and
exploitation will persist and will
prevent citizens from recognizing
each other’s shared humanity.
Racism and racial narratives are
ultimately a large force which
prevents a powerful and
collective group from demanding
more from the state like that seen
in this photo of Latinx immigrants banning together with the Black Lives Matter protests in the
United States. Activist Lilla Watson once wrote while advocating for collective liberation: “If
you have come here to help me, you are wasting your time. But if you have come because your
liberation is bound up with mine, then let us work together” (“The Origin of ‘Our Liberty Is
Bound Together’”, 2012). Globally, it is clear that our liberation from racial narratives, from
259

oppression by the state, and from centuries of dehumanizing each other, is ultimately bound
together.
…
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